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INTRODUCTION

No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice
in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if
the right to vote is undermined. I
With these words in 1964, Earl Warren, Chief Justice of the United
States Supreme Court, explained the basic principle underlying the Court's
landmark decision in Reynolds v. Sims, 2 which declared the apportionment 3 of the Alabama Legislature invalid as invidiously discriminatory
under the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.4 Only
two years earlier in Baker v. Carr5 the Supreme Court for the first time had
clearly established that federal courts can consider whether state legislative
apportionments are violative of the United States Constitution. By providing access to federal courts for persons who believe that the apportionment
of their state and local legislative bodies deprives them of equal participation in the political process and fair representation of their interests, the
Supreme Court departed sharply from prior practice by venturing into an
area that was described by some as a political thicket and a mathematical
quagmire. 6 Yet, despite the warnings that preceded these decisions and
the outcries that accompanied them,7 Chief Justice Earl Warren emphasized, on his retirement from the Court, that these decisions and their progeny were the most significant of any rendered during his tenure as Chief
8
Justice.
1. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 560 (1964) (quoting Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S.
1, 17 (1964)).
2. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
3. Throughout this Article the terms "apportionment," "reapportionment," and "redistricting" often are used interchangeably. In the technical sense the terms are not synonymous, as "apportionment" and "reapportionment" more properly refer to the result of the
process of allocating members of the legislative body among areas or political subdivisions,
while "districting" entails the actual drawing of district lines. As noted by the district court
in Kilgarlin v. Martin, 252 F. Supp. 404, 410 n.l (S.D. Tex. 1966), rev'd in part and remanded
sub nom. Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967), Congress "apportions" United States Representatives among the states, and a state actually "districts." The Supreme Court, however,
has not utilized the technical meaning of the terms. See, e.g., Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S.
315, 320 (1973), in which Mr. Justice Rehnquist refers to "state reapportionment statutes for
federal congressional districts." Some effort is made in this Article to employ the terms in
the technical sense, but on occasion, for purposes of simplicity, the terms are used interchangeably.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
5. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
6. See id. at 268 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556
(1946).
7. See generally REPRESENTATION AND MISREPRESENTATION (R. Goldwin ed. 1966);
Bonfield, Baker v. Carr- New Light on the Constitutional Guarantee of Republican Government, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 245 (1962); Dixon, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Constitution, 27 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 329 (1962); Israel, On Charting a Course Through the

Mathematical Quagmire. The Future of Baker v. Carr, 61 MICH. L. REV. 107 (1962); Neal,
Baker v. Carr.- Politicsin Search of Law, 1962 Sup. CT. REV, 252; .4 Symposium on Baker v.
Carr, 72 YALE L.J. 7 (1962).
8. N.Y. Times, June 27, 1969, at 17, col. 6; see Chu, PoliticalEfficacy: The Problems of
Money, Race, and Control in the Schools, 1977 WIs. L. REV. 989, 992 n. 16.
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By virtue of these decisions and the Federal Voting Rights Act of 1965, 9
state and local governments today confront the prospect of significant federal scrutiny of legislative and political processes that, under more traditional standards of judicial review, would be immune from challenge.
Persons representing a variety of racial, economic, or political interests
within the several states have evidenced dissatisfaction with existing or
proposed districting plans and have made use of the availability of this
federal intervention in attempts to change their state legislative bodies or
congressional delegations. Almost every state has been affected.' 0
In most states, responsibility for reapportionment resides with the state
legislature."I The purpose of this Article is to provide some guidance to
members of these legislatures to aid them in enacting reapportionment
plans that comply fully with the requirements of the United States Constitution and federal law and that will withstand federal or state court review.
With the litigious experience of the State of Texas serving as background,
this Article seeks to assist in the identification of reapportionment factors
that characterize plans that are genuinely representative and that embody
legitimate federal, state, and local goals. The United States Supreme
Court has stated on many occasions that reapportionment is primarily a
matter for legislative consideration and determination. 12 This Article is
intended to assist state legislatures in retaining this authority.
II.

REAPPORTIONMENT:

A.

AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Limited FederalIntervention

Until two decades ago, the focus of federal involvement in state elections was on the impact of federal legislation on the state's power to prescribe qualifications for federal officials and to regulate state elections for
federal offices. '3 In the late nineteenth century, the United States Supreme
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973dd-5 (1976).
10. By the end of the 1960's, at least one house in every state had been reapportioned
based on the decision in Baker v. Carr. 18 THE BOOK OF THE STATES 1970-197 1, at 57-58,

82-83 (1970). As discussed later in Part 11, see notes 82-116 infra and accompanying text,
this process of reapportioning through state court or federal intervention continued actively

through the 1970's. The mere redrawing of districts, with resulting decreases in the disparity
of population among the districts, however, does not necessarily result in more equal representation. Many writers suggest that the effect of federal intervention in the reapportionment process has not been as great as first expected. See, e.g., W. ELLIOTT, THE RISE OF
GUARDIAN DEMOCRACY (1974); Elliott, Prometheus, Proteus, Pandora, and Procrustes Unbound- The Political Consequences of Reapportionment, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 474, 481 (1970);
Smith, The Failure of Reapportionment; The Effect of Reapportionment on the Election of
Blacks to Legislative Bodies, 18 How. L.J. 639 (1975).
11. Forty states entrust at least initial authority for reapportionment to the state legislature. Eleven of these provide for some other state officer or officers to reapportion if the
legislature fails. Nine other states give the authority initially to the governor or to a board or
commission. Two other states have the reapportionment prepared initially by a board and
then submitted to the legislature. 22 THE BOOK OF THE STATES 1978-1979, at 15-16 (1978);
see Adams, A Model State Reapportionment Process. The Continuing Questfor "Fair and
Effective Representation," 14 HARV. J. LEGis. 825, 846-49 (1977).

12. See, e.g., Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 539-40 (1978).
13. During this period the United States Supreme Court generally viewed the power to
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Court established that, under article I of the United States Constitution, 14
Congress has broad authority to supervise such elections through appointment of election officers, enforcement of regulations, and imposition of
sanctions. 15 The Court further determined that state enactments in conflict
with federal law are void.16 For approximately seventy years after the establishment of this broad congressional power over elections of federal officials, however, the Court did little to augment federal involvement in this
area of state conduct.17
During this period of restraint by the Supreme Court, major changes
occurred in the population of the country. Not only did the population of
the country grow, but the distribution of the population changed significantly. Migration altered the relative population among the states as well
as between the rural and metropolitan areas within each state. These
changes caused increasingly difficult decisions for those state authorities
required by law periodically to redraw state legislative and congressional
districts on the basis of population. In many instances, the members of
state legislative bodies were in essence mandated through reapportionment
to redraw districts in a manner that would significantly reduce the legislative influence of their constituency and endanger their own chances for reelection. Consequently, many state legislatures failed to comply with applicable mandates for periodic reapportionment. With each decade of inaction, the malapportionment among districts became more severe.' 8
Congress, which in 1842 had mandated that congressional districts be
contiguous 19 and in 1872 had directed that they contain "as nearly as practicable an equal number of inhabitants, '20 was also aware of the pressures
of demographic change. 2 1 Although Congress passed reapportionment
acts incorporating these principles following each census through the Reregulate elections for federal offices as concurrent with the states' power to set qualifications
and regulate the elections within their boundaries. See, e.g., Swafford v. Templeton, 185
U.S. 487 (1902); Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58 (1900).
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
15. See Exparte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884); United States v. Gale, 109 U.S. 65
(1883); Exparte Clark, 100 U.S. 399 (1879); Exparte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
16. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964).
17. See generally Derfner, Racial Discrimination and the Right to Vote, 26 VAND. L.
REV. 523, 525-42 (1973); Padilla & Gross, Judicial Power and Reapportionment, 15 IDAHO L.
REV. 263, 271 (1979).
18. In 1962 Mr. Justice Frankfurter commented, "[11f... there is any generally prevailing feature, that feature is geographic inequality in relation to the population standard."
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 321 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see DAVID & EISENBERG, DEVALUATION OF THE URBAN AND SUBURBAN VOTE (196 1); Bone, States Attempting
to Comply with ReapportionmentRequirements, 17 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 387, 391 (1952);
Goldberg, The Statistics ofMalapportionment, 72 YALE L.J. 90 (1962); Walter, Reapportionment and Urban Representation, 195 ANNALS 11, 12-13 (1938).
19. Act of June 25, 1842, ch. 47, § 2, 5 Stat. 491. This requirement was dropped in the
Act of May 23, 1850, ch. 1,§ 25, 9 Stat. 428, but then reinstated in the Act of July 14, 1862,
12 Stat. 572.
20. Act of Feb. 2, 1872, ch. 11,§ 2, 17 Stat. 28.
21. R. MCKAY, REAPPORTIONMENT: THE LAW AND POLITICS OF EQUAL REPRESENTATION 6 (1965).
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apportionment Act of 1911,22 it failed to pass an act immediately following
the 1920 census. When the federal Reapportionment Act of 1929 finally
passed, it dropped the requirements of compactness, contiguity, and equality in population for congressional districts. 2 3 The prevalent attitude in
Congress was that districting was a matter largely or even exclusively for
the states. 24 This attitude persisted through the next two decades.
The reapportionment conflict did not reach the United States Supreme
Court until 1932. In that year the Court held that a state congressional
redistricting bill is ordinary legislation requiring a governor's signature in
order to become law. 25 The Court also upheld congressional legislation
prescribing remedies, including at-large elections, for state failure to redistrict its congressional delegation. 26 In the same year the Supreme Court
held that the provisions of the federal Reapportionment Act of 1911 requiring compactness, contiguity, and population equality among congressional districts had expired and had been superseded by the
Reapportionment Act of 1929.27 Limiting its decision to the question of

congressional intent, the Court did not determine the 28broader issue of the
impact of these requirements under the Constitution.
The Supreme Court decided the watershed reapportionment case, Colegrove v. Green,29 in 1946. In Colegrove a sharply divided Court dismissed
a suit complaining of malapportionment among Illinois' congressional districts due to the state's failure to reapportion. Writing for the Court, Justice Frankfurter warned that scrutiny of state apportionment and
districting decisions would involve the courts in a "political thicket" of
party interests, party contests, and political questions that are not justiciable. 30 Justice Rutledge, concurring in the result, cast the deciding vote for
dismissal, reasoning that while the review of apportionment was within the
subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts, it was an issue of equity so
delicate that the courts should exercise their power only in the most compelling circumstances. 3 1 During the sixteen years following the decision in
22. Act of Aug. 8, 1911, ch. 5, §§ 3-4, 37 Stat. 13; Act of Jan. 16, 1901, ch. 93, §§ 3-4, 31
Stat. 733, 734; Act of Feb. 7, 1891, ch. 116, §§ 3-4, 26 Stat. 735, 736; Act of Feb. 25, 1882, ch.
20, § 3, 22 Stat. 5-6; see Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. L, 6-8 (1932).
23. Act of June 18, 1929, ch. 28, § 22, 46 Stat. 21. The Act set membership in the House
of Representatives at 435 and provided for automatic reapportionment to be implemented
by the President if Congress failed to act. This measure, however, did not cure the malapportionment of congressional districts. In the election of 1962, 42 states elected their Representatives from districts. All but five of these states had disparities of at least 100,000
persons among their districts, with the average population per district only 500,000 persons.
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
24. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 44 & n.51 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
25. The requirement of the governor's signature arises pursuant to state rather than
federal law. Carroll v. Becker, 285 U.S. 380 (1932); Koenig v. Flynn, 285 U.S. 375 (1932);
Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932).
26. Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 374-75 (1932).
27. Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1 (1932).
28. Id. at 8.
29. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
30. Id. at 553-56.
31. Id. at 564-66.
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Colegrove, the Supreme Court was presented with numerous opportunities
to consider the merits of challenges to congressional districting plans as
well as to allegedly malapportioned local governments and state legislatures. On each occasion, however, the Court dismissed the challenges on
32
narrow, equitable grounds.
The period extending from the latter part of the nineteenth century to
the time of the landmark decisions of the Warren Court in the 1960's generally can be viewed as an era of federal restraint from involvement in
state election matters. In several instances, however, the Supreme Court
broadened the definition of the personal right to vote under federal law in
such a way as to begin to intertwine this personal right with the right of a
group to be protected from a state's illegal activity. 33 These cases, in conjunction with the earlier ones that had established the broad supervisory
power of Congress, 34 provided a foundation from which the Supreme
Court could enter the area of legislative apportionment.
B.

The 1960's

In 1962 the issue of malapportioned state legislatures again came before
the United States Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr.35 The State of Tennessee had not reapportioned its state legislature since 1901, even though its
32. Matthews v. Handley, 361 U.S. 127 (1959) (per curiam) (Court affirmed refusal to
strike down state income tax on basis that legislature malapportioned); Hartsfield v. Sloan,
357 U.S. 916 (1958) (Court refused to exercise powers of equity); Radford v. Gary, 352 U.S.
991 (1957) (per curiam) (Court affirmed district court refusal to mandamus the Governor to
call a special session and legislature or state court to apportion); Kidd v. McCanless, 352
U.S. 920 (1956) (per curiam) (Court dismissed appeal from Tennessee Supreme Court decision in which state court refused to invalidate the Tennessee reapportionment based on the
state law of remedies, ie., "de facto" officers); Cox v. Peters, 342 U.S. 936 (1952) (per
curiam) (Court dismissed challenge to state primary elections because not "state action");
Remmey v. Smith, 342 U.S. 916 (1952) (per curiam) (Court dismissed as premature); Tedesco v. Board of Supervisors, 339 U.S. 940 (1950) (per curiam) (Court found no substantial
federal question where state court refused to upset city council seats and there was a rational
justification urged for the challenged districting); South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950) (Court
refused to exercise powers of equity); MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948) (per
curiam) (Court in equity would not act to void state's requirement that there be at least
minimum support for nominees for state-wide office); Colegrove v. Barrett, 330 U.S. 804
(1947) (per curiam) (Court affirmed appeal for want of equity as exercise of discretionary
power of district court); Cook v. Fortsorr, 329 U.S. 675 (1946) (per curiam) (Court dismissed
as moot). Several federal district courts, however, assumed jurisdiction during this period,
but found the issues mooted by intervening events. See Magraw v. Donovan, 159 F. Supp.
901 (D. Minn. 1958); Perry v. Folsom, 144 F. Supp. 874 (N.D. Ala. 1956); Dyer v. Kazuhisa
Abe, 138 F. Supp. 220 (D. Hawaii 1956), rev'd, 256 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1958). While most
state courts also adopted a posture of nonintervention, there were several exceptions. See
Stiglitz v. Schardien, 239 Ky. 751, 40 S.W.2d 715 (1931); Ragland v. Anderson, 125 Ky. 141,
100 S.W. 865 (1907); Asbury Park Press, Inc. v. Woolley, 33 N.J. 1, 161 A.2d 705 (1960);
State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 440, 51 N.W. 724 (1892).
33. Padilla & Gross, supra note 17, at 277 & n.67; see United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S.
385 (1944); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268
(1939); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383
(1915); Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U.S. 487 (1902).
34. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
35. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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state constitution required reapportionment every ten years. 36 The disparity in population among the state legislative districts had reached gross
proportions, causing significant underrepresentation for the state metropolitan areas. The Supreme Court abstained no longer. It found that
Charles Baker, as a citizen of Tennessee, had standing to complain that the
apportionment of the state legislature invidiously discriminated against
him in violation of the United States Constitution, that the federal courts
had jurisdiction to consider such a claim, and that the claim was justiciable. 37 In his lengthy opinion for the majority of the Court, Justice Brennan
considered the many cases in which the Court previously had followed the
policy of nonintervention in apportionment or political matters and decided that the cases were either inapposite or generally involved issues of
equity calling for the exercise of the Court's discretion.38 Justice Brennan
explained that the holdings in the previous cases did not mean that the
issue of malapportionment was beyond the reach of the federal courts or
the scope of the United States Constitution. 39 Justice Clark's concurrence
suggested the policy behind the Court's departure from past practice when
he concluded that the voters of the state were caught in a "legislative strait
jacket"4 0 and that the federal courts had become the only recourse for a
majority of persons because the legislative policy of the members of the
Tennessee Legislature had been to rivet the present seats in the legislative
body to their own respective constituencies, even in the face of a state constitutional mandate to the contrary. 4 ' In this landmark decision the
Supreme Court swept past the issue of malapportioned congressional districts4 2 posed in Colegrove v. Green and opened the doors of the federal
courts to persons prepared to challenge the existing apportionment of their
Within nine months, suits were pending in at
own state legislative bodies.
43
least thirty-four states.
Although Baker v. Carr had established the right of a plaintiff to have
his complaint heard, it did not establish a standard for courts to follow
36. TENN. CONST. art. II, §§ 5-6.
37. 369 U.S. at 237. The Court was not unanimous in its decision to venture into the
political thicket. In a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Harlan, Justice Frankfurter accused the Court's majority of a "massive repudiation of the experience of our whole past in
dissenting).
asserting destructively novel judicial power." Id. at 267 (Frankfurter, J.,
38. 369 U.S. at 208-37.
39. Id. at 209-10.
40. Id. at 259 (Clark, J., concurring).
41. Id. at 258.
42. See Note, Challenges to Congressional Districting. After Baker v. Carr Does Colegrove v. Green Endure?, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 98 (1963). The Court formally decided the
congressional districting issue in Wesberry v. Saunders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964). See notes 48-52
infra and accompanying text.
43. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 536 n.30 (1964). By May 1964 there were suits
pending in 39 states. Actions had been consummated in three additional states. Rhyne,
State-by-State Summary of Legislative Apportionment [As of May, 1964], in LEGISLATIVE
APPORTIONMENT: KEY TO POWER 155-69 (H. Hamilton ed. 1964). For a survey of state
reapportionment actions and suits filed during this period to require reapportionment of
state legislative or congressional districts, see COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, LEGISLATIVE REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE STATES (1964) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE REAPPORTIONMENT].
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when determining these cases on their merits. Federal district courts
across the nation struggled with their new-found power.44 In 1963 the
Supreme Court provided the lower courts with some guidance when it
reached the merits of a case involving a county unit system for statewide
elections that on its face weighted the votes of certain areas of the state and
certain counties more heavily than others.4 5 The Court found that all such
weighted voting systems were unconstitutional per se. 46 Justice Douglas,
in a dictum at the close of the majority opinion, concluded: "[Tlhe conception of political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth
Amendments could mean only one thing-one person, one vole."' 47 This
phrase was to become the popular and familiar banner for the myriad of
federal court redistricting opinions that were to follow over the next fifteen
years.
In 1964 the Supreme Court for the first time considered the merits of the
apportionment of congressional districts. In Wesberry v. Sanders48 the
Court found that the population disparities among congressional districts
in the State of Georgia were so great that they invidiously discriminated
against voters in the larger districts by diluting their votes in the same
manner as if a weighted system had been in effect. 49 The Court enunciated
the constitutional principle50 for congressional redistricting that "making
equal representation for equal numbers of people [is] the fundamental goal
for the House of Representatives" 5' and "that as nearly as practicable one
man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as an52
other's."
Shortly after Wesberry, the Court addressed the issue of state legislative
malapportionment in a series of cases that had been filed in the wake of
Baker v. Carr.5 3 The cases were argued in November and December of
that year. On June 15, 1964, a sharply divided Court concluded that "as a
basic constitutional standard, the Equal Protection Clause requires that
seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned
on a population basis."' 54 Through a series of opinions, led by Reynolds v.
44. See generally LEGISLATIVE REAPPORTIONMENT, note 43 supra; Rhyne, note 43

supra. For a study of the case histories of the Baker and Reynolds suits, see R. CORTNER,
THE REAPPORTIONMENT CASES (1970).
45. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
46. Id. at 376-81. The Court, however, expressly pretermitted the issue of the degree to
which the equal protection clause limits the authority of the state legislature in designing
geographical congressional or legislative districts. Id. at 376.
47. Id. at 381 (emphasis added).
48. 376 U.S. I (1964).
49. Id. at 7.
50. The Court based its holding on the command of U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 that United
States Representatives be chosen "by the People of the several States." 376 U.S. at 17.
51. 376 U.S. at 18.
52. Id. at 7-8.
53. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
54. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964); see Auerbach, The Reapportionment
Cases.- One Person, One Vote, One Value, 1964 Sup. CT. REV. I; Comments on the Reappor-
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Sims,5 5 the Court directly invalidated the legislative apportionments present in fifteen states 56 and indirectly affected virtually all of the states. In
arriving at its far-reaching conclusion, the majority of the Court systematically set aside various rationales offered by the affected states as the
basis
57
for the existing gross malapportionment of their state legislatures.
In one of these opinions, Lucas v. Forty-Fourth GeneralAssembly, 58 two
dissenting Justices, Justices Stewart and Clark, challenged the result insofar as it ignored the "federal analogy" and required population-based apportionment in both houses of a state legislature. 59 Justice Stewart's
dissent emphasized: "The Court's draconian pronouncement, which
makes unconstitutional the legislatures of most of the 50 States, finds no
support in the words of the Constitution, in any prior decision of this
Court, or in the 175-year political history of our Federal Union. '60 Although the Reynolds Court had also rejected the federal analogy argument,
it did distinguish between the drawing of congressional and state legislative districts, and acknowledged that some divergence from a strict population standard among state legislative districts was constitutionally
permissible when based on legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational state policy. 6 ' In so doing, however, the Court left to
a case-by-case determination both the degree of disparity in population
permissible in a state apportionment and the type of state interest that
would allow such disparity.
The Supreme Court's sudden intervention in the reapportionment process prompted efforts in Congress to provide specific population guidelines
for use in congressional redistricting, to stay court proceedings, and to retionment Controversy, 63 MicH. L. REV. 209 (1964); Note, The Apportionment Cases.- An
Expanded Concept of Equal Protection, 1965 Wis. L. REV. 606.
55. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
56. On June 15, 1964, the Supreme Court invalidated the apportionment statutes of six
states in Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964) (Colorado); Roman v.
Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964) (Delaware); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964) (Virginia);
Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964) (Maryland);
WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964) (New York); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964) (Alabama). One week later, on June 22, 1964, the Supreme Court invalidated the
apportionment statutes of nine other states: Hill v. Davis, 378 U.S. 565 (1964) (per curiam)
(Iowa); Pinney v. Butterworth, 378 U.S. 564 (1964) (per curiam) (Connecticut); Hearne v.
Smylie, 378 U.S. 563 (1964) (per curiam) (Idaho); Marshall v. Hare, 378 U.S. 561 (1964) (per
curiam) (Michigan); Germano v. Kerner, 378 U.S. 560 (1964) (per curiam) (Illinois); Williams v. Moss, 378 U.S. 558 (1964) (per curiam) (Oklahoma); Nolan v. Rhodes, 378 U.S. 556
(1964) (per curiam) (Ohio); Meyers v. Thigpen, 378 U.S. 554 (1964) (per curiam) (Washington); Swarm v. Adams, 378 U.S. 553 (1964) (per curiam) (Florida).
57. See notes 257-62 infra and accompanying text.
58. 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
59. Id. at 741-43 (Clark, J., dissenting). In their dissents, Justices Stewart and Clark
objected to the requirement of population-based apportionment for both houses of state
legislatures; such a requirement ignored the analogy to the federal system in which one
house is apportioned on the basis of territory rather than population. Id. The majority
rejected this argument, demonstrated that the federal system was the result of unique historical circumstances, and stated that the so-called federal analogy was "inapposite and irrelevant to state legislative districting schemes." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 573 (1964).
60. 377 U.S. 713, 746 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
61. 377 U.S. at 579.
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lieve the federal courts entirely of jurisdiction to review reapportionment
enactments. 62 Efforts were made to amend the United States Constitution
to remove population equality as a factor in congressional redistricting. 63
None of these proposals was successful. 64
Instead of reversing the trend of federal intervention in state election
matters set by the Supreme Court, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act
of 1965.65 Section 5 of the Act 66 places on states subject to the Act the
burden of showing that changes in a standard, practice, or procedure with
respect to voting have neither the purpose nor the effect of denying the
right to vote on account of race or color. By 1966 the Supreme Court was
required to rule on the Act's constitutionality. 67 While acknowledging that
it was "an uncommon exercise of congressional power," 68 the Court upheld the Act. 69 Later in the decade, the Court found that private plaintiffs
had standing under the Act to enjoin implementation of election changes
that had not been submitted for federal approval. 70 The applicability of
the Act to reapportionment plans, however, remained uncertain until the
71
1970's.

Cases reaching the United States Supreme Court in the latter part of the
1960's required the Court to refine its view of the scope and application of
the equal population principle. The Court found that the principle applied
not only to state governments but also to local governments with legislative
functions. 72 The Supreme Court suggested, but did not firmly establish,
that a different and more rigid standard existed for determining the constitutionality of congressional districts than for state legislative districts and
overturned congressional districting plans in four states.73 Despite the ap62. R. MCKAY, supra note 21, at 204-05.
63. Id. at 209.
64. See R. MCKAY, REAPPORTIONMENT REAPPRAISED 1-12 (1968); T. O'ROURKE, REAPPORTIONMENT: LAW, POLITICS, COMPUTERS 52-57 (1969); Representation and Reappor-

tionment, CONG. Q., Aug. 1966, at 27-37. The climax in Congress came in August 1965,
when Senate Minority Leader Everett Dirksen failed to obtain the constitutionally required
vote of two-thirds of the United States Senate in favor of his resolution proposing a constitutional amendment allowing states to reapportion one house on a basis other than popula-

tion. Meanwhile, among the states, the movement to call a constitutional convention came

surprisingly close to success. By March 1967, 32 of the required 34 states had passed resolutions memorializing Congress to call a convention. The State of Texas passed such a resolution, S. Con. Res. 24, on Feb. 4, 1965.
65. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1976).
66. Id. § 1973(c).

67. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
68. Id. at 334.

69. Id. at 337. The Court again upheld the Act in City of Rome v. United States, 48
U.S.L.W. 4463 (Apr. 22, 1980).
70. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
71. See notes 276-83 infra and accompanying text.

72. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968) (selection of county commissioners

from single-member districts); Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112 (1967) (consolidation of county

government with city government). But see Sailors v. Board of Education, 387 U.S. 105
(1967).

73. E.g., Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542 (1969) (New York congressional districting
statute with 13.09% maximum deviation); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969) (Missouri congressional redistricting statute with 5.7% maximum deviation); Lucas v. Rhodes,
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parently less rigid standard applicable to state districts, the Court struck
down post-Reynolds legislative reapportionments in two states,74 emphasizing that the Constitution permitted only minor75population variances
free of any taint of arbitrariness or discrimination.
During the 1960's the Supreme Court suggested an additional means of
challenging apportionment. Under a challenge based on a failure to adhere to the equal population requirement, a state apportionment is attacked as diminishing the value of individualvotes. The Court suggested,
however, that reapportionments also may be unconstitutional if they invidiously dilute, minimize, or cancel the voting strength of racial or political
groups. Challenges on this basis in the 1960's generally arose in the context of either alleged racial gerrymandering or the use of multimember
districts. Although such challenges could be based on the fifteenth amendment if they alleged dilution of a racial voting franchise, they generally
also invoked the same fourteenth amendment right of equal protection
that serves as a constitutional foundation for the requirement of equal
population.
The seminal case concerning the dilution or cancellation of group voting
strength, Gomillion v. Lighfoot,76 actually preceded Baker and Reynolds.
In Gomillion the Supreme Court held that federal courts have jurisdiction
to consider whether a redrawing of municipal boundaries to disenfranchise
black voters was invalid under the fifteenth amendment. While not a reapportionment case, Gomillion is generally viewed as establishing the invalidity of racial gerrymanders. The majority of cases alleging dilution of
group voting rights during the 1960's, however, focused on the use of multimember districts. The Supreme Court repeatedly stated that multimember districting is not unconstitutional per se, 7 7 but suggested that it would
invalidate multimember districts when they operate to minimize or cancel
78
the voting strength of racial or political elements of the population.
Plaintiffs challenging multimember districts during the 1960's uniformly
failed to present sufficient evidence of the invidious nature of such districting schemes. 79 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court refused to foreclose the
possibility that such a challenge might be successful under different cir389 U.S. 212 (1967) (per curiam) (Ohio congressional redistricting statute with 31% maximum deviation); Duddleston v. Grills, 385 U.S. 455 (1967) (per curiam) (Indiana congressional districting statute with 20% maximum deviation).
74. Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440 (1967) (State of Florida with total maximum deviations of 25.65% among senatorial districts and 33.55% among house districts); Kilgarlin v.
Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967) (Texas House of Representatives with total maximum deviation of
26.48%).
75. Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440, 444 (1967).
76. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
77. See, e.g., Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88 (1966); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S.
433 (1965); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964).
78. See Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88 (1966).
79. See Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966);
Harrison v. Schaefer, 383 U.S. 269 (1966), mem. a,'gpercuriam Schaefer v. Thomson, 251
F. Supp. 450 (D. Wyo. 1965); Bumette v. Davis, 382 U.S. 42 (1965), mem. affg per curiai
Mann v. Davis, 245 F. Supp. 241 (E.D. Va. 1965); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965).
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cumstances. 80
The decade of the 1960's ended with most states confronting the prospect of once again redrawing legislative and congressional districts.8 ' As a
result of the Supreme Court's decisions over the decade, no state could
escape its periodic obligation to reapportion. Furthermore, no state could
redraw districts in a manner that produced gross disparities in population
among legislative districts or even moderate disparities among congressional districts. The Court's decisions, however, left many questions unanswered concerning the degree of discretion remaining with the state
legislature. Although acknowledging that some state discretion existed,
the Supreme Court had not directly upheld any state legislative reapportionment or congressional redistricting as sufficient under the equal population requirement, so the question of the allowable degree of deviation
remained unresolved. While rejecting most claims of dilution of group
voting strength, the Court continued to hold open this avenue of attack.
Therefore, no state could utilize multimember districts with absolute security. For those states subject to the Voting Rights Act, there were even
more unanswered questions regarding the impact of the Act on the reapportionment process.
C.

The 1970"s

Virtually every state had been required to redraw state legislative and
congressional districts during the 1960's.82 Following the 1970 census,
however, most renewed the redistricting process. These new districting
schemes, which had been enacted in forty-five states by the end of 1972,83
embodied significantly lower population disparities than the schemes in
use at the beginning of the preceding decade, 84 but they still encountered
opposition. The United States Attorney General, pursuant to the Voting
Rights Act, prevented several of the new enactments from taking effect. 85
In Maine and Minnesota, the governors vetoed the legislatures' legislative
reapportionment plans, causing the state supreme courts to draw the districts. 86 In several states, executive officers or state boards performed the

80. See notes 341-88 infra and accompanying text for discussion of multimember districts and gerrymandering.
81. Between the decision in Baker v. Carr and the end of the decade, at least one house
of every state legislature had been reapportioned. 18 THE BOOK OF THE STATES 1970-1971
(1970).
82. Id.
83. THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE SEVENTIES 3
(1973) [hereinafter cited as REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE SEVENTIES]. In 18 states the number

of legislators elected to one or both houses was altered. In six the change was occasioned by
a court. Several of the states made the change voluntarily to provide for a ratio of districts
in one house to those in the other and to establish districts with common boundaries between the two state legislative chambers. Id. at 9-10. See also Sixty-Seventh Minn. State
Senate v. Beens, 406 U.S. 187, 198 n. 10 (1972) (cases during the 1960's dealing with changes
in the number of legislators).
84. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 779-80 (1973) (Brennan, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part); REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE SEVENTIES, supra note 83, at 3.
85. See note 109 infra.
86. REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE SEVENTIES, supra note 83, at 3, 26.
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function when the legislature was unsuccessful. 87 Once in effect, state
plans again were challenged in state and federal court. Even as late as
1978, at least two states remained in
federal court seeking approval of state
88
legislative reapportionment plans.
Although the United States Supreme Court decided no apportionment
cases during the 1970's comparable in impact to the landmark decisions of
Baker v. Carr89 and Reynolds v. Sims, 90 it did answer some of the questions posed at the end of the previous decade regarding the principles of
equal population and nondilution of group voting strength. The Supreme
Court refined the Constitution's equal population requirement. Through
the decisions of the 1970's differing equal population standards emerged
for at least four circumstances: congressional redistricting, state legislative
reapportionment enactments, local government reapportionment, and
court-drawn districts. The Court affirmed that a broader latitude exists for
state legislative redistricting than for congressional redistricting. 9' In
drawing congressional districts the state legislature must "make a good
faith effort to achieve precise mathematical equality [and] [ulnless population variances. . . are shown to have resulted despite such effort, the State
must justify each variance, no matter how small." 92 In regard to state legislative redistricting, however, the Court held that not all minor deviations
require state justification 93 and that the presence alone of a total maximum
deviation 94 near 10% does not constitute a prima facie equal protection
violation. 95 For the first time the Court found adequate justification for a
total maximum deviation above 10% in one state legislative reapportionment, 96 but also struck down state legislative redistricting plans in two
states. 97 With regard to local governments, 9 several opinions of the Court
suggested that the smaller the total population affected by the reapportion87. The states included Oregon (Secretary of State), Texas (State Legislative Redistricting Board), Connecticut (Board), and Alaska (Governor and Advisory Reapportionment
Board). In at least two states, Michigan and Missouri, redistricting boards were unsuccessful
and the state supreme court ultimately drew the districts. Id. at 11.
88. The states were Mississippi, Mississippi v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 994 (1980), and
Texas, Graves v. Barnes (Graves IV), 446 F. Supp. 560 (W.D. Tex. 1977).
89. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
90. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
91. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 763 (1973); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735,
741-42 (1973); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 324-25 (1973).
92. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 530-31 (1969).
93. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 763 (1973); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735,
743 (1973).
94. See text following note 242 infra for discussion of the term "total maximum deviation."
95. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 763 (1973).
96. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973) (upholding Virginia house districts with 16%
maximum deviation because the districts served to preserve political subdivision boundaries).
97. See Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407 (1977) (court apportionment of state senate with
16.5% total maximum deviation and house of representatives with 19.3% total maximum
deviation in Mississippi found unacceptable); Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1 (1975) (courtordered apportionment of North Dakota Legislative Assembly, with 20% maximum deviation, found unacceptable).
98. The Court continued to identify those local governments to which the doctrine of
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ment, the higher might be the permissible percentage of deviation among
the districts. 99 By the end of the decade, the Supreme Court also had
made clear that once a federal court declares an existing apportionment
scheme unconstitutional and is required to devise and impose a plan, the
court will be "held to stricter standards. . . than a state legislature."l°° As
a result, the courts "must ordinarily achieve the goal of population equality with little more than de minimis variation."'' °
Early in the decade the Court issued its first decision declaring a multimember district invalid. 02 In the 1960's,10 3 and on two occasions earlier
in the 1970's,10 4 the Court had rejected challenges to legislatively drawn
multimember districts, reaffirming that such devices are not unconstitutional per se. In 1973, however, the Supreme Court upheld a lower court
decision requiring the use of single-member districts in lieu of multimember districts where it was shown that the multimember districts invidiously
discriminated against black and Hispanic voting populations. 10 5 As the
decade progressed, the Court distinguished multimember districts drawn
by state or local governments from those drawn as part of a federal court
order. While upholding the principle established in the 1960's that legislatively drawn multimember districts were not unconstitutional per se, '0 6 the
Court enunciated the additional general principle that, absent persuasive
justification to the contrary, a court-drawn plan should prefer single-member districts over multimember districts. 07
During the 1970's, section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965108 had
significant impact on state reapportionments. Not only did the United
States Attorney General lodge objections under the Act to several state
reapportionment enactments, 0 9 but the Supreme Court interpreted the
one man, one vote applied. E.g., Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970); see
Burton v. Whittier Regional Vo-Tech. School, 587 F.2d 66 (1st Cir. 1978).
99. E.g., Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 185 (1971) (11.9% deviation among county supervisors districts found permissible); see White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 793 (1973). But see
Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1,25 (1975) (in small populations "each individual vote may be
more important to the result of an election").
100. Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 414 (1977).
101. Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27 (1975).
102. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
103. See notes 76 & 78 supra and accompanying text.
104. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 125 (1971).
105. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973). In 1975 the Court heard argument on the
constitutionality of additional multimember districts in Texas, but remanded the case for a
determination of mootness. White v. Regester, 422 U.S. 935 (1975).
106. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 143 (1971); see notes 77-78 supra and accompanying text.
107. Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 415 (1977); East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636, 639 (1976); Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 18 (1975); Connor v. Williams, 404 U.S. 449, 450 (1972). In one case the Court upheld a court-drawn multimember
districting scheme as the only effective means to deal with a unique local problem. Mahan
v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973).
108. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973dd-5 (1976).
109. The Attorney General objected to reapportionments in these four states: Georgia
(an objection was made on the basis of multimember districts and racial gerrymanders; the
state drew another plan, which also was found objectionable; the Attorney General then
filed suit to prevent enforcement of the plan, resulting in Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S.
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breadth of the Act in several decisions. In Georgia v. United StatesI10 the
Court affirmed that reapportionment plans were election changes that
must be submitted for federal approval before taking effect. Distinguishing between plans ordered by a court and those enacted by a state or local
legislative body, the Supreme Court found that plans imposed by court
order are not subject to the Voting Rights Act."' In 1977 the Court rebuked an effort by the State of Texas for review of the determination by
federal officials that the Act applied to the state."l 2 The decision left states
and other jurisdictions solely to the Act's "bail-out" provisions for exemption. 113 The Court also established that the Act did not permit reapportionments that "would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial
minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral
franchise."1 4 In a decision with great potential significance for reapportionment in the 1980's, the Court in 1977 recognized that the Constitution
does not prevent state legislatures from deliberately creating or preserving
racial majorities in particular districts in order to ensure that its reapportionment complies with the Voting Rights Act.' '5
Despite the extensive litigation of the 1960's and the efforts of state legislatures to enact constitutional reapportionments at the beginning of the
1970's, all or part of the state legislative districts in use in 1978 in twenty
states were the product of court-ordered redistricting plans."l 6 Now, as the
final clashes of the reapportionment battles of the 1970's are ending, state
and local governments are awakening to the realization that within one
year the federal decennial census will provide new evidence of the need to
526 (1973)); Louisiana (an objection was made on the basis of multimember districts and
racial gerrymanders, but the district lines subsequently were drawn by federal courts; see
Taylor v. McKeithen, 499 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1974)); South Carolina (an objection was made
to the senatorial districts on the basis of multimember districts; the state plan shortly thereafter was struck down by a federal district court as violative of the Constitution; Twiggs v.
West, No. 70-1106 (D.S.C. Apr. 7, 1972)); Virginia (an initial objection on the basis of multimember districts was withdrawn, but the state plan subsequently was struck down by a
federal district court, which then was reversed in part by the Supreme Court in Mahan v.
Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973)). Two states, Mississippi and Alabama, covered by § 5 in 1971,
escaped review by the Attorney General because they were under an order of a federal
district court. Halpin & Engstrom, Racial Gerrymandering and Southern State Legislative
Redistricting: Attorney General Determinations Under the Voting Rights Act, 22 J. PUB. L. 37

(1973).
110. 411 U.S. 526 (1973).
111. Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690, 691 (1971).
112. Briscoe v. Bell, 432 U.S. 404 (1977).
113. See text accompanying note 440 infra.
114. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976); see City of Richmond v. United
States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975); City of Petersburg v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 1021 (D.D.C.
1972), afJ'dmem., 410 U.S. 962 (1973).
115. United Jewish Organizations, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977); see notes 380-88
infra and accompanying text.
116. In several of the states, the courts only drew the districts for one house of the legislature or a portion of the districts in one house. Some state courts drew the plans pursuant to
state law as the agency authorized to reapportion when the state legislature failed to act.
The states with redistricting plans at least partially drawn by a state or federal court are
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon,
Texas, Virginia, and Washington. 22 THE BOOK OF THE STATES 1978-1979, at 15-16 (1978).
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reapportion again. Undoubtedly, some are optimistic that the real controversies and legal battles already have been fought and that most states will
escape significant or prolonged legal battles in the next decade. Yet, in
view of the increased level of organization, political awareness, and litigiousness of individuals and groups throughout our society, every effort at
congressional, state, or local reapportionment must be predicated upon an
awareness of the near inevitability of state court or federal scrutiny of any
redistricting plan that the political process produces.
III.

REAPPORTIONMENT IN TEXAS: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

A.

1836-1961." Apportionment and the Texas Constitution

The requirements of state law governing apportionment of the Texas
Senate and House of Representatives always have been embodied in the
Texas Constitution. Four general themes have persisted through each of
Texas's six constitutions: required periodic reapportionment, utilization of
counties as the basic building blocks for districts, districts of contiguous
territory, and apportionment according to population or electors. No
Texas constitution, however, has prescribed either standards or procedures
for drawing congressional districts.
The Constitution of the Republic of Texas required that senators 1be
17
elected from districts as nearly equal in "free population" as practical
and that representatives be apportioned among the counties roughly according to population, with each county entitled to at least one representative. 118 The State of Texas Constitution of 1845 for the first time provided
for periodic reapportionment when it required reapportionment every
eight years following an enumeration by the state of all free inhabitants.' 9
The 1845 Constitution also instituted the requirement of contiguity in senatorial districts and changed the basis for apportionment of the senate
from population to the number of qualified electors. 120 The Constitution
of 1866 required a census every ten years. 12 1 The Constitution of 1869
22
provided for two to four representatives to be elected from each district. 1
The present Texas Constitution, adopted in 1876, requires the Texas
Legislature to reapportion after each federal decennial census.' 2 3 The
state is to be divided into thirty-one senatorial districts of contiguous territory according to the number of qualified voters, with no single county
117.
TEXAS:

TEX. CONST. art.

I, § 7 (1836). Seegenerall,

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF
147 (G. Braden ed. 1977) [hereinaf-

AN ANNOTATED AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

ter cited as TEXAS CONSTITUTION ANNOTATED].

118. TEX. CONST.
119. TEX. CONST.
117, at 157.
120. TEX. CONST.
note 117, at 147.
121. TEX. CONST.
117, at 157.
122. TEX. CONST.
117, at 149.
123. TEX. CONST.

art. I, § 5 (1836).
art. III, § 29 (1845); TEXAS CONSTITUTION ANNOTATED, supra note
art. III, §§ 10, 13 (1845); TEXAS CONSTITUTION ANNOTATED, supra
art. III, § 28 (1866); TEXAS CONSTITUTION ANNOTATED, supra note
art. III, § 40 (1869); TEXAS CONSTITUTION ANNOTATED, supra note
art. III, § 28.
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entitled to more than one senator. 124 The constitution further requires that
the 150 members of the house of representatives must be apportioned
among the several counties according to population. 125 Each county that
has sufficient population is entitled to be formed into a separate district
and to elect a representative. 126 Two or more whole contiguous counties
may be combined to form a representative district but only when necessary
to achieve a district with sufficient population. 127 Surplus population from
a county already entitled to one or more representatives may be joined
with any other contiguous county or counties to provide a district of suffi128
cient population.
The Texas Legislature apportioned itself in accordance with these state
constitutional provisions after each decennial census through 1921.129
Then in 1931, the legislature found itself unable to agree on an enactment
redrawing existing legislative districts.' 30 Legislators, the great majority of
whom were elected from districts composed essentially of rural counties in
the central and eastern portions of the state, were unable to agree on a new
apportionment based on population or electors. In part, the conflict was
regional.' 3 1 Primarily, however, it was urban-rural. The unavoidable result of redistricting in accordance with these constitutional requirements
would have been to combine these rural counties into fewer representative
districts, while increasing the number of legislators elected from the state's
124. Id. § 25.
125. Id. § 26.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. The Texas Legislature failed to redraw senatorial districts in 1901, but drew new
ones in 1911 and 1921. An examination of the 1921 apportionment of the senate fails to
disclose whether the legislature relied on population or numbers of electors as its base, or
perhaps "no formula at all except the wishes of the senators." W. CHUMLEA, THE POLITICS
OF LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT IN TEXAS-1921-1957 (1959) [hereinafter cited as APPORTIONMENT IN TEXAS] (dissertation available through Texas Legislative Reference Library,
Texas Capitol). The San Antonio Express described the apportionments as "political and
geographical freaks" and the product of "selfishness and prejudices." Id. at 71. Reapportionments in 1911 and 1921 did not come easily. In each instance the governor called the
Texas Legislature into at least one special session to pass the necessary legislation. The
rearrangement of legislative districts in 1921 was particularly protracted and acrimonious.
See generally APPORTIONMENT IN TEXAS, supra. The 1921 bill apportioning the Texas Senate is noteworthy for its delayed effective date, 1924, to allow incumbent senators to serve
out their terms without effect. The bill apportioning the Texas House of Representatives in
1921 (1921 Tex. Laws, 37th Leg., 2d C.S., ch. 6) inadvertantly left Swisher County out of any
district. The Texas Supreme Court on certified questions ruled that the legislature had intended to include it in the 120th legislative district. Smith v. Patterson, I ll Tex. 525, 242
S.W. 749 (1922). The court agreed, however, that if the 1921 act had indeed deprived the
citizens of Swisher County of their right of suffrage, the act would have been unconstitutional and invalid.
130. See generally APPORTIONMENT IN TEXAS, supra note 129, at 82-126.
13 1. As the western and southern portions of Texas were settled and grew in population,
they struggled with east and central Texas for legislative seats. For example, the population
of Cameron and Hidalgo Counties in south Texas almost tripled between 1910 and 1920.
APPORTIONMENT IN TEXAS, supra note 129, at 36. The counties of the high-plains in west
Texas increased almost fivefold during this same period. Id. at 37. In contrast, some counties in the northeastern and central portions of the state showed only slight population increases or even lost population. Id. at 37-38.
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western, southern, and metropolitan areas. 132 In 1936 an amendment to
the state constitution was proposed and adopted, adding section 26a to
article III and thus restricting the number of state representatives possible
for any one county. 133 Section 26a represented an active retreat from the
mandate of apportionment on the basis of population that had existed for
the house since the Constitution of the Republic. 34 Despite the adoption
of section 26a, which guaranteed that the state metropolitan areas would
be underrepresented in any subsequent apportionment of the house of representatives, the Texas Legislature remained unable to agree on a bill
35
redrawing either house or senatorial districts.1
In 1948 the legislature amended section 28 of article III of the Texas
Constitution 36 to provide that if the Texas Legislature failed to reapportion the state legislative districts in its first regular session after a federal
decennial census, a State Legislative Redistricting Board, composed of five
state officers, 137 would convene to district the state according to the applicable provisions of the state constitution. Furthermore, the supreme court
could mandamus this board to carry out its function.138 Following adoption of this constitutional amendment, the Texas Legislature, in 1951, enacted its first state legislative reapportionment bills in twenty-nine years. 139
Ten years later, it again enacted state legislative apportionment
bills in the
0
regular session following the decennial census.14
The Texas Legislature encountered similar difficulties during the first
half of this century in redrawing congr6ssional districts. The legislature
failed to pass any congressional redistricting legislation between 1917 and
132. See generally APPORTIONMENT IN TEXAS, supra note 129.
133. TEX. CONST. art. III, § 26a.
134. Section 25 of art. III, however, had limited counties to no more than one senator

since the constitution was adopted in 1876.
135. APPORTIONMENT IN TEXAS, supra note 129, at 82-165.

In 1947 Mr. Philip A.

Schraub was certified by the county judge of Nueces County as that county's duly elected
state representative, but there was no legislative district prescribed by statute encompassing

only Nueces County. Instead, the 1921 apportionment had combined the county with two
other counties in a single district from which a person other than Schraub had been elected.
Schraub protested that the Texas Constitution provided that each county with sufficient population should elect a representative and that Nueces County now had sufficient population,

but was denied a representative because the legislature refused to reapportion. The attorney
general ruled that Schraub could not be seated. TEX. ATr'y GEN. Op. No. V-53 (1952).

136. In Texas the legislature is charged with proposing amendments to the state constitution. TEX. CONST. art. XVII, § 1. This amendment, proposed in S.J. Res. 2, 50th Legis.,
Reg. Sess. (1947), was approved by the legislature by the narrowest of margins. Requiring
approval by two-thirds of the membership of each house of the legislature, it passed the
senate 23-7. TEX, S.J. 1246 (1947). In the house it initially fell one vote short when it was
engrossed by a vote of 99-35. Following an intensive campaign by Governor Beauford
Jester, W.O. Reed, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, cast the deciding vote in
favor of passage. APPORTIONMENT IN TEXAS, supra note 129, at 160-61.
137. The officers are the Lieutenant Governor, Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Comptroller of Public Accounts, Attorney General, and Commissioner of the General Land
Office. TEX. CONST. art. III, § 28.
138. Id.
139. 1951 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 30, § 1, at 480; 1951 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 27, § 1, at 41.
140. 1961 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 261, § 1, at 544; 1961 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 256, § 1, at 544.
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1933.' 4 1 The bill enacted in 1933 remained in effect until 1957, when only
4 2 Efforts to pass legislation after the
one significant change was made.'
43
1960 census were unsuccessful.'
B.

1962-1979." The Years of Turmoil

Although the Texas Legislature modified its congressional districts in
1957 and redrew its state legislative districts in 1951 and 1961 roughly on
the basis of population, a significant disparity in population existed among
the districts. In 1962 Texas's legislative and congressional districting
schemes, like those of many states, embodied significant underrepresentation for metropolitan areas. An effort in state court to withhold the salaries of the Legislative Redistricting Board because it did not act to correct
the imbalance in the 1961 reapportionment was unsuccessful. 44 A subsequent suit filed in state court challenged the use of multimember districts
as a denial of black voting rights.145 The petitioner emphasized that no
black had served in the Texas Legislature since the 1880's. 146 The Texas
court held that neither the Texas Constitution nor the United States Constitution prevents the use of multimember districts by requiring that counties with two or more representatives be divided into single-member
districts.147 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Texas 148court because of suits filed in federal court and subseqdent legislation.
The 1962 Supreme Court decision in Baker v. Carr149 provided Texans
with the opportunity to challenge state apportionment plans in federal
court. Although aware of the decision, the Governor of Texas did not call
a special session of the Texas Legislature to consider redistricting. 50 Litigants, therefore, filed suits in federal court to declare the existing state legislative and congressional districts invalid. In 1963 a three-judge federal
district court in Bush v. Martin' 5' struck down the state congressional dis141. See Bush v. Martin (Bush I), 224 F. Supp. 499, 506 n.13 (S.D. Tex. 1963), aI/'dper
curiam, 376 U.S. 222 (1964).
142. 224 F. Supp. at 507. The sole significant change of the 1957 act was the division of
Harris County into two districts. Id.
143. Id.
144. Miller v. James, 366 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1963, no writ). The petitioner, Giles E. Miller, a resident of Dallas, alleged that the legislature had failed to apportion on the basis of qualified electors or population "as nearly as may be practicable." Id. at
120. The court avoided the merits of the charge by finding that even if the allegations were
proven and the board was under a duty to act, the court could not withhold the board
members' salaries because the legislature had failed to provide a means for making such
deductions. Id. at 121.
145. Hainsworth v. Martin, 386 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin, writ refd n.r.e.),
vacated as moot, 382 U.S. 109 (1965).
146. 386 S.W.2d at 204.
147. Id. at 205.
148. 382 U.S. 109 (1965).
149. 369 U.S. 186 (1962); see notes 35-43 supra and accompanying text.
150. Bush v. Martin (Bush I), 224 F. Supp. 499, 509 (S.D. Tex. 1963), af'dper curiam,
376 U.S. 222 (1964).
151. 224 F. Supp. 499 (S.D. Tex. 1963), affdper curiam, 376 U.S. 222 (1964).

SO UTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 34

tricting plan, which had been enacted in 1957, because of "spectacular"
disparities in population.152 The ratio between the districts of highest and
lowest population was 4.4 to 1,153 with the districts of excessive population
primarily located in the metropolitan areas. The district court order invalidating the legislation and requiring an at-large election of all twenty-three
congressmen unless the legislature enacted an acceptable plan, was stayed
by the circuit justice, 1 54 pending the resolution of Wesberry v. Sanders.155
In 1964 the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision, 56 but
subsequently, in view of the exigencies of time, the district court modified
its order to permit the 1964 congressional election to be carried out on the
basis of the 1957 legislation.' 5 7 In 1965 the same three-judge federal court
that earlier had struck down Texas's congressional districts declared sections 25 and 26a of the Texas Constitution violative of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and
invalidated the 1961 legislation apportioning state senatorial and representative districts.' 5 8 The ratio among the senatorial districts was 8 to 1, while
it was 2 to 1 among districts in the house of representatives. The state did
not appeal.
Confronted with invalid state legislative and congressional districts, the
legislature in 1965 passed new districting legislation. 59 Litigants again
challenged the reapportionment bills before the three-judge federal
court,' 60 alleging that the congressional districting plan not only contained
62
excessive population disparities,161 but also discriminated against cities,'
the Gulf Coast, 163 and the Republican Party. 164 In January 1966 the court
upheld the congressional districts as a "substantial good faith effort [by
152. 224 F. Supp. at 505.
153. This ratio was over twice that present at any time prior to 1940. The district with

the highest population in the United States was district 5 in the Dallas metropolitan area,
with 951,527 citizens. See id. at 506-07.
154. See Bush v. Martin (Bush 11), 251 F. Supp. 484, 489 (S.D. Tex. 1966). As a result, in
1963 there were 22 congressmen elected from districts and one at-large.
155. 376 U.S. 1 (1964); see notes 48-52 supra and accompanying text.
156. Martin v. Bush, 376 U.S. 222 (1964).
157. See Bush v. Martin (Bush II), 251 F. Supp. 484, 490 (S.D. Tex. 1966) (order entered

on Apr. 1, 1964).
158. Kilgarlin v. Martin, No. 63-H-390 (S.D. Tex. Jan. il, 1965) (summary judgment),
reprinedin 252 F. Supp. 404, 456 (1966).
159. 1965 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 342 (state senate); 1965 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 349 (congres-

sional); 1965 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 351 (state representative). In Texas the first reapportionment bills contained both house and senatorial districts' together. Since 1892, however, the
legislature has passed separate bills. See TEX. ATT'Y GEN. Op. No. 0-4899 (1943).
160. Bush v. Martin (Bush II), 251 F. Supp. 484 (S.D. Tex. 1966).
161. Id. at 498-500.
162. fd. at 500-02.
163. Id. at 503-06.

164. Id. at 513-15. The Republican complaint centered on the disposition of portions of
Dallas and Bexar Counties that were not included in the primary congressional districts for
those counties. The remnants of Dallas County, which were described by the Republican
plaintiffs as a "vigorous Republican stronghold of demonstrated outspoken, effective, militant, articulate conservatives," had been joined with other, more rural, counties in an alleged
attempt to submerge the Republican minority when it could have been combined with other,

more kindred areas, to form a different district. 1d. at 513-14. The allegation concerning
Bexar County was essentially the same. Id.
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Texas] toward the constitutional goal of population equality,"' 16 5 but was
highly critical of the 19.4% total maximum deviation existing among the
districts.' 66 The court was unwilling to find that the division and shifting
of counties shown by plaintiffs was sufficient to constitute invidious discrimination in the form of political or regional gerrymandering. 167 As a
result of its concern over whether the plan was the best possible one, how16
ever, the court retained jurisdiction to review subsequent legislation. s
One month later, the three-judge court in Kilgarlin v. Martin169 upheld a
large part of the new state legislative reapportionment plan. Plaintiffs had
not challenged the senate districting, but attacked the house districting on
the grounds that it violated the requirements of equal population, diluted
the voting strength of racial and political elements through the use of multimember and flotorial districts1 70 and constituted an arbitrary and capricious "crazy-quilt" apportionment.' 7 1 The court found the plan
constitutional except for the flotorial districts, which were violative of the
requirement for equal population. On appeal, the United States Supreme
Court not only agreed with the district court that the flotorial districts were
unconstitutional but went a step further and found that the remaining state
representative districts were invalid as well. 172 The Court expressed doubt
that the 25% total maximum deviation in population among the districts
was within the range of "minor" deviations that the Court earlier had suggested might be justified by local policies of maintaining established political subdivision boundaries. 173 The Supreme Court, however, affirmed that
portion of the decision
of the district court denying the claims of dilution
174
and gerrymandering.
Because the district court in Kilgarlin had allowed the Texas Legislature
165. Id. at 488.
166. Id. at 506-13.
167. Id. at 500-06, 513-15. State Representative Neil Caldwell of Brazoria County impressed the court with his argument that on the basis of history and community interests, his
county should not have been split. The court did not feel, however, that the complaint was
of constitutional significance. Id. at 514.
168. Id. at 517.
169. 252 F. Supp. 404 (S.D. Tex. 1966).
170. The Kilgarlin court explained that:
Provision for flotorial districts is contained in Art. 3, Sec. 26 of the Texas
Constitution. As used in Texas, a flotorial district is a voting district entitled
to one Representative, but is composed of more than one county, one of which
has additional representation in another district. As an example, in H.B. 195
Smith County and Rusk County receive one Representative as District 15F,
while Smith County alone receives another Representative as District 14. By
contrast, a multi-member district consists of one county only, and elects more
than one Representative from that district. The United States Supreme Court
utilized the spelling "floterial" in Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. at 686, 84 S.Ct. at
1445.
Id. at 418 n.19.
171. Id. at 411-12.
172. Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967).
173. Id. at 123; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 578-79 (1964). The Court stated that
since Texas policy allowed the violation of county lines in order to surmount undue population variances, it was unnecessary to reach the issue presented by Reynolds. 386 U.S. at 123.
174. 386 U.S. at 121.
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until 1967 to equalize the votes of citizens living in flotorial districts, 175 the
1966 elections were carried out according to the 1965 legislation. The legislature drew new districts in 1967,176 and the elections, of 1968 were carried out according to the new legislation. In 1969 the Texas Legislature
acted to eliminate the more egregious population disparities,' 77 and the
1970 elections were conducted under the amended plan.
The State of Texas had spent most of the 1960's in federal court litigating the validity of its state legislative and congressional districts. Yet, the
turmoil of the 1960's served only to set the stage for the battle that was to
occur after the 1970 census. The growth and shift in location of the population in Texas evidenced by the 1970 census required the Texas Legislature to redraw house, senatorial, and congressional seats in 1971. Various
interests competed throughout the regular session of the legislature that
year. Charges of unfairness and vindictiveness were directed at the presiding officer of the Texas House of Representatives. 7 8 When the legislature
on June 1, 1971, was forced by state law to adjourn, it had succeeded only
in passing a bill apportioning the house of representatives.179 Senatorial
and congressional districts remained unchanged.
Since the legislature had failed to act during its regular session to reapportion the senate, the task passed to the State Legislative Redistricting
Board under article III, section 28 of the Texas Constitution. The board
does not have jurisdiction to draw congressional districts, however, so the
Governor of Texas immediately reconvened the legislators in special session. Legislation drawing the twenty-four congressional districts was
adopted on June 4, 1971, and signed by the governor on June 17, 1971.180
The battle that had been waged in the legislature over state legislative
districts immediately shifted to the State Legislative Redistricting Board
and to court. Republican officials' 8 ' filed suit in state court challenging
the constitutionality of the bill apportioning the house of representatives.
The state district court declared the bill invalid as violative of the Texas
Constitution because it failed-to adhere closely enough to the requirement
175. Kilgarlin v. Martin, 252 F. Supp. 404, 411 (S.D. Tex. 1966), rev'd in part and remandedsub nom. Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967). The United States Supreme Court
expressly approved that delay. Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120, 121 (1967).
176. Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 531, § 1,at 1187.

177. 1969 Tex. Laws, ch. 808, §§ 1-6, at 2403; 1969 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 733, §§ 1-4, at
2128-30.
178. It was alleged that the Speaker of the Texas House of Representatives, Gus Mutscher, tried during reapportionment to pair liberal Democrats or to put Republicans or liberal Democrats into hostile districts. H. KATZ, SHADOW ON THE ALAMO 253-54 (1972). See
also Adams, A Model State Reapportionment Process.- The Continuing Questfor "Fair and
Effective Representation," 14 HARV. J. LEGiS. 825, 841 & n.62 (1977). See generally, J.
ANDERSON, R. MURRAY & E. FARLEY, TEXAS POLITICS 104-13 (1979); Smith, Where's My
Line, TEXAS MONTHLY, A POLITICAL READER 226-28 (1978).

179. 1971 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 981, §§ 1-6, at 2974.
180.

1971 Tex. Gen. Laws, 1st Spec. Sess., ch. 12, §§ 1-30, at 38-41.

181. State Representative Tom Craddick of Midland County led the Republicans. The
state district court was in Midland County.
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for preserving counties intact. 82 The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the
decision in August 1971.183 Meanwhile, the Legislative Redistricting
Board had convened to apportion the Texas Senate, but refused to redraw
representative districts even after the Texas Supreme Court had invalidated the bill passed by the legislature. The board's refusal prompted a
Texas state senator 84 to bring an original action in the Texas Supreme5
8
Court to compel the board to apportion both the house and the senate.
The senator also asked the court to declare the state's 1967 apportionment
and its 1969 amendments unconstitutional, to enjoin elections, to declare
that multimember districts could not be used, and to retain jurisdiction
until a valid apportionment scheme had been enacted.' 86 The Texas
Supreme Court rejected such a broad reaching remedy, 8 7 but declared
that the State Legislative Redistricting Board had a duty to apportion not
only the Texas Senate but also the Texas House of Representatives, once
the legislative enactment had been declared invalid.' 8 8 Pursuant to the
order of the court, the Legislative Redistricting Board met and accomplished a reapportionment of the senate by October 15, 1971, and of the
house by October 21, 1971.'89 The redistricting plan for the house of representatives divided the state into ninety single-member districts and
eleven multimember districts, with the multimember districts located in all
of the metropolitan counties in the state except Harris County. 90
As the clashes in state court came to an end in late 1971, the battle
shifted to the federal courts. The first challenge in federal court was directed at Senate Bill I (S.B. 1),19 1 which prescribed congressional districts.
The districts had a maximum deviation of 2.43% above and 1.7% below the
ideal of 466,530 persons.' 92 A three-judge federal district court struck
down the state enactment as containing excessive deviation in population
and immediately adopted one of several alternative reapportionment plans
182. See Smith v. Craddick, 471 S.W.2d 375, 375-76 (Tex. 1971) (discussing unreported

district court opinion).
183. Id. at 376.
184. State Senator Oscar Mauzy of Dallas earlier had announced his opposition to the
reapportionment of the house of representatives when the bill passed the Texas Senate because, in his opinion, it contained an unconstitutionally high population variance. TEX. S.J.
2010 (1971).
185. Mauzy v. Legislative Redistricting Bd., 471 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. 1971).
186. Id. at 575. Commissioner of the General Land Office, Bob Armstrong, refused to
sign the board's report because in his opinion the senatorial districts in Harris County operated to dilute black voting strength.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 574.
189. See Graves v. Barnes (Graves I), 343 F. Supp. 704, 711 (W.D. Tex.), aff dsub nom.
Archer v. Smith, 409 U.S. 808 (1972), modified sub nom. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755
(1973).
190. The metropolitan counties with multimember districts were Dallas, Bexar, Tarrant,
McLennan, Lubbock, Travis, Jefferson, Hidalgo, El Paso, Neuces, and Jefferson. The
United States Supreme Court erroneously indicated in White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 758
(1973), that the Texas apportionment included only 79 single-member districts.
191. 1971 Tex. Gen. Laws, 1st Spec. Sess., ch. 12, §§ 1-30, at 38-41.
192. See White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 785 (1973).
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offered by the parties to the Suit.1 9 3 The court also invited the possibility
of a special legislative session to redraw the districts before the impending
primary elections, but the Governor refused. 194 Instead, the state appealed
the district court decision, with the result that the court's plan was stayed
by the Supreme Court' 95 and the 1972 congressional elections were carried
out under the plan in S.B. 1. Within a year, however, the Supreme Court
had heard the merits of the case and decided that the plan embodied in
S.B. 1 was indeed violative of the United States Constitution. 196 The
Court found, however, that the district court had erred by adopting the
197
wrong plan from among those alternatives offered to it by the parties.
On remand, the district court adopted a second plan consistent with the
Supreme Court's opinion. 19 8 In 1975 the legislature essentially codified
the court's plan and congressional elections during the remainder of the
decade were carried out pursuant to that plan. 19 9
The first federal suit challenging state legislative districts was filed on
October 22, 1971, only seven days after the Legislative Redistricting Board
had adopted the plan apportioning the Texas Senate. 2°° By December
1971, four separate suits, one in each federal district in the state, were
pending, challenging all state representative districts and the senatorial
districts in Bexar County and Harris County. 20 ' The cases were consolidated and a three-judge court was constituted. 20 2 The suits alleged excessive population deviation and dilution of racial, Republican party, and
other political elements' voting strength through the use of multimember
districts and racial and political gerrymandering. 20 3 In Graves v. Barnes204
193. Id. at 788-89.
194. Id. at 789 n.7.
195. Bullock v. Weiser, 404 U.S. 1065 (1972).
196. White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 797 (1973).
197. Including the plan present in S.B. 1, the court had four alternatives. One of these,
offered by the chairman of the Republican Party in Bexar County, was not pressed on appeal. The Supreme Court held that the district court had erred in adopting plan "C," which
was based purely on population, instead of plan "B," which struck a balance between the
desires of the legislature and the demand for equal population. Id. at 793-97.
198. See Weiser v. White, 505 F.2d 912, 914 (5th Cir. 1975).
199. 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 537, §§ 1-29, at 1390-94.
200. Graves v. Barnes (Graves I), 343 F. Supp. 704, 708-10 (W.D. Tex. 1972), afdin
part, rev'd in part sub nom. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
201. Id.
202. Ordered on Dec. 13, 1971, by John R. Brown, Chief Judge of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Judge Brown had been presiding judge of the threejudge court that had struck down the state's redistricting plans in the 1960's. The judges
composing the three-judge district court were not ecstatic about the prospect of undertaking
a review of the state districting efforts. The court observed:
We are once again in the Texas sector of the political thicket of legislative
redistricting and required to contour the condition of the individual trees as
well as the physiography of the forest as we explore for "crazy quilts,"
"groves," contiguity, compactness, specie, motivation in planting, and other
possible impedimenta to constitutionality in redistricting. In ten years of wandering about this political thicket, we have not yet found the burning bush of
final explanation.
343 F. Supp. at 708.
203. Id. at 709-10.
204. (Graves I), 343 F. Supp. 704 (W.D. Tex. 1972), a d in part,rev'd in part sub nom.
White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973).

19801

REAPPORTIONMENT

the court upheld the senatorial districting plans, but invalidated the house
districting plan as containing an unconstitutionally high variance in population among its districts. In addition, the court ordered implementation
of single-member districts in Bexar and Dallas Counties because the court
found that the multimember districts in these two counties diluted black
and Hispanic voting strength. Challenges to the nine remaining multimember districts in the house were not pressed at the hearing in 1972, but
remained pending. The district court gave the Texas Legislature until
1973 to reapportion the house of representatives, but immediately adopted
a plan for single-member districts in Bexar and Dallas Counties.2 0 5 The
state appealed, but the United States Supreme Court refused to stay the
district court order for immediate implementation of single-member districts in Bexar and Dallas Counties. 20 6 As a result, the state representative
elections in 1972 were carried out under the redistricting plan of the Legislative Redistricting Board20 7modified by the court's reapportionment of Dallas and Bexar Counties.
In 1973 the United States Supreme Court in Whie v. Regester 20 8 reversed the district court with regard to excessive population deviation
among Texas's house districts. Thus the configuration of most of these
primarily nonmetropolitan districts was established for the remainder of
the decade. 20 9 The Supreme Court had earlier upheld the district court's
ruling regarding the constitutionality of the senatorial districts, 2 10 thereby
allowing the senatorial districts drawn by the Legislative Redistricting
Board to stand. In Regester the Supreme Court also upheld the district
court's finding that the multimember districts in Dallas and Bexar Counties unconstitutionally diluted the voting strength of minorities and should
be replaced by single-member districts. 2 1' The plans drawn by the district
court for these districts and used for the elections in 1972 were enacted into
law in 1975212 and continued to be used for the remainder of the decade.
The question remaining was whether the other nine metropolitan multimember districts also were unconstitutional and needed to be replaced.
In 1974 the three-judge district court reconvened and considered the
21 3
constitutionality of the nine remaining multimember districts in Texas.
The court required seven of the counties to be divided into single-member
districts. The multimember districts in Hildalgo and Galveston Coun205. 343 F. Supp. at 737.
206. Graves v. Barnes, 405 U.S. 1201, 1204 (1972).
207. See note 190 supra and accompanying text.
208. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).

209. These single-member state representative districts drawn in 1971 by the State Legislative Redistricting Board later were codified, with some boundary adjustments, along with
the districts drawn by the federal court for Bexar and Dallas Counties. 1975 Tex. Gen.
Laws, ch. 727, § 1, at 2358.
210. Archer v. Smith, 409 U.S. 808 (1972).
211. 412 U.S. at 764-65.
212. 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 727, §§ 1-6, at 2358.
213. Graves v. Barnes (Graves II), 378 F. Supp. 640 (W.D. Tex. 1974), remandedfor
determination of mootness sub nom. White v. Regester, 422 U.S. 935 (1975).
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ties 2 14

were left undisturbed. Once again, the state appealed to the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court issued a stay of the district court
order, so again elections were carried out on the basis of the legislatively
drawn multimember districts. Shortly after the case was argued before the
United States Supreme Court in 1975, the Texas Legislature, in regular
session, enacted H.B. 1097,215 which provided for single-member districts
for all 150 state representative seats, thereby eliminating the last of the
state's multimember districts. The Supreme Court responded by remanding the case to the district court for reconsideration and dismissal if
moot.

2 16

By this time, however, a new element had been added to the redistricting
process. Texas was subject to the Voting Rights Act 2 17 and, pursuant to
section 5 of that Act, 2 18 was required to submit the new reapportionment
legislation to the United States Attorney General for clearance. 21 9 The
Attorney General approved the new single-member districts for all of the
counties except Tarrant, Nueces, and Jefferson. The Attorney General's
objections to the districts in these counties did not come until January
1976, shortly before the state primary elections scheduled for that
spring. 220 Because of these objections, the single-member districts drawn
by the legislature for these three counties could not go into effect. Rather
than initiating a declaratory judgment action in the District of Columbia,22 1 the State of Texas resorted to a hearing before the three-judge district court to determine which districts should be used for the upcoming
primary and general elections. The parties resolved their differences with
respect to Nueces and Jefferson Counties, and the court adopted a compromise permanent plan embodying districts for these counties. 222 The court
considered alternative single-member district plans for the state representatives to be elected from Tarrant County and adopted one offered by the
Texas attorney general on behalf of the state. 223 Efforts by Tarrant County
plaintiffs to stay the district court order were denied. 224 In 1977 the plaintiffs from Tarrant County petitioned the district court to adopt their plan
in lieu of the state plan used for the 1976 elections. In October of 1977, the
214. The challenge to Galveston County was not based on the dilution of minority vot-

ing strength through its multimember district but on an alleged racial gerrymander. The
court held the districting scheme unconstitutional, but did not require a division of the multimember districts. 378 F. Supp. at 661-63.
215. 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 727, §§ 1-6, at 2358.
216. White v. Regester, 422 U.S. 935 (1975).
217. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1976).
218. Id.§ 1973(c).
219. See text accompanying notes 441-53 infra.
220. The first elections were municipal and school district elections scheduled for Apr. 3,
1979, in Tarrant County.
221. For discussion of the declaratory judgment action before the District of Columbia
court, see notes 435-36 infra and accompanying text.
222. Graves v. Barnes (Graves III), 408 F. Supp. 1050, 1052 (W.D. Tex. 1976).
223. Id. at 1054.
224. See Graves v. Barnes (Graves IV), 446 F. Supp. 560, 574 (W.D. Tex. 1977) (Wood,

J., dissenting), af'd sub nom. Briscoe v. Escalante, 435 U.S. 901 (1978).
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court adopted the plaintiffs' plan and ordered its use for 1978 elections. 225
The Supreme Court initially stayed the district court order, but subsequently affirmed the district court decision shortly before primary elections. Therefore, by the spring of 1978, the configuration of house districts
was finally established.
C. Observations
As a result of litigation in the 1970's, Texas evidences an unusual composite of districts for its house of representatives. Ninety districts initially
created pursuant to an order of the State Legislative Redistricting Board
now are prescribed, with some changes, by a 1975 statute; 226 twenty-nine
districts initially created by federal court order are now prescribed by the
same statute; sixteen districts were created from multimember districts by
the statute in 1975;227 thirteen districts were created and now exist only by
court order; and two districts, initially created by court order, were subsequently modified by statute in 1979.228 Among the existing house districts
initially prescribed by the redistricting board, the deviation from the ideal
district in population ranges from a +5.8% to a -- 4.1%, for a total maximum deviation of 9.9%.229 The current legislative district with the smallest
population according to 1970 census data was created later by court order,
thereby causing a maximum statewide deviation of 11.6% among house
districts. 2 30 The senatorial districts, which have remained unchanged since
drawn by the Legislative Redistricting Board in 1971, contain a total maximum deviation from the ideal of 5.5%.231 The state congressional districts,
which initially were drawn by court order and later enacted into law have
a total maximum deviation of only .15%.232 These current deviations may
provide a standard against which both the Texas Legislature and the federal courts will judge future districting plans.
The political party and racial composition of the Texas Legislature and
the state congressional delegation have changed significantly over the past
two decades. The most dramatic change has occurred in the Texas House
of Representatives where, in 1963, there were only eight Republican, six
Hispanic, and no black members. By 1980 there were twenty-five Republican, 233 fourteen black, and fifteen Hispanic house members. In 1961 there
225. 446 F. Supp. at 571.
226. 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 727, § 1, at 2358.
227. Id.

228. 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 774, § 1, at 1961.
229. White v, Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 770-72 (1973).
230. District 48B, with a deviation of -5.8% from the ideal district, was ordered in Nueces County. Graves v. Barnes (Graves III), 408 F. Supp. 1050, 1052 (W.D. Tex. 1976).
231. Texas Senate, The 1981 Redistricting Process; Report Number 1, Preliminary Report on Redistricting (Senate) (1980).
232. Texas Senate, The 1981 Redistricting Process; Report Number 3, Preliminary Report on Redistricting (Congress) 1 (1980).
233. The number of Republicans in the house of representatives increased to 25 recently
when two members, earlier elected as Democrats, announced that they would run in the
future as Republicans.
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were no Republican senators, but by 1980 there were five. 234 Other
changes in the senatorial and the congressional delegation have been less
dramatic, but still discernible. In addition, the number of members in the
house of representatives elected from essentially metropolitan counties has
increased significantly. 235 In 1961 the number of such representatives was
thirty-one. This number increased to sixty-nine by the end of the 1970's.
This same period also saw a significant increase in the number of female
236
members of the Texas House of Representatives.
The litigious experience of the State of Texas over the past two decades
offers several lessons. First, prolonged litigation affecting the validity of
the apportionment of the state legislative or congressional districts does
not serve the interests of the state or its citizens. Such litigation is costly
and can lead to considerable voter confusion. Therefore, in anticipation of
the possibility of litigation, each state legislature should act, even before it
convenes after the 1980 census, to devise a legislative process void of even
the taint of arbitrariness through which competing interests are afforded
the opportunity to exercise their right of access to the political process.
Part VIII of this Article contains some specific recommendations. Second,
no state legislature may assume that the potential for future court challenges exists only in one political party or racial or interest group. Over
the past two decades, officials of both the Republican and Democratic parties, as well as black, Hispanic, and anglo citizens at various times have
been movants in redistricting litigation. Potential sources for litigation and
litigants in the 1980's exist among a much broader spectrum of political
interests than in the 1970's. The legislature must be sensitive to this range
of interests during the reapportionment process. Third, the legislature, by
resolution or statute, should designate individual persons or a joint com234. The number of Republicans in the senate increased recently when one senator
elected as a Democrat announced that he would seek reelection as a Republican.
235. The growth of urban representation is shown below:

County

1961

1963

1971

1979

Harris
Dallas
Tarrant
Bexar

8
7
7
9

12
7
7
7

19
15
8
10

24
23
10
13

31

33

52

70

Total

236. The first woman was elected to the 38th Texas Legislature in 1922. The first female
state senator was elected four years later. Over the period from 1923-1973, the number of
female members of the house of representatives varied from zero or one to a high of four
elected during World War II and again during the 53rd Legislature (1953-1955). Beginning
in 1973, the number of female members serving in the house increased steadily until during
the 1979 legislative session there were 11. During most of this century there has been one
female senator elected to each legislature.
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mittee with responsibility for consulting with the attorney general of Texas
and the secretary of state on reapportionment matters when the legislature
is not in session. If litigation occurs, the persons or committee could provide the attorney general with guidance regarding legislative policy, act as
an official body for discussion of tactical and legal issues affecting the litigation, and provide planning for any necessary future legislative action.
Such a committee would be of invaluable assistance to the attorney general
throughout any litigation, regardless of whether the legislatively enacted
plans withstand challenge.
IV.

PRINCIPLES OF REAPPORTIONMENT UNDER THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION

The premise of this Article is that under the fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments to the United States Constitution, state enacted reapportionment plans are valid unless shown to be invidiously discriminatory. The
Supreme Court first applied the standard of invidiousness to the reapportionment process in Baker v. Carr237 and this standard has been consistently applied by a majority of the Supreme Court throughout the
intervening two decades. Invidious discrimination is not a term susceptible to precise definition. In determining the constitutionality of any legislatively enacted plan, however, invidiousness is the single objective to
which the judicial concepts of equality in population and nondilution of
minority or political element voting strength are directed. The Court has
developed several tests and identified certain evidentiary guideposts to aid
in the assessment of the constitutionality of a reapportionment plan.
Through its decisions involving reapportionment over the past two decades, the Supreme Court has established that certain extremes exist in legislative action for which there can be no rational explanation. Such
actions on their face are invidiously discriminatory per se and invalid. The
Court has discerned a secondary level of actions that are sufficiently questionable on their face to establish a prima facie case for invidiousness,
which the state or local government may overcome by showing a rational
and legitimate justification. A third level of actions exists for which the
Court has not yet established specific, clearly identifiable guideposts for
determining invidiousness. In such cases, the person complaining of the
plan's illegality must utilize a combination of factors to show that the legislature's decision, while not on its face invidious, is nevertheless violative of
the Constitution. This Article examines reapportionment cases dealing
with equality in population and dilution of voting strength to illustrate the
Court's application of this tripartite approach.
A.

The ConstitutionalRequirementfor Equal Population

In its first venture into the thicket of state legislative and congressional
237. 369 U.S. 186, 244-46 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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districting, the United States Supreme Court in Reynolds v. Sims 238 emphasized that "the fundamental principle of representative government in
this country is one of equal representation for equal numbers of people."' 239 The most specific evidentiary tests of constitutionality apply to
this requirement for equal population. Even as to this requirement, however, there remain issues for each state to ponder in the reapportionment
process. In refining and applying the principle of equal representation
through equal population over the past two decades, the Supreme Court
has distinguished among four circumstances. 240 Two of these, the reapportionment of local government 24 ' and court-drawn reapportionment
plans242 are discussed in Part II. The application of the principle to the
drawing of state legislative and congressional districts is the focus of the
following discussion.
In considering whether the constitutional requirement of equal population has been met, the courts have used several numerical tools. Most judicial evaluations begin with a calculation of the population of the ideal
district in the plan as computed by dividing the total population by the
number of members in the legislative body. A district drawn so as to have
a population greater than the ideal district is said to cause its voters to be
"underrepresented" because the vote of a person in the district for his representative in the legislative body is worth less than the vote of a person in
a district with a smaller population. In the same sense, a district with a
population smaller tha nthe ideal district may be said to cause its voters to
be "overrepresented." The degree or impact of the disparity in population
and/or voting strength may be shown through: (1) the ratio of the population of the district with the largest number of persons to the population of
the ideal district or the one with the smallest number of persons (e.g., 4 to
1); (2) the total number of persons constituting the difference between the
population of the largest, smallest, and/or ideal district; (3) the minimum
number of persons required to elect a majority in the legislative body;
(4) the number of districts with significant amounts of underrepresentation or overrepresentation; or (5) the percentage by which the districts of
largest and smallest population vary from the ideal district. The most
common numerical tool is the use of the percentage of variation from the
ideal district to show the "average deviation" or "median deviation" of all
of the districts from the ideal, and the "total maximum deviation" which is
the aggregate total of the percentage of variation from the ideal of the
districts with the largest and smallest population. For example, if the variation of the district with the largest population is +5% from the ideal dis238. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
239. Id. at 560-61.
240. In addition, the Supreme Court recently has affirmed that the one-man, one-vote
principle does not apply to the selection of judges. Concerned Citizens of Ohio, Inc. v. Pine
Creek Conservancy Dist., 429 U.S. 651 (1977); see Wells v. Edwards, 347 F. Supp. 453
(M.D. La. 1972), aft'd, 409 U.S. 1095 (1973).
241. See notes 26, 98-99 supra and accompanying text.
242. See notes 106-07 supra and accompanying text.
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trict and the variation of the district with the smallest population is -4%,
the total maximum variation or deviation is 9%.
The Supreme Court has established a rigid numerical standard for determining the constitutionality of congressional districting plans. 243 The

only permissible deviations from the ideal district are those population
variances that are unavoidable despite a good faith effort to achieve absolute equality, or for which justification is shown. 244 As recently as 1973,
the Court expressly rejected the possibility of a de minimis standard for
congressional redistricting similar to one adopted that same year for state
legislative reapportionment. 245 In reaching this result the Court noted
that, as compared to state legislative districts, congressional districts contain relatively enormous populations and are not so intertwined and
freighted with strictly local interests. 246 The Court has left open the possibility that under certain circumstances a state may be able to show a basis
sufficient to justify some deviation from optimum equality in population
among congressional districts in a state, 247 but in its yet unrewarded search
for such a basis, the Court has directly disapproved plans with total maximum deviations of only 4.13%248 and 5.97%.249 In each of these two cases,
however, an alternative congressional redistricting plan with smaller total
deviation had been rejected during the political process or was clearly possible, and the state was unable to show that the plans under scrutiny actually effectuated the state interests offered as justifications for the
deviations. 250 Rejecting Missouri's argument that its 1967 attempt at congressional redistricting represented the best and most equitable compromise possible among Missouri's legislators, the Court stressed that "the
rule is one of 'practicability' rather than political 'practicality' .,"25,
In 1964 the United States Supreme Court established the following requirements for state legislative reapportionment efforts:
1. By holding that as a federal constitutional requisite both houses
of a state legislature must be apportioned on a population basis,
we mean that the Equal Protection Clause requires that a State
make an honest and goodfaith effort to construct districts, in both
houses of its legislature, as nearly of equalpopulationas ispracticable.252

243. Eg., White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783 (1973); Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542
(1969); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964);
see Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973).
244. White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 790 (1973); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 52728 (1969).
245. White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 792-93 (1973); see Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1,
7-8 (1963), in which the Court held that U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 mandates the use of a strict
"one-man, one-vote" approach to congressional districting.
246. White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 793 (1973).
247. Eg., id. at 791; Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969).
248. White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783 (1973).
249. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969).
250. White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 784 n. 1, 790 n.9 (1973); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394
U.S. 526, 532, 533-36 (1969).
251. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 533 (1969).
252. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964) (emphasis added).
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Population is, of necessity, the startingpointfor consideration and
the controlling253
criterion for judgment in legislative apportionment
controversies.

3. So long as the divergences from a strict population standard are
based on legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation of a
rational state policy, some deviations from the equal-population
principle are constitutionallypermissible .... 254
4. [T]he proper judicial approach is to ascertain whether, under the
particularcircumstances existing in the individual State whose
legislative apportionment is at issue, there has been a faithful adherence to a plan of population based representation, with such
minor deviations only as may occur in recognizing factors that are
freefrom any taint of arbitrarinessor discrimination.255
After almost two decades, these remain the basic requirements.
While it may be possible to list the myriad of cases decided over the past
two decades approving or disapproving reapportionments with particular
deviations, the Supreme Court has noted that such lists are of limited use,
with one Justice observing: "Since every reapportionment case presents as
its factual predicate a unique combination of circumstances, decisions upholding or invalidating a legislative plan cannot normally have great precedential significance." 256 What is tolerable in one state, under one set of
circumstances, or on the basis of one record, may not be tolerable in another state.
When considering the constitutionality of particular state reapportionments, the Supreme Court over the past two decades has developed several
guidelines. First, any reapportionment containing gross disparities in population is unconstitutional per se and cannot be justified. In reaching its
conclusion in Reynolds and the other cases decided on the same day,257 the
Court rejected the following justifications, among others, for the existing
gross malapportionments: (1) that the provision for apportioning the state
on a basis other than population had been recently adopted by the state's
voters as an amendment to the state constitution; 2 58 (2) that the state had a
history or tradition of apportionment of at least one house of the state
legislature on a basis other than population; 259 (3) that a state's apportionment of its senators among its counties is analogous to the apportionment
of United States Senators among the states; 2 60 (4) that the existence of the
253. Id. at 567 (emphasis added).
254. Id. at 579 (emphasis added).
255. Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 710 (1964) (emphasis added).
256. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 334 (1973) (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 22 (1975); Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440,
445 (1967).
257. See note 56 supra.
258. Lucas v. Fourty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 738 (1964). Butsee Jordan v.

Silver, 381 U.S. 415 (1965) (finding constitutional amendment adopted by virtue of initiative
to be sufficient to justify basis other than population).
259. Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656, 675 (1964).

260. E.g., Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 708-09 (1964); Maryland Comm. for Fair
Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656, 675 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 573
(1964).
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apportionment scheme in question at the time of the state's admission to
disparity
the Union constituted congressional approval; 26 1 and (5) that the
262
was less than existed among the states in the electoral college.
The Court takes a second approach when a plan produces deviation
which, although not unconstitutional per se, is nevertheless sufficiently
large to establish prima facie that the reapportionment is unconstitutional.
In this instance, the state must justify the deviation by showing that it has
2 63
utilized factors "free from any taint of arbitrariness or discrimination"
and that the divergence from the strict standard is based on considerations
incident to the effectuation of a rational state policy. Recent Supreme
Court decisions suggest that any reapportionment with a total maximum
deviation among its districts of 10% or above is within this category and
requires justification. 264 In Mahan v. Howell265 the Supreme Court upheld
a deviation of 16.4% among the districts of the Virginia General Assembly
because the reapportionment was shown by "uncontradicted" evidence to
produce the minimum deviation possible while keeping political subdivisions intact. 266 Even with this showing, Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion acknowledged
that the 16.4% deviation "may well approach tolerable
limits. ' 267 Therefore, even if all divergences may be shown to have been
unavoidably caused by conditions incident to a rational state policy, a total
maximum deviation above approximately 16.5% may be intolerable and
unconstitutional per se.
When the percentage of deviation is considered de minimus and thus
insufficient by itself to establish a prima facie case of invidiousness, the
268
Court takes a third approach to attempts at state legislative districting.
The Court considers minor deviations alone insufficient to show the unconstitutionality of state legislative reapportionments because: (1) basic
statistical materials are not sufficiently accurate to make the population of
a district known; (2) differentials in population growth rates are striking
and well-known phenomena; (3) "census persons" are not necessarily the
body of voters who must be counted; (4) the goal of fair representation is
not served when the reapportionment task is recurringly removed to the
federal courts; and, (5) if courts are required to adopt plans in lieu of legislative enactments whenever there is a plan with smaller deviations, they
will become "bogged down in a vast, intractable apportionment slough" in
a never-ending search for the constantly receding point of perfection. 269 In
261. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 582 (1964).
262. Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678, 692 (1964).
263. Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 710 (1964).
264. E.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 764 (1973) ("Very likely, larger differences
[than 9.9%] between districts would not be tolerable without justification.").
265. 410 U.S. 315 (1963).
266. Id. at 326.
267. Id. at 329. But see Goines v. Heiskell, 362 F. Supp. 313 (S.D. W. Va. 1973) (upholding state legislative reapportionment with total maximum deviation of 16.179% without
specific showing that the deviation was necessary to preserve county lines).
268. See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735
(1973).
269. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 745-51 (1973). In Gaffney, however, the Court
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view of the Supreme Court decisions in White v. Regester 270 and Gaffney v.
Cummings, 27 1 it would appear that a total maximum deviation of approximately 10% constitutes the threshold of such minor deviation for state legislative reapportionments. Indeed, at least one district court has concluded
containing a deviation
that a state legislative reapportionment enactment 272
constitutionality.
facie
prima
of
is
10%
of less than
Too much reliance, however, by a state legislature on the 10% deviation
figure in drawing state legislative districts for the next decade may jeopardize the state's reapportionment for several reasons. First, the 10% figure
is an evidentiary guidepost for determining constitutionality and does not
relieve a state of its primary obligation to strive for districts "as nearly of
equal population as is practicable. ' 273 Second, in both White v.
Regester274 and Gaffney v. Cummings275 the Supreme Court carefully emphasized that minor total maximum deviations alone were not sufficient to
establish prima facie unconstitutionality, suggesting by negative inference
that such deviations in conjunction with other evidence of invidious dis276
crimination might establish a case of prima facie unconstitutionality.
Third, the state plans in both Regester and Gaffney are distinguishable on
their facts from reapportionments in other states. In both of these cases,
the reapportionments had average and median deviations significantly
smaller than the maximum deviations. 277 In addition, there were only a
small number of districts with a deviation of as much as 3% to 5% from the
ideal district,278 and there was evidence in each case that the reapportionments did, in fact, preserve county or other political subdivision boundaries. 279 Fourth, a deviation that is tolerable in one state under certain
found that, in addition to a "minor deviation," Connecticut had concededly drawn its legislative districts to reflect the relative strengths of the major political parties and to insure
"safe districts" for each, and still no prima facie case existed against the validity of the
reapportionment plan. Id. at 736-37.
270. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
271. 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
272. Graves v. Barnes (Graves IV), 446 F. Supp. 560, 569 (W.D. Tex. 1977), aff d sub
nom. Briscoe v. Escalante, 435 U.S. 901 (1978). In a dissenting opinion in Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 775 (1973), Mr. Justice Brennan concluded that the Court's ruling
meant that deviations of no more than 8% are de minimis.
273. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964); see Ely v. Klahr, 403 U.S. 108, 111
(1971). See also Hensley v. Wood, 329 F. Supp. 787, 792 (E.D. Ky. 1971) ("The legislators
must not start from the premise that justifiable variances may be made, and then proceed to
purposely make mathematically impure districts, believing that they may be justified.").
District courts have required justification for ad hoc state legislative reapportionments having the effect of increasing the disparity in population among districts even when the increase is within the 10% limit. See Sullivan v. Crowell, 444 F. Supp. 606, 610-11 (W.D.
Tenn. 1978). See also Graves v. Barnes (Graves IV), 446 F. Supp. 510, 569 (W.D. Tex.
1977), aad sub nom. Briscoe v. Escalante, 435 U.S. 901 (1978).
274. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
275. 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
276. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. at 764; Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. at 745. But see
note 269 supra.
277. Texas's average deviation among districts in its house of representatives was 1.82%.
White v. Regester, 412 U.S. at 764. Connecticut's average deviation in its house of representatives was 1.9%; its median deviation was 1.8%. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. at 737.
278. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. at 764; Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. at 742.
279. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. at 764 n.8; Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. at 739.
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circumstances may not be acceptable in another state or even in the same
state under different circumstances. 2 80 Finally, despite the several
Supreme Court pronouncements that distinctions exist between congressional and state legislative districting allowing application of different numerical and evidentiary standards, several dissenting opinions have argued
forcefully that the expressed standard of "as nearly of equal population as
is practicable" for state legislative districts is identical to the one applied to
congressional reapportionments. 28 Furthermore, many of the reasons for
adopting a minor deviation standard for legislative redistricting, such as
on in Gaffney, are equally applicable
the inaccuracy of census data relied
2 82
to congressional redistricting.
The Supreme Court has recognized that the federal decennial census is
not a statistically flawless basis for reapportionment. 283 The census inevitably has a certain percentage of error in its numerical counting. For ex284
ample, historically, both blacks and Hispanics have been undercounted.
Furthermore, a census may include some aliens 285 or other persons not
eligible to vote, or transients, or military personnel 286 who are present in a
280. See note 256 supra and accompanying text.
281. Eg., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. at 777-78 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 342 (1973) (Brennan, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
282. See Justice Brennan's dissent in Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 340-41 (1973),
noting that there is a difference between recognizing that state legislative and congressional
reapportionments are different and establishing two distinct controlling standards for review. For example, there may be certain considerations, such as the recognition of local
government boundaries, that are peculiarly applicable to legislative redistricting because of
the duties of a state legislature.
While the state may have a broader range of interests to which it can point in
attempting to justify a failure to achieve precise equality in the context of legislative apportionment, it by no means follows that the state is subject to a
lighter burden of proof or that the controlling constitutional standard is in any
sense distinguishable.
Id. at 341.
283. Eg., Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. at 745-51; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 583
(1964).
284. In Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. at 745 n.10, the Court acknowledged that census
figures underestimated the United States population by 2.5% and may have underestimated
particular minority groups by as much as 7%. See Stewart v. O'Callaghan, 343 F. Supp.
1080 (D. Nev. 1972). See generally H. ALTERMAN, COUNTING PEOPLE: THE CENSUS IN
HISTORY (1969); COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, IMPROVING THE 1980 CENSUS (1974);
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, AMERICA'S UNCOUNTED PEOPLE (1972).
285. Recently Congressmen tried unsuccessfully to enjoin the Bureau of Census from
including illegal aliens in the population count. Federation for American Immigration Reform v. Klutznick, No. 79-3269 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 1980).
286. See Borough of Bethel Park v. Stans, 449 F.2d 575 (3d Cir. 1971). Any effort to
exclude military personnel must take into consideration that under Carrington v. Rash, 380
U.S. 89 (1965), a person in the military cannot be denied the right to vote. The consideration of military personnel required in Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973), related to the
district in which the military personnel resided and could vote, not to whether they should
be counted, but Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678, 691 (1964), held that discrimination against
military personnel on the basis of occupation in reapportionment is violative of the Constitution. Among states excluding military personnel or students from the population base of
particular regions in their 1971 apportionments were Alaska, Idaho, New Hampshire, Vermont and Washington. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE
STATES 36-83 (1972). See also Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1974) (only those
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particular district at the time of the census but actually reside and vote in
other districts. The Supreme Court has suggested that under certain circumstances such persons may be excluded from the apportionment

base. 2 87 If this disparity between "census persons" and persons properly

part of the apportionment base for purposes of equal representation is
large enough to result in significant underrepresentation, the legislature is
under an affirmative obligation to take this fact into consideration during
the reapportionment process. 288 A reapportionment plan that ignores such
anomalies may be invalid. On the other hand, any apportionment plan
failing to rely exclusively on census figures probably is prima facie invalid,289 casting upon the state the burden to show by clear and convincing
evidence that the census figures are unreliable and that the figures utilized
by the state have a "high degree of accuracy" 290 and are not "substantially
different from that which would have resulted from the use of a permissible population base."' 29' The Supreme Court, in limited circumstances,
has allowed the use of a citizen population base, 292 an eligible voter
base, 293 and a registered voter base 294 in lieu of the census population. In
recognizing the possibility of using a registered voter base, however, the
Court warned that such a modification of the census population could be
susceptible to improper influence and could allow the perpetuation of underrepresentation. 295 States that attempt to use an alternative population
base in lieu of the census population must bear the heavy burden of justification if the reapportionment is challenged as invidious, especially in those
states where any such modification could be shown to adversely affect the
students actually excluded by county apportionment have standing to challenge the apportionment on equal protection grounds); Winter v. Docking, 373 F. Supp. 308 (D. Kan. 1974)
(sustaining use of state census in which students and military personnel were counted under
special rules).
287. In Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 92 (1966), the Supreme Court indicated that,
"in [no] decision has this Court suggested that the States are required to include aliens,
transients, short-term or temporary residents, or persons denied the vote for conviction of
crime, in the apportionment base ...... See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 746
(1973).
288. See Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 330-33 (1973).
289. See Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969).
290. Id. at 535; see Dixon v. Hassler, 412 F. Supp. 1036 (W.D. Tenn.), aff'dsub nom.
Republican Party v. Dixon, 429 U.S. 934 (1976); Sims v. Amos, 365 F. Supp. 215 (M.D. Ala.
1973), affd sub noma. Wallace v. Sims, 415 U.S. 902 (1974); Troxler v. St. John the Baptist
Parish Police Jury, 331 F. Supp. 222 (E.D. La. 1971), appeal dismissed per curiam, 452 F.2d
1388 (5th Cir. 1972).
291. Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 92-93 (1966).
292. WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 382 U.S. 4, 6 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring); see Bums v.
Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 94-95 (1966); Winter v. Docking, 373 F. Supp. 308 (D. Kan. 1974).
293. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 535 (1969) (Court assumed an eligible voter
base is valid if properly identified and systematically used throughout the apportionment
scheme).
294. Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 94-95 (1966); see Jones v. Branigin, 433 F.2d 576,
581 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 977 (1971); Simon v. Landry, 419 F.2d 1329, 1329
(5th Cir. 1969); Martin v. Venables, 401 F. Supp. 611, 615-17 (D. Conn. 1975).
295. Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 92-93 (1966). See generally Padilla & Gross,
supra note 17, at 296-98. But see Martin v. Venables, 401 F. Supp. 611, 617 (D. Conn. 1975)
("When districts include substantially equal numbers of registered voters, it is difficult to see
how the weight of anyone's vote has been diminished in a constitutional sense.").
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voting strength of minorities and thereby perpetuate or maintain the
group's underrepresentation. If a state adopts a modification of census
must apply the modification in a systematic manner
population figures, it 296
throughout the state.
Legislators and courts who must consider the constitutionality of reapportionments containing a total maximum deviation of less than 10% may
find it difficult to realize that less than two decades ago reapportionments
in many states had gross deviations among their state legislative and congressional districts reaching the range of 422 to 1.297 At least one writer
has urged that once the more flagrant malapportionments were remedied,
the Supreme Court should have adopted a maximum allowable deviation
below which reapportionments would be secure. 29 8 To some extent this
result has been achieved for state legislative districts through recognition
of the concept of "minor" deviations that are not prima facie unconstitutional. The Court, however, has repeatedly refused to adopt such a standard for congressional districts. Notwithstanding the Court's repeated
indications that legislative reapportionments will be scrutinized less intensely than congressional districting plans, state legislatures cannot be remiss in fulfilling their constitutional obligation to make a good faith effort
to reach population equality.
B.

Dilution of Voting Strength

When the United States Supreme Court announced the principle of
equal population in Reynolds v. Sims, 29 9 it emphasized that the principle
applied "without regard to race, sex, economic status or place of residence
within a State" 3°° and that "each and every citizen has an inalienable right
to free and effective participation in the political processes of his State's
legislative bodies."' 30 One year later, in an opinion upholding particular
multimember districts, 30 2 the Court utilized the above concepts to suggest
296. E.g., Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969); Cohen v. Maloney, 410 F. Supp.
1147 (D. Del. 1976); Graves v. Barnes (Graves I), 343 F. Supp. 704, 717 (W.D. Tex.), aid
sub nom. Archer v. Smith, 409 U.S. 808 (1972), modified sub nom. White v. Regester, 412

U.S. 755 (1973).
297. In California after the 1960 census, the population of the smallest senatorial district

was 14,294, while the largest district encompassed all of Los Angeles County with a population of 6,038,771.

Representation and Apportionment, supra note 64, at 11. Each district

elected one state senator. Eleven percent of the population in the state could elect a majority
of the senate. In Vermont where representation in the lower house was by township, one
town with 24 inhabitants elected a representative to serve with one elected from a city of
35,531. The ratio resulting was 1,480 to 1. Other significant disparities such as 1,414 to I
(Rhode Island Senate), 223 to 1 (Nevada Senate), 424 to I (Connecticut House), and 99 to I

(Georgia Senate) were present. It took less than 40% of the population to elect a controlling
majority in the legislatures of 44 states. In 13 states, less than one-third of the population
could elect a majority.

298. See, e.g., Note, Congressional Redistricting.- Missouri Again Fails to Meet Constitutional Requirements, 35 Mo. L.

REV.

246, 251 (1970).

299. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
300. Id. at 560-61 (1964); see Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 143 (1971).

301. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964).
302. Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965).
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a basis for challenging a reapportionment that dilutes a group's right to
participate in the political processes: "It might well be that, designedly or
otherwise, a multimember constituency apportionment scheme, under the
circumstances of a particular case, would operate to minimize or cancel out
the voting strength of racialorpoliticalelements ofthe votingpopulation.' 30 3
Since that decision over fifteen years ago, the Supreme Court and lower
3°4
federal courts have utilized this language, with occasional modification,
for determining the constitutionality of multimember districts and racial or
305
political gerrymanders that affect electoral minorities.
Considerable dispute exists today regarding the nature of the nondilution principle and the evidence necessary to show that a reapportionment
unconstitutionally dilutes minority voting strength. Most visible has been
the dispute over whether the principle, as based on the fourteenth or
fifteenth amendment 30 6 to the United States Constitution, requires a showing that the districting scheme in question was enacted purposefully to
minimize or cancel the complaining element's voting strength, 307 or
whether it is sufficient to show only that the districting plan has that effect. 30 8 In the only opinion in which it has set forth its approval of a find303. Id. at 439. (emphasis added).
304. See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765 (1973), in which the Court limited its
reference to racial groups.
305. For background on dilution of voting strength, see text preceding note 76 supra and
notes 76-79 supra and accompanying text.
306. Some writers have suggested that a distinction exists between the two amendments
in regard to the need to show a discriminatory purpose. E.g., Comment, At-Large Voting
Dilution Claims- The Ffth Circuit Requires Racially Motivated Discrimination, 9 CUM. L.
REV. 443 (1978); Comment, Racial Dilution in Multimember Districts.- The Constitutional
StandardAfter Washington v. Davis, 76 MICH. L. REV. 694 (1978); Note, United Jewish
Organizations v. Carey and the Need to Recognize Aggregate Voting Rights, 87 YALE L. REV.
571, 595 (1978).
307. In Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 148 n.4 (1976) (Marshall, J.,dissenting),
Justice Marshall suggested that Supreme Court opinions on this subject under the fifteenth
amendment are "somewhat less than a seamless web" and allowed three possible approaches: (1)that purpose alone is sufficient, and effect is irrelevant; (2) that effect alone is
the test, and purpose is irrelevant; or (3) that purpose or effect, alone or in combination are
sufficient. Justice Marshall did not include an apparent fourth alternative, that purpose and
effect in combination are required. On several occasions, the members of the United States
Supreme Court have suggested that a showing of a discriminatory purpose is necessary in
reapportionment cases under the fourteenth and/or fifteenth amendments. See, e.g., United
Jewish Organizations, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 165 (1977); Id. at 179 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment). See also Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 150 (1971) (suggesting that
an at-large district must be conceived or operated as a purposeful device for racial or economic discrimination); Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 56-58 (1964) (fifteenth amendment case suggesting need to show purposeful discrimination); Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209,
215-17 (5th Cir. 1978) (illicit racial motivation is a necessary element in both a fourteenth
amendment and fifteenth amendment voting dilution claim), appeal docketed, No. 78-492
(U.S. Aug. 21, 1979).
308. E.g., Whitcomb v. Chavis, 430 U.S. 130, 177 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (effect
alone is sufficient); Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 149 n.5 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (purpose or effect is sufficient under the fifteenth amendment); Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d
209, 231 (5th Cir. 1978) (Wisdom, J., specially concurring) (fourteenth and fifteenth amendments prohibit dilution of voting rights without proof of racially discriminatory purpose),
appeal docketed, No. 78-492 (U.S. Aug. 21, 1979). See generally Brest, Palmer v. Thompson,
An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SuP. CT. REV. 95;
ELY, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205
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ing that a reapportionment was unconstitutional as dilutive of voting
strength, White v. Regester,30 9 the United States Supreme Court failed to
discuss whether a showing of intentional or purposeful discrimination was
required. 310 Evidence produced by petitioners in the case was such as to
be probative of both discriminatory purpose and effect. Subsequent to the
decision in Regester, however, the Court, in non-voting-rights cases, found
that a mere showing of disproportionate impact on a racial minority is
inadequate to establish a violation of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment and that a plaintiff must show that the state acted
with a racially discriminatory intent. 3 11 Recently, in City of Mobile v.
Bolden,312 a plurality of the Court found that a showing of purposeful
discrimination is required to establish a denial or dilution of voting
strength in violation of the fourteenth or fifteenth amendments. Five Justices, however, either dissented from this view or found it unnecessary to
determine the issue. 3 13 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had determined that purposeful discrimination is required, 31 4 but that a reapportionment plan may be invalid if improperly motivated either in its creation
or in its maintenance. 31 5 Motivation or purpose may be shown through
(1970); Note, Legislative Purpose and Federal ConstitutionalLitigation, 83 HARV. L. REV.
1887 (1970).
309. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
310. Id. at 766.
311. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266
(1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
312. 48 U.S.L.W. 4436 (Apr. 22, 1980). The plurality, quoting from Massachusetts v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1980), indicated: "Discriminatory purpose '... implies more
than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. . . . It implies that the decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part "because
of" not merely "in spite of," its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.'" 48 U.S.L.W. at
4440 n. 17. Several standards have been suggested in lieu of a need to show that the motive
was blatant, including: (1) a standard similar to torts in which each person intends the
natural consequences of his actions, Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976) (Stevens,
J.,concurring); Brown v. Moore, 428 F. Supp. 1123, 1137 (S.D. Ala. 1976); (2) a "quasiimpact" test, see Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977); or (3) the "inference of intent," Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 221 (5th Cir. 1978),
appealdocketed,No. 78-492 (U.S. Aug. 21, 1979); Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors, 554 F.2d
139, 147 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,434 U.S. 968 (1977). See Comment, Vote Dilution
Challenges After Washington v. Davis, 30 ALA. L. REV. 396, 415 (1979).
313. Justice Blackmun concurred in the result. 48 U.S.L.W. at 4443. Justice Stevens
concurred in the judgment. 48 U.S.L.W. at 4443. Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall
dissented. 48 U.S.L.W. at 4446, 4449.
314. Thomasville Branch of NAACP v. Thomas County, 571 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1978);
Blacks United for Lasting Leadership, Inc. v. City of Shreveport, 571 F.2d 248 (5th Cir.
1978); Bolden v. City of Mobile, 571 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1978), a]J'd,48 U.S.L.W. 4436 (Apr.
22, 1980); Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-492 (U.S.
Aug. 21, 1979).
315. In the Fifth Circuit, the test regarding maintenance of a reapportionment or characteristic of districting that cannot be shown to have been purposefully discriminatory when
enacted is whether it has been maintained by either action or inaction "for the purpose of
excluding minority input or devaluing the votes of minorities." Bolden v. City of Mobile,
571 F.2d 238, 245-46 (5th Cir. 1978), af'd,48 U.S.L.W. 4436 (Apr. 22, 1980); Nevett v. Sides,
571 F.2d 209, 222 (5th Cir. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-492 (U.S. Aug. 21, 1979). A
recently enacted and racially neutral reapportionment still may be invalid if it is an "instrumentality for carrying forward patterns of purposeful and intentional segregation." Kirksey
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direct evidence 3 16 or circumstantial evidence, 3 17 including a showing of the
plan's effect.
Allegations that a reapportionment plan dilutes the voting strength of an
electoral minority are of a "qualitative" nature because they focus "not on
population-based apportionment but on the quality of representation. ' 31 8
Since no group has a constitutional right to be represented in a legislative
body in direct proportion to its numerical voting strength or potential, 31 9
no controlling numerical tests are available to determine constitutionality.
Instead, the constitutionally protected right is one of equal access to the
political process. 320 Therefore, as explained in White v. Regester:32 1
[T]he plaintiffs' burden is to produce evidence to support findings that
the political processes leading to nomination and election were not
equally open to participation by the group in question-that its members had less opportunity than did other residents in the district to
participate
in the political processes and to elect legislators of their
322
choice.
Although no strictly numerical test exists for purposes of determining
whether unconstitutional dilution is present, federal courts have suggested
some evidentiary guidelines. Most dilution of voting strength cases arise
over certain recurring characteristics or "devices" of districting that are
questionable to the extent that in combination with other evidence they
may establish a prima facie case of invidiousness. Primary among such
characteristics are multimember districts, 323 "crazy-quilt" apportionments, 324 and districts that gerrymander 325 a substantial and compact miv. Board of Supervisors, 554 F.2d 139, 147 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 968
(1977).

316. E.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469-70 (1953).
317. See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765 (1973).
318. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 142 (1971). See also Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d
209, 216 (5th Cir. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-492 (U.S. Aug. 21, 1979).
319. See, e.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden, 48 U.S.L.W. 4436 (Apr. 22, 1980); City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 368-69 (1975); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 769
(1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 156 (1971); Paige v. Gray, 437 F. Supp. 137, 143
(M.D. Ga. 1977); Connor v. Waller, 396 F. Supp. 1308, 1313 (S.D. Miss. 1975), rev'don other
grounds, 421 U.S. 656 (1975).
320. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-66 (1973).
321. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
322. Id. at 766.
323. See notes 77-78 supra and accompanying text.
324. See, e.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden, 48 U.S.L.W. 4436,4445 (Apr. 22, 1980) (Stevens,
J., concurring in judgment) (a configuration "manifestly not the product of a routine or a
traditional political decision"); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 254 (1962) (Clark, J., concurring) (where the term "crazy-quilt" first appeared); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339
(1960) (describing an "uncouth twenty-eight sided figure"); Winter v. Docking, 356 F. Supp.
88, 91 (D. Kan. 1973) (state's legislative reapportionment that unduly disregarded political
subdivision boundaries and created many noncontiguous districts was a "crazy-quilt" without rational basis); Wells v. Rockefeller, 311 F. Supp. 48, 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (Canella, J.,
concurring) ("wild district configurations" are not constitutionally acceptable), afl'd, 398
U.S. 901 (1970).
325. The objective of a gerrymander is to redistrict for political benefit by causing as
many as possible of the opposition's votes to be "wasted," either by concentrating them in a
few districts or spreading them as minority segments among many constituencies. The political advantage sought may be for the benefit of one group or party over another or one
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nority community. To show that the characteristic or device is
unconstitutional in a particular circumstance, the complaining minority
must show through corroborative evidence that it operates invidiously to
minimize or cancel the group's voting strength. 326 Among elements considered by the courts as corroborative evidence of invidious discrimination
in a variety of contexts are the following: (a) a decision-making process
controlled by a majoritarian group unresponsive to the minority's interests
or needs; 327 (b) a starkly differential or disparate impact of the charactercandidate over ailother. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 538 (1969) (Fortas, J., concurring) (the gerrymander is "the deliberate and arbitrary distortion of district boundaries and
populations for partisan or personal political purposes"). The drawing of districts for political benefit has been present throughout the history of this country. See Colegrove v. Green,
328U.S. 549, 555 (1946). The term "gerrymander" owes its origin to the Governor of Massachusetts in 1812, Eldridge Gerry. The state legislature that year carved a district for the
political benefit of Gerry's Democratic party that when later observed on a map had the
extraordinary appearance of a salamander. It, therefore, soon acquired the name "gerrymander." In reality, any redistricting of a nonhomogeneous area is a gerrymander in the
sense that any line drawn on a political map represents an electoral advantage for someone
and a disadvantage for another. See generally Adams, A Model State Reapportionment Process.: The Continuing Questfor "'Fairand Effective Representation, " 14 HARV. J. LEGIS. 825
(1977); Edwards, The Gerrymander and "One Man, One Vote," 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 879
(1971); Gottlieb, Identifying Gerrymanders, 15 ST. Louis U.L.J. 540 (1971); Hardy, Considering the Gerrymander, 4 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 243 (1977); Sickels, Dragons, Bacon Strips and
Dumbbells- Who's Afraid of Reapportionment?, 75 YALE L.J. 1300 (1966); Comment, Racial
Gerrymandering in the Deep South, 22 ALA. L. REV. 319 (1970); Comment, Constitutional
Challenges to Gerrymanders, 45 U. CHL L. REV. 845 (1978).
326. In 1973 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit established a specific evidentiary formula consisting of certain primary and enhancing factors, for application
by district courts to determine whether dilution exists. Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297
(5th Cir. 1973) (en banc), affd on other grounds sub nom. E. Carroll Parish School Bd. v.
Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976). Once a finding is made separately for each factor, the district
court is to consider the findings together in the aggregate. 485 F.2d at 1305. Since 1978 the
circuit has established that a violation of either the fourteenth amendment or fifteenth
amendment requires the showing of an illicit or racially motivated purpose, so this evidentiary Zimmer formula is utilized to raise an "inference of intent." Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d
209, 221 (5th Cir. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-492 (U.S. Aug. 21, 1979); Kirksey v. Board
of Supervisors, 554 F.2d 139, 147 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 968 (1977). In
City of Mobile v. Bolden, 48 U.S.L.W. 4436 (Apr. 22, 1980), a plurality of the Supreme
Court found that an aggregate of the Zimmer factors was not sufficient to establish the unconstitutionality of an apportionment. Id. at 4440-41. Justice Stevens apparently agreed.
Id. at 4444. Insofar as the Zimmer formula embodies the basis of White v. Regester, 412
U.S. 755 (1973), and is understood to be some circumstantial evidence of discriminatory
purpose, its factors appear to remain a useful but nonexclusive means of determining an
apportionment's constitutionality. For an indication of how federal district courts were applying the Fifth Circuit's specific formula before the Supreme Court decided Bolden, see
Clark v. Marengo County, 469 F. Supp. 1150 (S.D. Ala. 1979) (upholding at-large county
elections); Mosely v. Sadler, 469 F. Supp. 563 (E.D. Tex. 1979) (upholding at-large city
council elections); Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors, 468 F. Supp. 285 (S.D. Miss. 1979) (upholding redistricting plan for county board); Kirksey v. City of Jackson, 461 F. Supp. 1282
(S.D. Miss. 1978) (upholding at-large city elections); Hendrix v. McKinney, 460 F. Supp. 626
(M.D. Ala. 1978) (declaring at-large elections for county commission invalid); Ausberry v.
City of Monroe, 456 F. Supp. 460 (W.D. La. 1978) (declaring at-large elections for city
council invalid). See also David v. Garrison, 553 F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1977) (reversing district
court for findings inadequate under the Zimmer formula). These cases may be contrasted
with recent district court dilution decisions in other circuits where the Zimmer formula is not
in use. Eg., Aranda v. Van Sickle, 455 F. Supp. 625 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (denying claim by
Hispanic petitioners).
327. E.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 768-69 (1973). Control of the decision-mak-
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istic as applied to the group; 328 (c) an historical pattern of a disproportionately low number of the group's members being elected to the legislative
body; 329 (d) bloc voting, 330 permitting elected representatives to ignore the
33 1
affected group's interests without fear of reprisal at the polls;
(e) residual effects of past discrimination that operate to preclude the
3 32
group from effective participation in the election process today;
(f) depressed social and economic status, which makes the group's particiing process often has been shown through the presence of a majoritarian group "slating"
candidates for public office. Id. at 766-69. The absence of slating, however, does not foreclose a finding of unconstitutional dilution. United States v. Board of Supervisors, 571 F.2d
951, 953-55 (5th Cir. 1978). In determining whether officials are responsive, federal courts
have considered matters such as: discrimination in hiring practices, Hendrix v. Joseph, 559
F.2d 1265, 1269 (5th Cir. 1977); David v. Garrison, 553 F.2d 923, 929-30 (5th Cir. 1977);
perception of the officials in the minority community, Graves v. Barnes (Graves IV), 446 F.
Supp. 560, 567 (W.D. Tex. 1977), af'd sub nom. Briscoe v. Escalante, 435 U.S. 901 (1978);
support by minorities in past elections, id.; responsiveness in implementing desegregation,
Brown v. Moore, 428 F. Supp. 1123, 1129-31, 1140-41 (S.D. Ala. 1976); failure to approve
low income housing for white neighborhoods or to adopt an affirmative action plan, Pitts v.
Busbee, 395 F. Supp. 35, 39 (N.D. Ga. 1975); the officials' legislative records, Graves v.
Barnes (Graves II), 378 F. Supp. 640, 647, 653 (W.D. Tex. 1974); discriminatory provisions
of service, Yalverton v. Driggers, 370 F. Supp. 612, 618 (N.D. Ala. 1974). See Perry v.
Opelousas, 515 F.2d 639 (5th Cir. 1975); Wallace v. House, 515 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1975),
vacated,425 U.S. 947 (1976); Robinson v. Commissioners Court, 505 F.2d 674, 679 (5th Cir.
1974); Greater Houston Civic Council v. Mann, 440 F. Supp. 696 (S.D. Tex. 1977);
Bonapfel, Minority Challenges to At-Large Elections- The Dilution Problem, 10 GA. L. REV.
353 (1976). Where, as in City of Mobile v. Bolden, 48 U.S.L.W. 4436 (Apr. 22, 1980), the
officers accused of being unresponsive are not the ones responsible for the election system in
use, evidence of discrimination may be relevant only as the most tenuous and circumstantial
evidence of the invalidity of the system. Id. at 4441.
328. E.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
267 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976); Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors,
554 F.2d 139, 147 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,434 U.S. 968 (1977). See also Gomillion
v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1970); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
329. E.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
266 (1977); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765 (1973); Sims v. Baggett, 247 F. Supp. 96,
109 (M.D. Ala. 1965).
330. The mere presence of bloc voting may not constitute a denial of access to the political system when, on the basis of prior elections, it can be shown that voter apathy and
turnout were determinative of prior election outcomes. Clark v. Marengo County, 469 F.
Supp. 1150, 1163 (S.D. Ala. 1979). Moreover, the quality of the candidate may also be a
factor. Marshall v. Edwards, 582 F.2d 927, 934 n.8 (5th Cir. 1978). See also Dove v. Moore,
539 F.2d 1152 (8th Cir. 1976) (upholding at-large city council statute in Arkansas).
331. E.g., Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 142 (1976); Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209,
223 (5th Cir. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-492 (U.S. Aug. 21, 1979); Kirksey v. Board of
Supervisors, 554 F.2d 139, 145 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 968 (1977).
332. E.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-70 (1973); Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209,
227 (5th Cir. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-492 (U.S. Aug. 21, 1979); McGill v. Gadsden
County Comm'n, 535 F.2d 277, 279-81 (5th Cir. 1976); Kendrick v. Walder, 527 F.2d 44, 4849 (7th Cir. 1975). Once past discrimination is established, plaintiffs often attempt to show
its lingering effects through the discrepancy in the number of registered voters. E.g., Hendrix v. Joseph, 559 F.2d 1265, 1270 (5th Cir. 1977); Bradas v. Rapides Parish Police Jury,
508 F.2d 1109, 1112-13 (5th Cir. 1975). Such a showing alone may not be sufficient if the
opportunity to register is clearly equal and losses by candidates favored by racial minorities
are traceable to a failure to turn out the vote. Moreover, the fact that there are such candidates may be suggestive that there now is minority access to the nomination process. Hendrix v. Joseph, 559 F.2d 1265, 1268 (5th Cir. 1977); David v. Garrison, 553 F.2d 923, 929
(5th Cir. 1977); Clark v. Marengo County, 469 F. Supp. 1150, 1158 (S.D. Ala. 1979). A
consistent pattern of past discrimination is not a necessary predicate. A single invidiously
discriminatory act would not necessarily be immunized by the absence of other comparable
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pation in community processes difficult; 333 (g) the historical background
of the decision to include the device in the reapportionment, particularly
as such history shows a resistance to recognition of the voting rights of the
affected group; 334 (h) legislative or administrative history, 335 including
any irregularities in the process that produced the disparity; (i) substantive
factors, particularly if regularly considered important by the decisionmaker; 336 and (j) the presence of other rules in the electoral system favoring exclusively majoritarian control. 337 The specific nature of evidence offered under these elements will vary according to whether the
objectionable characteristic is a multimember district or a gerrymander.
No list of elements is likely to be exhaustive. 338 Moreover, none of these
elements alone is sufficient to establish invidiousness. 339 Some of the elements relate to impact; some to purpose. Ultimately, as observed by the
Court in Regester, the determination of unconstitutionality comprehends
"a blend of history and an intensely local appraisal of the design and impact of the [reapportionment] in light of past and present reality, political
' '340
and otherwise.
Multimember Districts. On numerous occasions the United States
Supreme Court has held that multimember districts alone or in combination with single-member districts are not unconstitutional per se. 34 1 The
decisions. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
266 n.14 (1977).
333. E.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 767-70 (1973); Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors, 554 F.2d 139, 145 (5th Cir.) (en banc) ("Inequality of access is an inference which flows
from the existence of economic and educational inequalities"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 968
(1977). The combination of this factor and past discrimination are not dissimilar from the
basis for a "suspect classification" under other Supreme Court decisions. For example, in
San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), the Court described
such a classification as one "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of
purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to
command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process." Id. at 28. A
"suspect classification" also has been described as an "immutable characteristic determined
solely by the accident of birth." Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973). But see
City of Mobile v. Bolden, 48 U.S.L.W. 4436, 4441 n.22 (Apr. 22, 1980), referring to such
historical and social factors as "gauzy sociological considerations" without constitutional
significance.
334. Eg., Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors, 554 F.2d 139, 148 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 968 (1977); Robinson v. Commissioners Court, 505 F.2d 674, 679 (5th Cir.
1974); Clark v. Marengo County, 469 F. Supp. 1150, 1173 (S.D. Ala. 1979); Kirksey v. City
of Jackson, 461 F. Supp. 1282, 1291 (S.D. Miss. 1978).
335. Eg., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
267 (1977).
336. See, e.g., Conner v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 422 (1977) (unexplained departures from
application of neutral guidelines).
337. E.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 766 (1973); Graves v. Barnes (Graves I), 343
F. Supp. 704, 725 (W.D. Tex.), af'd
sub755
nom.
Archer v. Smith, 409 U.S. 808 (1972), modifled
(1973).
U.S.
sub nom. White v. Regester, 412
338. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
266 (1977).
339. Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 224 (5th Cir. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-492 (U.S.
Aug. 21, 1979); McGill v. Gadsden County Comm'n, 535 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1976).
340. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 769-70 (1973).
341. Eg., Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535 (1978); Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1 (1975);
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Court also has recognized, however, that multimember districts can contribute to voter confusion, make legislative representatives more remote
from their constituents, increase the cost of campaigning, and tend to submerge electoral minorities while overrepresenting electoral majorities. 342
In White v. Regester 34 3 the Supreme Court invalidated multimember legislative districts in Bexar County and Dallas County, Texas, because the
districts unconstitutionally diluted the voting strength of racial minorities. 344 No electoral minority other than racial minorities has successfully
challenged multimember districts. The Supreme Court has continued to
suggest, however, that the nondilution principle applies to "racial" and
"political" elements of the population.3 45
The Supreme Court has considered the following factors as evidence
corroborative of the unconstitutionality of multimember districts: 346
(a) the presence of a history of official racial discrimination in the region
in question, such as the past presence of a poll tax or other discriminatory
voting qualification; 347 (b) the number of members of the racial minority
elected in proportion to the group's voting strength or potential; 34 8
(c) residual effects of past official discrimination that adversely affected
racial minority participation in the electoral process, such as low voter registration or turnout; 349 (d) bloc voting that results in the ability of a white
candidate to win elections without the support of racial minorities; 35 0
(e) the presence of a white dominated political organization effectively
controlling party nomination and employing racial campaign tactics; 35 '
(f) the responsiveness of elected legislators to the needs and interests of the
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966); Fortsen

v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965).
342. See Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 540 (1978); Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 415
(1977). See also White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-70 (1973). But see David v. Garrison,
553 F.2d 923, 928 (5th Cir. 1977), wherein the court observed:
To replace an at-large system with several single member districts invites variance from the perfect one person--one vote goal, and forever compartmentalizes the electorate, reinforces the bloc voting syndrome, and prevents members
of a minority class from ever exercising influence on the political system beyond the bounds of their single member districts.
343. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
344. Id. at 765-70; accord,Bolden v. City of Mobile, 571 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1978), af 'd,
48 U.S.L.W. 4436 (Apr. 22, 1980); Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en
banc), afl'dsub nom. East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976). On at
least one occasion, white voters constituting a minority in a jurisdiction have sued to enjoin
use of an at-large system. Van Cleave v. Town of Gibsland, 380 F. Supp. 135 (W.D. La.
1974).
345. See note 368 infra.
346. See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 766-71 (1973). See also Note, Discriminatory
Effect of Elections At-Large." The "Totality of Circumstances" Doctrine, 41 ALB. L. REV. 363
(1977). The evidentiary elements utilized by the Supreme Court in White P. Regester have
been extended to alleged gerrymandering of single-member districts. See Robinson v. Commissioners Court, 505 F.2d 674, 678 (5th Cir. 1974).
347. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 766 (1973).
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 767.
351. Id.
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racial minority; 352 (g) the presence of other electoral rules that favor electoral majorities, such as a "majority rule" requiring run-offs, "place" elections, "anti-single shot" provisions, and the lack of a requirement for
residence in a particular area of the multimember
district;353 and (h) the
354
size of the multimember district itself.

Racial Gerrymanders. The Supreme Court has not directly invalidated a
redistricting plan as constituting an impermissible racial gerrymander.
From its decisions, however, it appears virtually certain that a redistricting
gerrymander purposefully drawn to dilute racial minority voting strength
is violative of the 355
fourteenth and fifteenth amendments to the United
States Constitution.
The leading Supreme Court decision regarding racial gerrymandering,
Gomillion v. Lightfoof, 356 technically is neither a reapportionment case nor
one in which the voting strength of a group was diluted by a configuration
of congressional, state, or local district lines. Instead, in Gomillion, the
Supreme Court found justiciable a claim that the Alabama Legislature
redrew the boundaries of the city of Tuskegee from the outline of a square
to a strangely irregular twenty-eight sided figure so as to exclude from the
city virtually all black voters. While not a reapportionment, the Alabama
Legislature's alleged effort to "fence-out" a compact racial group for fear
of its impact on elections constitutes legislative action segregating racial
elements of the voting population that the Supreme Court would likely
find impermissible in the drawing of state legislative or congressional districts as well. Moreover, Gomillion is an example of legislative action that
is so striking on its face and disproportionate in its impact that "the conclusion would be irresistible, tantamount for all practical purposes to a
mathematical demonstration, '357 that the legislation is solely concerned
with accomplishing a constitutionally proscribed purpose. Such extreme
forms of legislative action may thus be viewed as comparable to those districting plans containing disparities in population so large that they establish the unconstitutionality per se of the reapportionment in question, or at
least a showing of a prima facie case of invidious discrimination. While
Gomillion is distinguishable from reapportionment dilution cases insofar
as the black voters of Tuskegee were entirely deprived of their formerly
held right to vote in city elections, Justices of the Supreme Court and lower
federal courts have treated the case as authority for the proposition that
352. Id.
353. Id. at 766. In a multimember district the legislator's tenure depends "upon the
county-wide electorate [and] he must [,therefore,] be vigilant to serve the interests of all the
people in the county, and not merely those of people in his home district." Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 438 (1965). This applies even when there are subdistrict residency requirements. Dallas County v. Reese, 421 U.S. 477, 480 (1975) (per curiam).
354. Id. at 767.
355. See, e.g., Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 420-24 (1977); United Jewish Organizations, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 165 (1977); Taylor v. McKeithen, 407 U.S. 191, 194 n.3
(1972).
356. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
357. Id. at 341.
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racial gerrymanders which disenfranchise or dilute racial minority voting
358
strength are constitutionally impermissible.
A second Supreme Court decision, Wright v. Rockefeller,35 9 also supports the conclusion that racial gerrymandering is violative of the Constitution. In Wright the Court affirmed a New York district court decision
dismissing a claim that certain congressional districts in the state were a
contrivance to segregate voters on the basis of race or place of origin. The
Court determined that while one of the four challenged districts had a
population that was 94.99% white and another was 86.3% nonwhite and
Puerto Rican, the district court was justified in finding that petitioners
failed to carry their burden of proof.360 Conceding that the record might
establish a prima facie case that the New York Legislature was either motivated by racial considerations, or in fact drew the districts on racial lines,
the Court found that there also was "equally, or more persuasive" 36 , evidence that the legislature did not create the districts on the basis of race
and place of origin. 362 The Court's decision was perhaps influenced as
well by a group of intervenors, led by Congressman Adam Clayton Powell,
who urged approval of the districts in question because districts drawn as
desired by petitioners to equalize white and nonwhite population among
363
the districts could themselves be unconstitutional.
There are two cognizable types of racial gerrymanders. One dilutes minority voting strength by purposefully fragmenting a compact minority
community among two or more districts, while the other accomplishes the
same purpose by concentrating the minority community in a single district.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded in 1977 that a redistricting
plan is constitutionally impermissible as racially discriminatory when it
fragments a geographically concentrated and substantial minority community in a context of bloc voting. 364 The court found that, against an historical background of purposeful and intentional discrimination, the residual
effects of which still persist, this fragmenting perpetuated a denial of access
358. See, e.g., Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 751 (1973); Perkins v. Mitchell, 400
U.S. 379, 388-89 (1971); Holt v. City of Richmond, 459 F.2d 1093, 1097 (4th Cir. 1972).
359. 376 U.S. 52 (1964).
360. Id. at 53-58.
361. Id. at 57.
362. Id. at 55-57.
363. Id. at 58.
364. Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors, 554 F.2d 139 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 968 (1977); see Robinson v. Commissioners Court, 505 F.2d 674, 676, 679 (5th Cir.
1974) ("acting as a modem Caesar dissecting its private Gaul," the commissioners court cut
the county's black population into three illogical parts; id.at 676); Moore v. Lefiore County
Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 502 F.2d 621, 622-24 (5th Cir. 1974) (although plan satisfied the
arithmetical aspect of one-man, one-vote standard, it diluted black voting strength and
failed to consider legitimate planning objectives; it was rejected); Sims v. Baggett, 247 F.
Supp. 96, 104-05 (M.D. Ala. 1965) (reapportionment for discriminatory purpose cannot be
approved). See also United States v. Texas, 321 F. Supp. 1043, 1051-52 (E.D. Tex. 1970)
(racially discriminatory district lines, whether for elections or school attendance, is constitutionally improper), afl'd, 447 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1971) (stay of judgment denied in 404 U.S.
1206 (1971)).
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to the election process. 365 Other federal decisions have recognized that the
purposeful oversaturation or "packing" of a racial minority in a single district can operate as an unconstitutional denial of the racial minority's voting strength. 366 The concentration of racial minorities in one or more
districts with populations significantly greater than the ideal district may,
in certain circumstances, constitute racial gerrymandering. Moreover,
dicta in recent opinions suggest that a reapportionment plan that on its
face attempts proportional representation may be invalid if employed
as a
"contrivance to segregate" the population on a racial basis. 36 7
Partisan Gerrymanders. Although the concept of dilution of minority voting strength theoretically includes other electoral minorities in addition to
racial ones, 368 no federal court has based an invalidation of a reapportionment solely on the ground that it diluted the voting strength of a nonracial
minority. 369 Challenges by political parties and other interest groups almost uniformly have been rejected 370 either because (1) the plaintiff failed
365. Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors, 554 F.2d 139, 146-51 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 968 (1977).
366. E.g., Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964); Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 219
(5th Cir. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-492 (U.S. Aug. 21, 1979); Mississippi v. United
States, No. 78-1425 (D.D.C. June 1, 1979), afd, 100 S. Ct. 994 (1980). In Beer v. United
States, 425 U.S. 130, 154 n.12 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting), Justice Marshall posed the
question: "Is it not as common for minorities to be gerrymandered into the same district as
into separate ones?" The mere presence of one or more districts with an exceptionally large
percentage of nonwhites, e.g., 75-100%, however, does not necessarily constitute "packing,"
particularly where the nonwhite population is densely concentrated and there is no evidence
that adjoining nonwhite neighborhoods are diffused among surrounding districts in which
white voters constitute a majority. See NAACP v. City of Canton, 472 F. Supp. 859 (S.D.
Miss. 1979).
367. See United Jewish Organizations, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 172 (1977) (Brennan,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Id. at 179 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment).
368. Several Supreme Court opinions seem to suggest that the idea of "dilution of minority strength" contemplates protection of political minorities in general, not merely racial
minorities. E.g., Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 426 (1977) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (inquiring as to a "racial or other improperly motivated gerrymander"); United Jewish Organizations, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 166 (1977) ("racial or political groups"); Dallas County
v. Reese, 421 U.S. 477, 480 (1975) (per curiam) ("identifiable element of the voting population"); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 754 (1973) ("what is done ... to achieve political ends or allocate political power, is not wholly exempt from judicial review"); Whitcomb
v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 150 (1971) (no evidence of purposeful device to further racial or
economic discrimination); Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. i (1971) (individual may not be denied access to the ballot because of some extraneous condition such as tax status, military
status, or wealth); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88 (1965) (racial or political elements of
the voting population). But see City of Mobile v. Bolden, 48 U.S.L.W. 4436, 4442 n.26 (Apr.
22, 1980) (suggesting that some questions regarding group representation are unanswerable).
369. But see Klahr v. Williams, 313 F. Supp. 148 (D. Ariz. 1970), aff'don other grounds,
sub nom. Ely v. Klahr, 403 U.S. 108 (1971).
370. E.g., Cousins v. City Council, 466 F.2d 830 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 893
(1972); Wendler v. Stone, 350 F. Supp. 838 (S.D. Fla. 1972); Wolfson v. Nearing, 346 F.
Supp. 799 (M.D. Fla. 1972); Graves v. Barnes (Graves I), 343 F. Supp. 704 (W.D. Tex.), af'd
sub nom. Archer v. Smith, 409 U.S. 808 (1972); Dunn v. Oklahoma, 343 F. Supp. 320 (W.D.
Okla. 1972); Kelly v. Bumpers, 340 F. Supp. 568 (E.D. Ark. 1972), aJ/'d,413 U.S. 901 (1973);
Obermiller v. Siegel, 340 F. Supp. 208 (D. Neb. 1972); Skolnick v. Mayor of Chicago, 319 F.
Supp. 1219 (N.D. Ill. 1970); Wells v. Rockefeller, 311 F. Supp. 48, 56 (S.D.N.Y.) (Cannella,
J., concurring), a1 ?'d, 398 U.S. 901 (1970) (per curiam); Sincock v. Gately, 262 F. Supp. 739
(D. Del. 1967); Kilgarlin v. Martin, 252 F. Supp. 404 (S.D. Tex. 1966), rev'd in part and
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to meet his burden of showing the invidiousness of the alleged discriminatory device, 37 1 (2) the relief sought was subsumed in claims by racial minorities, or (3) the court concluded that the group did not have a
constitutionally protected right of access to the political process. 372 No
Supreme Court decision, however, has expressly held that the federal
courts may not hear and decide a claim of malapportionment by members
of such a group. 37 3 Several commentators have urged that the Court
should expressly recognize that a claim of diluted minority voting rights is
available to all politically disadvantaged groups, rather than simply to racial minorities. 374 At present, it appears that the federal courts remain
open to a claim by a political element or group that a reapportionment
375
invidiously dilutes its voting strength.
remanded sub nom. Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967); Bush v. Martin (Bush II), 251 F.

Supp. 484 (S.D. Tex. 1966); Meeks v. Avery, 251 F. Supp. 245 (D. Kan. 1966); Sims v.
Baggett, 247 F. Supp. 96 (M.D. Ala. 1965); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 238 F. Supp. 916
(S.D.N.Y.), aft'd, 382 U.S. 4 (1965) (per curiam).

371. Graves v. Barnes (Graves 1), 343 F. Supp. 704, 734-35 (W.D. Tex.), aff'd sub nom.
Archer v. Smith, 409 U.S. 808 (1972), modfledsub nom., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755
(1973).
372. 343 F. Supp. at 734.
373. In 1965, however, the Court in a per curiam opinion affirmed the decision of a
district court that the issue of partisan gerrymandering was not justiciable. WMCA, Inc. v.
Lomenzo, 382 U.S. 4, af'g 238 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). Justice Harlan, in a concurring opinion, noted that the affirmance recognized as "eminently correct" the district court's
rejection of the partisan claims. 382 U.S. at 6. See Bagley v. Hare, 385 U.S. 114 (1966)
(dismissing appeal of state court decision for lack of federal question).
374. See R. MCKAY, REAPPORTIONMENT: THE LAW AND POLITICS OF EQUAL REPRESENTATION (1970); Chu, PoliticalEfficacy.- The Problems of Money, Race, and Control in the
Schools, 1977 Wis. L. REV. 989; Comment, ConstitutionalChallengesto Gerrymanders,45 U.
CHI. L. REV. 845 (1979). But see Note, supra note 306, at 589 (limiting recognition of group
rights to racial groups under the fifteenth amendment).
375. See note 368 supra; City of Mobile v. Bolden, 48 U.S.L.W. 4436, 4444-45 (Apr. 22,
1980) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in judgment) ("In the line drawing process, racial, religious,
ethnic, and economic gerrymanders are all species of political gerrymanders."); Cousins v.
City Council, 466 F.2d 830, 852 (7th Cir.) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Circuit Judge Stevens,
now Supreme Court Justice Stevens, urged that the concept of dilution must apply equally
to ethnic, political, and racial groups), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 893 (1972); Lipscomb v. Jonsson, 459 F.2d 335 (5th Cir. 1972) (acknowledging that"ghetto dwellers" could state a cause
of action if subject to a purposeful attempt "to fence them out"); Sutton v. Dunne, 365 F.
Supp. 483 (N.D. Il.1973) (finding total maximum deviation of 9.74% unacceptable when it
resulted in overrepresentation of city dwellers and underrepresentation of the suburban
dwellers); Winter v. Docking, 356 F. Supp. 88 (D. Kan. 1973) (finding total maximum deviation of 12.41% unacceptable when it arbitrarily cut political subdivisions); Wendler v. Stone,
350 F. Supp. 838, 841 (S.D. Fla. 1972) (Roettger, D.J., dissenting) (urging that a cause of
action for political gerrymandering exists when districts are not compact or contiguous or
there is unnecessary and arbitrary splitting of political subdivisions); Troxler v. St. John the
Baptist Parish Police Jury, 331 F. Supp. 222, 224 (E.D. La. 1971) (requiring local government to justify decision to carve up "areas which have traditionally identifiable interests"),
appeal dismissed, 452 F.2d 1388 (5th Cir. 1972); Klahr v. Williams, 313 F. Supp. 148 (D.
Ariz. 1970) (finding inapposite the consideration of party strength in reapportionment), a 'd
on other grounds sub nom. Ely v. Klahr, 403 U.S. 108 (197 1); Wells v. Rockefeller, 311 F.
Supp. 48, 54 (S.D.N.Y.) (Canella, J., dissenting) (urging that claim of political gerrymandering can be made when districts lack contiguity and compactness), aff'd, 398 U.S. 901 (1970);
Long v. Docking, 282 F. Supp. 256 (D. Kan. 1968) (accepting that the unnecessary division
of a county may thwart the purpose of constitutional apportionment and dilute the political
power of those counties); Sincock v. Gately, 262 F. Supp. 739, 855 (D.C. Del. 1967) (Wright,
D.J., dissenting in part) (urging that partisan gerrymandering is justiciable); Drum v.
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C. Affirmative Representation of Racial or PoliticalElements
No state is required to maximize the voting strength of any political or
racial element or to provide for proportional representation. 376 Likewise,
no such element has a constitutional right to an apportionment plan drawn
to maximize its political strength. The United States Supreme Court has
recognized, however, that a state legislature has authority to draw district
lines in such a manner that they achieve a rough approximation of the
strengths of political parties or racial groups. In 1973 the Court rejected a
constitutional challenge to a reapportionment that purported to draw districts statewide in accordance with the relative strength of the Democratic
and Republican parties. 377 The Court held:

[Clourts have [no] constitutional warrant to invalidate a state plan,
otherwise within tolerable population limits, because it undertakes,
not to minimize or eliminate the political strength of any group or
party, but to recognize it and, through districting, provide a rough sort
378
of proportional representation in the legislative halls of the State.
Cognizant of the abuses that a purposeful misreading of this holding might
engender, the Court cautioned that districting plans would be vulnerable if
racial or political groups "have been fenced out of the political process and
'379
their voting strength invidiously minimized.
Four years later the Court applied this concept to approve a reapportionment that contained districts drawn intentionally with black voting
majorities. In United Jewish Organizations,Inc. v. Carey380 a plurality of
the Court 38' held that "neither the Fourteenth nor the Fifteenth AmendSeawell, 250 F. Supp. 922 (M.D.N.C. 1966) (invalidating plan in part because districts not
compact and contiguous). Even if partisan claims are justiciable, however, it is unlikely that
either of the two major political parties could carry the burden of showing invidious discrimination. See note 373 supra; United Jewish Organizations, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144,
167 (1977); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 155 (1971) (ghetto residents in the case no
more discriminated against than "other Democrats").
376. E.g., Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 136 n.8 (1976); City of Richmond v.
United States, 422 U.S. 358, 370-72 (1975); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 156-60
(1971); Gilbert v. Sterrett, 509 F.2d 1389, 1394 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 951 (1975);
Cousins v. City Council, 503 F.2d 912, 920 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,420 U.S. 992 (1975);
Turner v. McKeithen, 490 F.2d 191, 197 (5th Cir. 1973); Howard v. Adams County Bd. of
Supervisors, 453 F.2d 455, 458 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 925 (1972); Dunn v.
Oklahoma, 343 F. Supp. 320, 329 (W.D. Okla. 1972). But see Beer v. United States, 425 U.S.
130, 157 n.16 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court's decision in Whitcomb
v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971), did not foreclose a right to proportional representation when
there is evidence of a denial of access to the political process).
377. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
378. Id. at 754.
379. Id.
380. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
381. The plurality opinion of four Justices based its judgment on two approaches to the
issue of proportional representation. One focused on the Voting Rights Act and the need for
a state to use racial criteria and race-oriented remedies in its effort to comply with the Act by
maintaining nonwhite voting strength. Id. at 163-65. Justice Brennan concurred in this approach. Id. at 168-80 (Brennan, J., concurring in part). The second approach adopted by
the plurality was that the state was free to use racial factors in apportioning as long as it did
not violate the United States Constitution. Id. at 165-68. Justices Stewart and Powell concurred in this approach on the basis that the petitioners had failed to show that the state's
use of racial criteria violated either the fourteenth or fifteenth amendment. Id. at 179-80

SO UTHWESTERN L4W JOURNAL

[Vol. 34

ment mandates any per se rule against using racial factors in districting
and apportionment.

'382

The plurality stated that:

[W]e think it. . .permissible for a State, employing sound districting principles such as compactness and population equality, to attempt to prevent racial minorities from being repeatedly outvoted by
creating districts that will afford fair representation to the members of
those racial groups who are sufficiently numerous and whose residenof creating districts in which they
tial patterns afford the opportunity
383
will be in the majority.
Thus, a state apparently is not confined to using racial criteria only to
eliminate the effects of past discrimination. 384 It may do so for the purpose
of providing proportional representation as long as it does not "fence out"
another group from participation in the political processes or "minimize or
unfairly cancel out" the voting strength of such a group. 385 In UnitedJewish Organizations,Inc. v. Carey386 the district lines were drawn "in such a
way that the percentage of districts with a nonwhite majority roughly approximate[d] the percentage of nonwhites in the county, ' 387 and white voters remained the majority in approximately 70% of the assembly and
(Stewart, J., concurring). Chief Justice Burger dissented. Id. at 180-87. See Dunn v.
Oklahoma, 343 F. Supp. 320, 329 (W.D. Okla. 1972) ("[A] color-conscience [sic] approach to
districting, if designed to aid the blacks, is constitutionally permissible; if designed to harm
the blacks, it is impermissible, but a color-conscience [sic] approach is never mandated.").
382. 430 U.S. at 162. Mr. Justice Brennan, however, in his concurring opinion warned
that apparently remedial or "benign" uses of racial criteria may actually "disguise a policy
that perpetuates disadvantageous treatment of the plan's supposed beneficiaries," stigmatize
racial groups, or be viewed as unjust by those who are disadvantaged by the preference
given other groups. Id. at 173-75.
383. Id. at 168. The Court's statement is not unlike that expressed in Justice Powell's
opinion in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), that a state university
may consider race as one factor in determining medical school admissions. Whether it similarly is possible for a court to draw districts with the objective of proportional representation
is less certain. See Marshall v. Edwards, 582 F.2d 927 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that courts
should leave racially proportional representation to legislative bodies and admonishing the
district court to give more attention to equal population and rational boundaries than to the
"political objective" of proportional representation). But see Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors, 554 F.2d 139 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 968 (1977). See generally Note,
Group Representation and Race-Conscious Apportionment.: The Roles of States and the Federal Courts, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1847 (1978).

384. 430 U.S. at 162; see Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1
(1971).
385. 430 U.S. at 165. All of the members of the Court, except Chief Justice Burger (dissenting), placed emphasis on the fact that whatever discrimination occurred against the
white petitioners did not "stigmatize" them. Four Justices repeated this test in Regents of
the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 360 (1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall, & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting). In United Jewish Organizations,
Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 171 (1977), Justice Brennan contrasted the affirmative use of
racial criteria in that case with other cases where it was used to reduce a minority's voting
strength and therefore would be viewed as "suspect." Perhaps, as noted by the Court in
Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969), "[t]he majority needs no protection against
discrimination.
...
Accord,
.
Ely, The Constitutionalityof Reverse RacialDiscrimination,41
U. CHI. L. REV. 723, 727 (1974). Contra, Dixon, The Supreme Court andEquality: Legisla-

tive Classfications, Desegregation, and Reverse Discrimination, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 494,
503-04 (1977); Emerson, Malapportionment and Judicial Power, 72 YALE L.J. 64, 74 (1962).
386. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
387. 1d. at 165.
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senate districts in the county. 388
V.

TEXAS

LAW APPLICABLE TO LEGISLATIVE REAPPORTIONMENT

Provisions of Texas law governing apportionment of the Texas Senate
and House of Representatives are embodied in sections 25, 26, 26a, and 28
of article III of the Texas Constitution. 38 9 As a result of federal court decisions over the past two decades, however, these state constitutional provisions no longer have their apparent or literal meaning. At least one,
section 26a, clearly is no longer in effect at all. 390 Section 25, governing
apportionment of the Texas Senate, was invalidated in part in 1965 by the
same federal court that declared section 26a unconstitutional. 39' Portions
of the section, however, are not violative of the United States Constitution
and therefore are severable from the offensive provisions and are still in
effect. The Texas Supreme Court has refused to find that the provisions of
section 26 governing apportionment of the house of representatives have
been invalidated or to permit the legislature to dispense with the section's
requirements except to the extent necessary to comply with the United
States Constitution. 392 Therefore, compliance with the existent requirements of the Texas Constitution will be necessary for enactment of a valid
state legislative reapportionment.
Section 25, 3 9 3 at least insofar as it prohibits any single county from entitlement to more than one senator, was declared violative of the United
Constitution in 1965 by the federal district court in Kilgarlin v. MarStates
tin. 394 If the section otherwise remains in effect, it imposes three identifiable requirements: that the state's thirty-one senators be elected from
single-member districts, that the districts be composed of contiguous territory, and that the districts be drawn on the basis of qualified electors. Total population rather than the number of electors was used to apportion
the senate both in 1965 and 1971. Continued use of total population instead of qualified electors as the apportionment base is advisable because
apportionment on the basis of qualified electors, although not unconstitutional per se, is permitted under the United States Constitution only if required by extraordinary circumstances. 395 Under section 3 of article III of
the Texas Constitution, a new senate must be elected after each apportion388. Id. at 163-65.
389. TEX. CONST. art. III, §§ 25-26a, 28.
390. Kilgarlin v. Martin, No. 63-H-390 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 1965) (summary judgment);
see note 158 supra and accompanying text. Section 26a limited counties to a maximum of
seven state representatives plus one for each 100,000 people over 600,000.
391. Kilgarlin v. Martin, No. 63-H-390 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 1965) (summary judgment).
392. Smith v. Craddick, 471 S.W.2d 375, 379 (Tex. 1971). Other courts have reached
similar conclusions regarding the continued effectiveness of state constitutional requirements. Eg., Reynolds v. State Election Bd., 233 F. Supp. 323 (W.D. Okla. 1964).
393. TEX. CONST. art. III, § 25 provides: "The State shall be divided into Senatorial
Districts of contiguous territory according to the number of qualified electors, as nearly as
may be, and each district shall be entitled to elect one Senator; and no single county shall be
entitled to more than one Senator."
394. No. 63-H-390 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 1965) (summary judgment).
395. See notes 288-96 supra and accompanying text.
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ment. 396

Section 26 of article II1397 requires that state representatives be apportioned among the counties according to population. If a county has sufficient population to be entitled to a representative, it is to be formed into a
separate district. Section 26 neither prevents nor requires drawing districts
within a county entitled to two or more representatives. Therefore, multimember districts are possible. 398 Section 26, however, prevents the division of a county and the combination of a part of that divided county with
another county or counties unless such division results from apportioning
surplus population from a county otherwise entitled to a representative or
of counties combined
is necessary under federal law. Counties or portions
399
to form legislative districts must be contiguous.
In holding the 1971 reapportionment of the Texas House of Representatives invalid, the Texas Supreme Court in Smith v. Craddick4°° expressly
directed that:
The only impairment of this mandate [apportionment by county] is
that a county may be divided if to do so is necessary in order to comply with the equal population requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment.
. . . If the population of the county is slightly under or over the
ideal population figure, the state constitution requires that the county
constitute a separate district.
. . . It is still required that a county receive the member or members to which that county's own population is entitled when the ideal
district population is substantially equalled or is exceeded. 40 1
The United States Supreme Court acknowledged, and impliedly approved,
396. TEX. CONST. art. III, § 3. Senators elected after every apportionment must be divided into two classes: those whose terms expire two years later and those whose terms
expire four years later. The Texas attorney general ruled in 1969 that this requirement similarly would apply to bills intended to make changes in only a few districts. TEX. ATT'Y
GEN. Op. No. M-349 (1969); see Spears v. Davis, 398 S.W.2d 921 (Tex. 1966).
397. TEX. CONST. art. III, § 26 provides:
The members of the House of Representatives shall be apportioned among the
several counties, according to the number of population in each, as nearly as
may be, on a ratio obtained by dividing the population of the State, as ascertained by the most recent United States census, by the number of members of
which the House is composed; provided, that whenever a single county has
sufficient population to be entitled to a Representative, such county shall be
formed into a separate Representative District, and when two or more counties are required to make up the ratio of representation, such counties shall be
contiguous to each other; and when any one county had more than sufficient
population to be entitled to one or more Representatives, such Representative
or Representatives shall be apportioned to such county, and for any surplus of
population it may be joined in a Representative District with any other contiguous county or counties.
398. See, e.g., Mauzy v. Legislative Redistricting Bd., 471 S.W.2d 570, 575 (Tex. 1971);
Smith v. Craddick, 471 SW.2d 375, 377 (Tex. 1971); Hainsworth v. Martin, 386 S.W.2d 202
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin, writ ref d n.r.e.), vacated as moot, 382 U.S. 109 (1965).
399. TEX. Arr'Y GEN. Op. No. WW-1041 (1961) (providing a definition for the term
contiguous).
400. 471 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. 1971).
401. Id. at 377-78.
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this Texas decision in White v. Regester,40 2 wherein the Court indicated by
footnote that the preservation of county lines would have been sufficient to
justify the 9.9% total maximum deviation in population existing40 3among
Texas house districts in the 1971 State Redistricting Board plan.
The view of the Texas Supreme Court with regard to enforcement of the
state constitutional requirement for apportionment on the basis of counties
is apparent from Smith v. Craddick.4°4 The Republican petitioners in the
case were able to show that the 1971 enactment divided thirty-three counties, thereby establishing a prima facie case that the plan was unconstitutional. At that point the burden shifted to the State of Texas to show the
reason behind the divisions.4 05 The only reason acceptable under section
26 was equalization of population, either as a result of apportioning the
surplus population in a county already entitled to a representative or as
otherwise required to comply with the equal protection requirement of the
40 6
United States Constitution. The state failed to make such a showing.
Instead, as pointed out by the Court, eighteen counties with less than the
ideal population were divided rather than joined with other similar counties and one county, which had population sufficient for a representative,
was divided between two districts. 4°7 The naked assertion by the state of
the need to equalize population under the United States Constitution was
not sufficient in the face of the petitioners' proof.
In assessing the significance of Craddick and the provisions of the Texas
Constitution on reapportionment in the 1980's, the following observations
are offered. First, the current requirements of sections 25 and 26 should be
followed insofar as possible subject to the overriding requirements of federal law. For this purpose, compliance with the fifteenth amendment and
the Voting Rights Act, in addition to the equal protection requirement of
the fourteenth amendment, should justify a failure to follow strictly the
provisions of the Texas Constitution. If adherence to federal law is the
reason for a failure to follow the Texas Constitution, legislators must be
careful to distinguish between what is required by federal law and what is
permitted by it. Exercise of legislative discretion, even if consistent with
federal policy, may not be sufficient to justify deviation from the specific
prescriptions of the state constitution. Secondly, the legislature, in enacting the reapportionment legislation, must provide the evidence that will
allow the state to carry its burden of explaining any deviation from the
requirements of the Texas Constitution. For example, whenever a proposed districting plan divides a county, the proponent of the plan must
demonstrate that such division is required in order to comply with federal
402. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).

403. Id. at 764 & n.8 ("[Tihe State achieved a constitutionally acceptable accommodation, between population principles and its policy against cutting county lines in forming
representative districts.").
404. 471 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. 1971).
405. Id. at 378.
406. Id.
407. Id.
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law or, in the house of representatives, that such division is the result of
apportioning a county's excess population.
Section 28 of article 111408 of the Texas Constitution requires that the
Texas Legislature apportion the state into senatorial and representative
districts at its first regular session after publication of each United States
decennial census. It does not apply to congressional districts. If the legislature, at the first regular session, fails to apportion either the house or
senate, the State Legislative Redistricting Board shall assemble within
ninety days after adjournment of the regular session and, within sixty days
thereafter, apportion the state. In 1971 the Texas Supreme Court, in
Mauzy v. Legislative Redistricting Board,409 considered several questions
concerning the meaning of section 28 that may be material for redistricting
in the 1980's. First, although section 28 provides that redistricting shall
occur at the first regular session "after" publication of the census, section
28 applies if publication occurs either before the legislature convenes or
during the session, even though publication in mid-session may permit
only "a few weeks, or even only a few days in which to put the finishing
touches on a redistricting bill."' 410 Secondly, although the court left open
the question of what constitutes "publication" for purposes of section 28, it
implied that "furnish[ing the legislature with] all census figures necessary
to apportion the state into legislative districts" 41' would be sufficient.
Thirdly, the court held that a legislatively enacted reapportionment
408. TEx. CONST. art. Ii, § 28 provides:
The Legislature shall, at its first regular session after the publication of each
United States decennial census, apportion the state into senatorial and representative districts, agreeable to the provisions of Sections 25, 26 and 26a of this
Article. In the event the Legislature shall at any such first regular session
following the publication of a United States decennial census, fail to make
such apportionment, same shall be done by the Legislative Redistricting
Board of Texas, which is hereby created, and shall be composed of five (5)
members, as follows: The Lieutenant Governor, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Attorney General, the Comptroller of Public Accounts
and the Commissioner of the General Land Office, a majority of whom shall
constitute a quorum. Said Board shall assemble in the City of Austin within
ninety (90) days after the final adjournment of such regular session. The
Board shall, within sixty (60) days after assembling, apportion the state into
senatorial and representative districts as the failure of action of such Legislature may make necessary. Such apportionment shall be in writing and signed
by three (3) or more of the members of the Board duly acknowledged as the
act and deed of such Board, and, when so executed and filed with the Secretary of State, shall have force and effect of law. Such apportionment shall
become effective at the next succeeding state-wide general election. The
Supreme Court of Texas shall have jurisdiction to compel such Commission to
perform its duties in accordance with the provisions of this section by writ of
mandamus or other extraordinary writs conformable to the usages of law.
The Legislature shall provide necessary funds for clerical and technical aid
and for other expenses incidental to the work of the Board, and the Lieutenant
Governor and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall be entitled to
receive per diem and travel expenses during the Board's session in the same
manner and amount as they would receive while attending a special session of
the Legislature. This amendment shall become effective January 1, 1951.
409. 471 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. 1971).
410. Id. at 573.
411. Id.
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"which is invalid, for whatever reason, is no apportionment, '4t 2 and that
"the Board's duty to proceed with apportioning the state . . .accrued
when the regular session adjourned . . . without having enacted a valid
apportionment statute. '41 3 Presumably, therefore, if a reapportionment is
invalid under federal law, the State Legislative Redistricting Board has a
duty to proceed to apportion the state. Finally, uncertainty exists as to
whether the legislature has the power to apportion when the invalidity of
the legislative enactment is determined more than 150 days after adjournment of the legislature and therefore beyond the period prescribed in section 28 for action by the Redistricting Board. The court declined to
decide whether the legislature could apportion in special session "if the
power did not reside in the Board or if the Board's own scheme [was] declared invalid. ' '4 14 By enacting state legislative reapportionment bills in
1975 and 1979, the Texas Legislature assumed that it has authority, at least
in regular session, to pass a reapportionment bill under such circumstances. In the view of this writer, the legislature has authority in either
regular or special session to cure an invalid reapportionment once the
State Legislative Redistricting Board is no longer empowered to do so.
There are several other aspects of Texas law that may affect reapportionment in the 1980's. Although article 29d of the Texas Civil Statutes 4 15
prohibits official recognition of or action on any report of the federal decennial census prior to September of the year after the census was taken,
the legislature is specifically exempted from the prohibition. Moreover,
the Texas Supreme Court in Mauzy held the provision ineffective to the
extent that it conflicts with the obligation of the legislature to reapportion
under section 28 of article III of the Texas Constitution. 4 16 The Governor
of Texas almost certainly has authority to veto legislative reapportionments, although the issue has never been addressed in Texas. 4 17 The
United States Supreme Court has established that a governor has such authority with regard to congressional districting. 41 8 Governors
have vetoed
41 9
reapportionment acts on several occasions in other states.
Although much attention over the coming months with regard to potential litigation challenging state legislative apportionments is likely to focus
on the requirements of federal law, the Texas Legislature must achieve a
proper accommodation between federal mandates and applicable require412. Id. at 574.
413. Id.
414. Id. But see TEX. ATT'Y GEN. Op. No. M-881 (1971).
415. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 29d (Vernon 1971).
416. 471 S.W.2d at 574-75. In 1976 Congress authorized a mid-decade census, 13 U.S.C.
§ 141(d) (1976), but provided that the information could not be used to reapportion congres-

sional districts. Id. § 141(e)(2). The state could impose a similar limitation on reapportionment by the Texas Legislature or political subdivisions.
417. In 1921 Governor Neff, while not vetoing the legislatively enacted apportionment
plans, refused to sign them and again submitted the subject for action in a special session
called immediately following the regular session. TEX. H.R.J. 16 (1921).
418. Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 368 (1932); see Carroll v. Baker, 285 U.S. 380 (1932);
Koenig v. Flynn, 285 U.S. 375 (1932).
419. See note 86 supra and accompanying text.
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ments of the Texas Constitution. During the past two decades, at least
four suits have been filed in state courts challenging state legislative reapportionments, with the 1971 enactment apportioning the house of representatives declared invalid.420 The legislature should anticipate the
possibility of state as well as federal litigation in the 1980'S. 42 1 Moreover,
the legislature should consider the role of the State Legislative Redistricting Board in regard to legislative enactments to which the United States
Attorney General objects under the Voting Rights Act. If an objection is
received within ninety or 150 days after adjournment of the regular session, there may be authority under section 28 for the board to redraw the
legislative districts to eliminate the cause for the objection. The legislature
should consider whether such an alternative, especially if the required
modification is minor, is preferable to a declaratory judgment
action in the
422
United States District Court in the District of Columbia.
VI.

PRINCIPLES OF REAPPORTIONMENT UNDER SECTION
VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965

A.

5 OF

THE

The Act

In 1965 prompted by what it perceived as "an insidious and pervasive
evil which had been perpetuated in certain parts of our country through
unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution, ' ' 42 3 Congress en425
acted the Voting Rights Act of 1965424 to enforce both the fourteenth
and fifteenth amendments 4 26 to the United States Constitution and "to rid
the country of racial discrimination in voting. '427 The Act prohibits certain prerequisites to voting and established a requirement of preclearance
420. See notes 404-07 supra and accompanying text.
421. Several state courts have considered the validity of state constitutional or statutory
reapportionment provisions under the United States Constitution. See, e.g., Groh v. Egan,
526 P.2d 863 (Alaska 1974); Legislature of Cal. v. Reinecke, 6 Cal. 3d 595, 492 P.2d 385, 99
Cal. Rptr. 481 (1972); Silver v. Brown, 63 Cal. 2d 270, 405 P.2d 132, 46 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1965);
Noun v. Turner, 193 N.W.2d 784 (Iowa 1972); Kruidenier v. McCulloch, 252 Iowa 1121, 142
N.W.2d 355, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 851 (1966); In re House Bill No. 2620, 225 Kan. 827, 595
P.2d 334 (1979); In re Senate Bill No. 220, 225 Kan. 628, 593 P.2d I (1979); Duxbury v.
Donovan, 292 Minn. 424, 138 N.W.2d 692 (1965); Nevada ex rel. Pagni v. Brown, 88 Nev.
339, 497 P.2d 1364 (1972); Jackman v. Bodine, 55 N.J. 371, 262 A.2d 389, cer. denied, 400
U.S. 849 (1970); Wisconsin exrel. Reynolds v. Zimmerman, 22 Wis. 2d 544, 126 N.W.2d 551
(1964).
422. See text accompanying notes 454-55 infra.
423. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309 (1966); see S. REP. No. 162, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3-6, reprinted in [1965] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2508, 2508-26; H.R.
REP. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-16, reprintedin [1965] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2437, 2440-44.
424. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973dd-5 (1976).
425. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 652-53 (1966); see Briscoe v. Bell, 432 U.S.
404, 414-15 (1977); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 118 (1970) (Black, J., separate opinion). But see United States v. Uvalde Consol. Independent School Dist., 461 F. Supp. 117
(W.D. Tex. 1978) (the Voting Rights Act enforces the fifteenth amendment, which the court
concludes does not apply to multimember districts, and therefore, the United States Attorney General lacks authority to challenge multimember districts under the Voting Rights
Act).
426. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309 (1966).
427. Id.at 315.
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by federal authorities of changes proposed in state elections. 428 Initially,
the Act applied only to certain states 429 and was for a limited duration. In
1975 Congress extended the Act for seven years and expanded it to include
"language minorities" in addition to other racial minorities, 430 thus extending its coverage to certain states, including Texas, that had not been
covered by the Act when passed in 1965 or when amended in 1970.
The Act prohibits any state or political subdivision from imposing or
applying any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or any standard, practice, or procedure to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of
the United States to vote on account of race or color. 43 1 In response to
what it viewed as the "common practice of some jurisdictions of staying
one step ahead of the federal courts by passing new discriminatory voting
laws as soon as old ones had been struck down, ' 432 Congress prescribed an
extraordinary remedy in section 5433 of the Act. 4 34 Under section 5, no
428. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976).
429. Under the original 1965 Act, a state or political subdivision is covered by § 5 if, on
Nov. I, 1964, it maintained a test or device as a prerequisite to registration or voting and less
than 50% of the voting age population was registered on Nov. 1, 1964, or voted in the 1964
presidential election. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 5, 79 Stat. 437 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976)). In 1970 the Act was amended to add those jurisdictions that maintained a "test or device" on Nov. 1, 1968, and in which less than 50% of
the voting age population was registered on Nov. 1, 1968, or voted in the 1968 presidential
election. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, § 5, 84 Stat. 314.
430. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, §§ 203-204, 206-207, 89
Stat. 400 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973d, 1973k-19731 (1976)); see S. REP. No. 295,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 24-37, reprintedin [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 774; H.R.
REP. No. 196, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-29. For purposes of the Act, "language minorities" or
a "language minority group" means "persons who are American Indian, Asian American,
Alaskan Natives or of Spanish heritage." 42 U.S.C. § 1973/(c)(3) (1976). Hispanics previously had been recognized by the Supreme Court as a racial minority under the Constitution. See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 768 (1973); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475
(1954). But see Renfrew, Affirmative Action." A Pleafora Reciilocation Princiole,9 Sw. U.L.
REV. 597 (1977).
431. Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1976).
432. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 314 (1966).
433. See generally Halpin & Engstrom, Racial Gerrymandering and Southern State Legislative Redistricting.- Attorney General Determinations Under the Voting Rights Act, 22 J. PUB.
L. 37 (1973); Roman, Section 5 ofthe Voting Rights Act. The Formationofan Extraordinary
FederalRemedy, 22 AM. UNIV. L. REV. 111 (1972).
434. The Act provides:
Whenever a-State or political subdivision with respect to which the prohibitions set forth in section 1973b (a) of this title based upon determinations
made under the first sentence of section 1973b (b) of this title are in effect
shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to
voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different
from that in force or effect on November 1, 1964, or whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to which the prohibitions set forth in section
1973b (a) of this title based upon determinations made under the second sentence of section 1973b (b) of this title are in effect shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, or
practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or
effect on November 1,1968, or whenever a State or political subdivision with
respect to which the prohibitions set forth in section 1973b (a) of this title
based upon determinations made under the third sentence of section 1973b
(b) of this title are in effect shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with re-
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jurisdiction may change a voting qualification, prerequisite, standard, procedure, or practice without first obtaining a declaration from the District
Court of the District of Columbia or the United States Attorney General
that the change has neither the purpose nor the effect of "denying or
abridging the right to vote on account of race or color. ' 435 The burden of
to
proof before both the court and the Attorney General is on the state 436
show that the change has neither such a purpose nor such an effect.
Therefore, if the plan is submitted to the Attorney General, it cannot be
enforced if he timely notifies the state that the plan is violative of the Act
conclude that the plan does not have a discriminaor that he is unable to 437
tory purpose or effect.
B. Administration of the Act
Designated federal officials determine whether the Act is applicable to a
particular state and whether, for purposes of the required review, a particspect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1972, such
State or subdivision may institute an action in the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose
and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section
1973b(f)(2) of this title, and unless and until the court enters such judgment no
person shall be denied the right to vote for failure to comply with such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice or procedure: Provided, That each
qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure may be enforced
without such proceeding if the qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice,
or procedure has been submitted by the chief legal officer or other appropriate
official of such State or subdivision to the Attorney General and the Attorney
General has not interposed an objection within sixty days after such submission, or upon good cause shown, to facilitate an expedited approval within
sixty days after such submission, the Attorney General has affirmatively indicated that such objection will not be made. Neither an affirmative indication
by the Attorney General that no objection will be made, nor the Attorney
General's failure to object, nor a declaratory judgment entered under this section shall bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforcement of such qualification,
prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure. In the event the Attorney General affirmatively indicates that no objection will be made within the sixty-day
period following receipt of a submission, the Attorney General may reserve
the right to reexamine the submission if additional information comes to his
attention during the remainder of the sixty-day period which would otherwise
require objection in accordance with this section. Any action under this section shall be heard and determined by a court of three judges in accordance
with the provisions of section 2284 of Title 28 and any appeal shall lie to the
Supreme Court.
42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (1976).
435. Id. A voting change brought about by a state court decision construing an already
precleared statute apparently is not within the scope of § 5. See Williams v. Sclafani, 444 F.
Supp. 895, 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
436. 28 C.F.R. § 51.19 (1979). See also id.§ 51.4(b). An election change failing to meet
preclearance requirements is "of no force or effect," and elections conducted pursuant to
such a change are unlawful. United States v. County Comm'n, 425 F. Supp. 433, 436 (S.D.
Ala. 1976), aff'd, 430 U.S. 924 (1977). The United States Attorney General or a private
party may sue to enjoin the use of such an election change. Id.; see note 456 infra. See also
Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 538 (1973); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S.
301, 328 (1966).
437. Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 530 (1973).
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ular change has a racially discriminatory effect or purpose. 438 Furthermore, no direct appeal of such determinations is possible. 439 Once federal
officials determine a state or political subdivision to be within the Act's
coverage, exemption is possible only through a "bail-out suit" brought
against the United States in the District Court for the District of Columbia. In such a suit, the state or political subdivision must show, or the
United States Attorney General must agree, that no test or device denying
the right to vote on account of race or color has been used for the preceding ten or seventeen years, depending on the applicable portion of 42
U.S.C. §§ 1973b(a), ().440
Once a proposed election change is submitted to him, the United States
Attorney General is afforded sixty days in which to review it and to object. 44 1 If he fails to convey an objection to the state within that period, the
change becomes effective. 44 2 A nunc pro tunc objection by the Attorney
General is invalid, and a state has the right to enforce the change. 44 3 Department of Justice regulations direct that the Attorney General also will
notify a jurisdiction within sixty days after submission if the proposed
4 " Expedited consideration is possible only under cerchange is approved.445
tain circumstances.
In construing what actually constitutes submission of a change pursuant
to the Act, the courts have required that the state "in some unambiguous
and recordable manner submit any legislation. . . directly to the Attorney
General with a request for his consideration pursuant to the Act." 44 6 Department of Justice regulations set out in considerable detail the requirements of a submission and the nature of supportive information deemed
necessary for adequate review." 7 For redistricting proposals, the regulations strongly urge jurisdictions to provide supportive information includ438. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (1976); see Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491, 499 (1977) (determination of whether to object under § 5); Briscoe v. Bell, 432 U.S. 404, 409-10 (1977)
(determination under § 4(b) of whether a jurisdiction is covered by the Act). See Connor v.
Waller, 421 U.S. 656 (1975); Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 383-86 (1971); Allen v. State
Bd. of Education, 393 U.S. 544, 555-59 (1969).
439. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (1976); see Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491, 504-07 (1977)
(no judicial review of Attorney General's failure to object under § 5); Briscoe v. Bell, 432
U.S. 404, 412 (1977) (no judicial review of determination of coverage under the Act); Harris
v. Bell, 562 F.2d 772, 773-74 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (no judicial review of Attorney General's
determination to withdraw objection under § 5).
440. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b(a), (f)(1976); see Briscoe v. Bell, 432 U.S. 404 (1977). A bailout suit for a city must be brought by the state. City of Rome v. United States, 48 U.S.L.W.
4463 (Apr. 22, 1980).
441. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976).
442. Id.
443. Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491, 504 (1977). The Court noted: "Although there
was to be no bar to subsequent constitutional challenges to the implemented legislation,
there also was to be 'no dragging out' of the extraordinary federal remedy beyond the period
specified in the statute." Id.
444. 28 C.F.R. § 51.20 (1979).
445. Id. § 51.22.
446. Allen v. State Bd. of Educ., 393 U.S. 544, 571 (1969); see United States v. Board of
Comm'rs, 435 U.S. 110, 136 (1978).
447. 28 C.F.R. § 51.10 (1979).
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ing the following: reasons for change; any litigation affecting the change;
prior laws; a map showing population distribution by race within existing
and proposed districts; populations by race of the areas to be affected; voting age population and number of registered voters by race; a record of
past candidates and elections; and evidence of public notices, hearings,
speeches, and newspaper articles discussing the proposed change. 4 8 A
failure to provide information that the Attorney General determines to be
necessary for his review under Department of Justice regulations will result in a determination that the submission is inadequate, and the period of
review will not commence until the information is provided. 44 9
Department of Justice regulations require an Attorney General to enter
an objection if the evidence regarding the purpose or effect of the change is
conflicting and he is unable within the prescribed sixty-day period to resolve the conflict. 4 50 If an objection is lodged, a request for rehearing may
be made within ten days to allow submission of further information. 45 ' A
similar sixty-day period exists for a decision on rehearing. 452 Under the
regulations, the Attorney General may withdraw an objection. 453 Although a state may not appeal the decision of the United States Attorney
General to object to a particular election change, it is not prevented from
bringing a declaratory judgment action under section 5 in the District
Court of the District of Columbia for a declaration that the proposed
change does not have the proscribed purpose or effect. 454 In such a declaratory judgment proceeding, the prior determination of the Attorney General, while apparently admissible, is not conclusive of whether the plan
455
should be approved.
Private parties also are restricted in their recourse under the Act. A person objecting to proposed election changes may enforce section 5 only by
instituting an action for a declaratory judgment that an election change is
subject to the Act and by seeking an injunction to prevent implementation
of the change unless it has first been submitted for federal review. 456 Department of Justice regulations, however, encourage private citizens opposed to a voting change to make the reasons for their opposition known
to the Department. 45 7 Persons may request that their identity not be dis448. Id. § 51.10(a)-(b).
449. Id. § 51.3(b); see City of Rome v. United States, 48 U.S.L.W. 4463 (Apr. 22, 1980).
450. Id. § 51.19.
451. Id. § 51.21(b).
452. Id. § 51.24.
453. Id. §§ 51.3, .25.
454. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976).
455. Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 441, 507 (1977). The Attorney General's interpretation of the scope of § 5, however, is given particular deference. See Dougherty County Bd.
of Educ. v. White, 439 U.S. 32, 39 (1978); United States v. Board of Comm'rs, 435 U.S. 110,
131 (1978); Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 391 (1971).
456. Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 383-87 (1971); see City of Mobile v. Bolden, 48
U.S.L.W. 4436, 4437 (Apr. 22, 1980); United States v. Board of Supervisors, 429 U.S. 642,
646 (1977).
457. See generally 28 C.F.R. §§ 51.12-.15 (1979).
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closed to anyone outside the Department. 458 Pursuant to the regulations, a
registry is maintained of persons in each jurisdiction to be notified when a
proposed change is submitted.4 59 If deemed necessary, the Attorney General may provide public notice sufficient to invite other interested persons
to provide evidence. 460 Since 1965 persons opposed to certain changes as
racially discriminatory have made the reasons for their opposition known
to the Department of Justice. Such opposition has undoubtedly affected
decisions by the United States Attorney General to object to certain
changes. If the Attorney General fails to make a timely objection to a
proposed change, private parties have no right of appeal, but retain the
right to challenge the change in court as violative of other state or federal
requirements, including the United States Constitution. 46 1
C.

Standards under the Act

Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act prohibits a voting change having
either the effect or the purpose of denying or abridging the right to vote on
account of race or color. The substantive meaning of section 5 as applied
to redistricting remains unclear. 462 In the United States Supreme Court's
only decision directly applying the substantive provisions of the Act to a
reapportionment, Beer v. UnitedStates,463 the Court considered what standard should be used under section 5 to determine when a new reapportionment has the proscribed effect. A majority of only five Justices concluded
that the question was one of statutory construction, 464 rather than constitutional law, and, after a review of the Act's legislative history, ruled: "[T]he
purpose of § 5 has always been to insure that no voting-procedure changes
would be made that would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial
minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral
franchise. ' 465 Using this retrogression test, the Court compared the old
and new apportionments and found that "a legislative reapportionment
that enhances the position of racial minorities . . . can hardly have the
458.
459.
460.
461.

Id. § 51.12(c).
Id. § 51.13.
Id. § 51.18(c).
See Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491, 504 (1977).

462. There is no question, however, that it applies to reapportionment enactments. Beer
v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 133 (1976); Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 531
(1973). In Georgia the Court expressly reserved the question of whether a district that is

identical to a district in the previous apportionment is subject to preclearance under the
Voting Rights Act. Id. at 535 n.7. The Court again reserved this question in Beer v. United
States, 425 U.S. 130, 139 n.10 (1973). In Beer the Court ruled that a preexisting plan for
certain at-large city councilman seats was not subject to review under § 5. Id. at 139.
463. 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
464. Id. at 139.

465. Id. at 141 (emphasis added). In Beer Justice White would have adopted a very
different standard under the Voting Rights Act. When it appears that polarized voting exists

and a racial minority cannot win in any district where the racial group does not constitute a
majority of the voters, Justice White would find that: "where these facts exist, combined
with a segregated residential pattern, § 5 is not satisfied unless, to the extent practicable, the
new electoral districts afford the Negro minority the opportunity to achieve legislative representation roughly proportional to the Negro population in the community." Id. at 143-44
(White, J., dissenting).
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'effect' of diluting or abridging the right to vote on account of race...
[and] cannot violate § 5 unless. .. [it] so466discriminates on the basis of race
or color as to violate the Constitution.
In determining that the reapportionment in Beer did not have a retrogressive effect, the Court found that the plan increased the likelihood of
election of a member of the racial minority because it increased the percentage of districts where members of the protected racial minority had a
clear majority of the voters. 467 The Court arrived at this standard for applying the retrogression test in the context of the lower court's findings that
bloc or polarized voting existed in the city and that a minority candidate
could not win an election except in districts where a majority of the voters
were members of the racial minority. 468 The majority opinion did not expressly reject other possible standards for other circumstances, such as
where bloc voting is not present and minority voting strength might be
heightened by being spread through several districts rather than concentrated in one.469 Still, assumptions of bloc or polarized voting and minority representation only through the election of members of the minority
470
itself are prevalent in other decisions regarding the Voting Rights Act.
The Department of Justice has used two population thresholds in determining whether a racial minority has a majority of voters in any particular
district. The Department considers a percentage of at least 65% of the district's total population and 60% of the district's voting age population necessary for members of a racial minority to have some chance of electing a
candidate of their own choice 47' due to the higher percentage of nonvoting
age persons and the presence of low voter registration and turnout among
racial minorities. 472 These figures, like the standard applied in Beer, are
based on an assumption of polarized or bloc voting. The Department further urges that factors such as incumbency, strength of campaign organization, qualifications of individual candidates, and the activism of local
466. Id. at 141.
467. Id. at 142.

468. See id. at 136-37; id. at 143-44 (White, J., dissenting).
469. In considering dilution of voting strength claims, several courts have found that
minorities may wield political strength by being a large minority in a district. E.g., Dove v.
Moore, 539 F,2d 1152, 1155 n.4 (8th Cir. 1976); Panior v. Iberville Parish School Bd., 536

F.2d 101, 104-05 (5th Cir. 1976); Moore v. Leflore County Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 520
F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1974); Howard v. Adams County Bd. Supervisors, 453 F.2d 455 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 407 U.S. 925 (1972). The Fifth Circuit noted in Paniorthat "there is no agreement on whether the political interests of a minority group are best maximized by an overwhelming majority in a single district, bare majorities in more than one district or a
substantial proportion of voters in a number of districts." 536 F.2d at 105. See also Wright
v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964); United States v. Board of Supervisors, 571 F.2d 951, 956
(5th Cir. 1978); Turner v. McKeithen, 490 F.2d 191, 197 n.24 (5th Cir. 1973).
470. E.g., Mississippi v. United States, No. 78-1425 (D.D.C. June 1, 1979), af'd, 100 S.

Ct. 994 (1980). But see City of Rome v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 221 (D.D.C. 1979)
(finding a "relatively benign racial atmosphere").
471. See, e.g., United States v. Mississippi, 100 S. Ct. 994, 997 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting); United Jewish Organizations, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 164 n.22 (1977).
472. United States v. Mississippi, 100 S. Ct. 994, 997 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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minority concentrations also should be considered in determining the effect of any particular reapportionment plan.
The Beer Court dealt only with whether the reapportionment plan in
question had the effect of denying the right to vote on account of race. A
state carries the additional burden of showing that the plan does not have
such a purpose. The Supreme Court has indicated in other cases arising
under the Voting Rights Act that a state must prove that "a racially dis473
criminatory purpose" was not a factor motivating it in devising the plan.
The Court has firmly directed that "[a]n official action . . . taken for the
purpose of discriminating against Negroes on account of their race has no
legitimacy at all under our Constitution or under the statute. '474 Evidence
material to whether the plan is purposefully discriminatory is of the same
nature as that considered by the courts in challenges based on the unconstitutional dilution of a group's voting strength.4 75 For example, the Department of Justice views the following characteristics of a
reapportionment as possibly indicative of a racially discriminatory purpose: (1) multimember districts; (2) an abnormally high concentration of
nonwhites in districts when adjoining nonwhite neighborhoods are diffused among surrounding districts in which white voters constitute a majority; (3) fragmentation of a nonwhite community among several districts
in which white voters constitute a majority; or (4) districts with substantial
nonwhite voting population that also have a total population significantly
in excess of the ideal district.4 76 These characteristics in combination with
other corroborative circumstantial evidence, such as a state's past record of
purposeful discrimination, may provide the basis for an objection by the
United States Attorney General. Since the burden of proof under section 5
rests with the state, 477 any state subject to section 5 should be cognizant of
such characteristics as they appear during the reapportionment process
and eliminate them unless to do so would conflict with an identifiable and
significant state goal otherwise applied systematically in the reapportionment plan. If such characteristics are present in the final reapportionment,
an objectively verifiable, legitia state must be prepared to demonstrate
478
mate purpose for their existence.
D. Conclusions
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act is likely to have a significant impact
on reapportionment after the 1980 census in the states to which it ap473. City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 357, 378 (1975).
474. Id. at 378. The Court observed that "acts generally lawful may become unlawful
when done to accomplish an unlawful end." Id. at 379.
475. Eg., Mississippi v. United States, No. 78-1425 (D.D.C. June 1, 1979), afl'd, 100 S.
Ct. 994 (1980); Wilkes County v. United States, 450 F. Supp. 1171 (D.D.C.), afjd, 439 U.S.
999 (1978).
476. Address by Drew S. Days III, National Conference of State Legislatures, Assembly
on the Legislature (Feb. 15, 1980).
477. See note 436 supra and accompanying text.
478. See Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 420-21 (1977); City of Richmond v. United
States, 422 U.S. 358, 375 (1975).

SO UTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 34

plies. 479

The extraordinary nature of the preclearance requirement, the
uncertainty of the substantive meaning of the Act, and the substantial authority and discretion of the United States Attorney General pose significant practical and legal difficulties for the affected states and for persons
likely to oppose the adopted reapportionments. The following recommendations are made in view of the potential significance of the Act.
First, any state subject to the Act must begin preparations for compliance with it and for submission of the state's reapportionment plan even
before the plan is considered in the legislative process. Every member of
the legislative body, as well as essential staff persons, must be made aware
of the substantive and procedural requirements of the Act. In addition,
staff personnel should begin early in the reapportionment process to collect
the materials and data and complete the calculations required by Department of Justice regulations for support of the reapportionment. As part of
this preparation, lines of communication and cooperation with appropriate
Department of Justice personnel should be established. Since the burden
under the Act remains with the state,4 80 however, no state should limit its
preparation solely to those materials expressly requested by the Department of Justice.
Second, though this Article assumes that each state legislature will carry
out the reapportionment process without purposefully discriminating
against racial or language minorities, special precautions should be considered to assure a fair and equal reapportionment process. Part VIII outlines
suggested precautions. 48' Additionally, legislators must be alert during the
reapportionment process to the existence of districting characteristics that
may dilute a racial minority's voting strength and suggest a racially discriminatory purpose. To some extent, a legislature may rely on its members to bring such characteristics to the attention of the appropriate
committee or to the full legislature during debate on a districting bill. A
state may choose, however, to establish quantitative criteria to be utilized
systematically through the reapportionment process for purposes of identifying some characteristics, such as district boundaries that have the effect
of fragmenting or packing compact minority communities. Once alerted to
the existence of a potentially dilutive characteristic, the legislature must
make an informed determination regarding the impact of the particular
district boundaries and whether an objectively verifiable, legitimate purpose exists for maintaining the boundary.
Third, since a reapportionment plan that is not purposefully discriminatory still may be violative of the Voting Rights Act if it will lead to a
retrogression in racial minority voting strength, a state covered by the Act
should adopt a policy in favor of districts with sufficient minority votingage population to assure the minority group some chance of electing a can479. For a discussion of the impact of the Act on reapportionments after the 1970 census,
see note 109 supra.
480. See note 436 supra and accompanying text.

481. See notes 539-46 infra and accompanying text.
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didate of its own choice. This objective should be applied systematically
throughout the reapportionment process together with population equality
and other objectively verifiable, legitimate state goals. Several standards
exist for testing a proposed reapportionment against the existing apportionment to determine "whether the ability of minority groups to participate in the political process and to elect their choices to office is
augmented, diminished, or not affected by the change." 48 2 Some standards, such as those based on the criteria of bloc voting and lower minority
voter registration, may be inapplicable in some states or in parts of some
states. An assumption of such criteria when they do not actually exist may
cause the needless "packing" of a minority group into only a few districts,
when the group could have a greater political impact if it constituted a
smaller majority or even a significant minority of the population in a
larger number of districts. 48 3 Whatever standards are utilized, the tests for
retrogression should be applied on a statewide and, when practicable, on a
local basis,48 4 such as when there are several districts within a county. If
Department of Justice criteria or standards for determining effect are either unavailable or, in the state's view, inappropriate, the state must carefully document
the basis for the criteria and the standards it believes
4 85
applicable.
Fourth, each state should provide formally, by statute, for the person or
persons responsible for submission of a reapportionment plan, and possibly other election changes, to the United States Attorney General. The
Voting Rights Act and Department of Justice regulations permit designation of the state's chief legal officer or other appropriate state officials. In
some states this responsibility may fall naturally on the state's chief legal
officer or elections officer. In Texas, by tradition rather than law, the sec482. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976). For example, to determine whether
retrogression exists in a particular proposal, a state legislature may wish to compare the
proposed and existing apportionments to determine (1) the number of districts with over
75% minority group population and/or voting age population (a substantial majority); (2)
the number of districts with 60% or more minority group population and/or voting age
population (a clear majority); (3) the number of districts with 51% or more minority group
population and/or voting age population (a numerical majority); and (4) the number of
districts with 35-50% minority group population and/or voting age population (a substantial
minority). In addition, the legislature may wish to consider both the existing and proposed
plans in terms of the proportion of the group in the general population as shown by comparing the previous and new census.
483. See Dove v. Moore, 539 F.2d 1152, 1155 n.4 (8th Cir. 1976); Panior v. Iberville
Parish School Bd., 536 F.2d 101, 104-05 (5th Cir. 1976); Moore v. Leflore County Bd. of
Election Comm'rs, 520 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1974); Howard v. Adams County Bd. Supervisors,
453 F.2d 455 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 925 (1972). See also Wright v. Rockefeller,
376 U.S. 52 (1964); United States v. Board of Supervisors, 571 F.2d 951, 956 (5th Cir. 1978);
Turner v. McKeithen, 490 F.2d 191, 197 n.24 (5th Cir. 1973).
484. Compare Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 427 (1977) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
("[d]istricts that disfavor a minority group in one part of the state may be counterbalanced
by favorable districts elsewhere") with United Jewish Organizations, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S.
144, 162-64 (1977) (considering percentage of districts with nonwhite majorities within a
county).
485. For example: (1) whether bloc voting is present; (2) whether the percentage of persons registered to vote is equal among white and nonwhite voting age populations; (3)
whether the turnout of eligible voters is equivalent among white and nonwhite groups.
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retary of state has exercised the responsibility. This responsibility should
be entrusted expressly by statute, and provision should be made for participation in the process by at least the state's chief legal officer, chief elections officer, and in reapportionment matters, a person or persons chosen
to represent the state legislature.
Fifth, the state should consider what alternative, if any, exists under
state law for changing a reapportionment plan if the United States Attorney General objects to the plan passed by the legislature. If the objection
is a minor one, a state may find that a modification of the plan in response
to the objection is preferable to initiation and prosecution of a declaratory
judgment action. For example, in Texas, a state in which the legislature
meets in regular session only every two years, immediate reconsideration
by the legislature of a disapproved plan is impossible, but other means for
modification exist: action by the State Legislative Redistricting Board, by
a special session of the legislature called by the Governor, by a court of
competent jurisdiction, or by the next regular session of the Texas Legislature in 1983. Each of these possibilities, however, raises several significant
legal and practical questions, which should be considered and decided
long before the objection is received.
Sixth, states should consider whether initiation of a declaratory judgment action in the District Court of the District of Columbia is preferable
to submission of the reapportionment plan to the United States Attorney
General. Submission to the Attorney General has the apparent advantages of being less costly and time-consuming than a declaratory judgment
action if the officer's approval is obtained and, even if such approval is not
obtained, of allowing informal exploration of any difficulties in the plan
while ultimately not prejudicing a subsequent declaratory judgment action. On the other hand, approval by the Attorney General does not constitute an adjudication of the issue of constitutionality. The Act does
provide that neither approval by the Attorney General nor approval by the
District Court of the District of Columbia shall "bar a subsequent action
to enjoin enforcement" of the reapportionment, 486 but whether the issue of
constitutionality may effectively be litigated as part of a declaratory judgment action and a favorable determination made res judicata of subsequent challenges is unclear.
Finally, in view of the great degree of discretion exercised by the United
States Attorney General under the Act and the inability of states or individuals to appeal directly his decision approving or disapproving a reapportionment plan, the attitude and policy of that officer will be of
considerable importance in determining the impact of the Voting Rights
Act on state reapportionments during the next decade. If the Attorney
General disapproves a reapportionment plan, a state confronts the alternatives of either modifying a state legislative enactment to meet the objections of a federal administrative officer or initiating and prosecuting a
declaratory judgment action in a distant forum against the Department of
486. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976).
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Justice and other intervenors. 487 Moreover, a state must obtain approval
of its new reapportionment expeditiously or confront court challenges to
its existing legislative or congressional districts on the basis of the disparity
in population among the districts as demonstrated by the new census. The
inability to put new legislatively enacted districts into effect could result in
elections under court drawn plans. 4 88 On the other hand, if the Attorney
General approves the state's plan, private parties are without any right to
appeal his decision and must institute a separate action in which the burden is upon them to show that the enactment is violative of the United
States Constitution.
VII.

THE RECOGNITION OF STATE INTERESTS IN REAPPORTIONMENT

In Reynolds v. Sims, 4 89 when the United States Supreme Court first authorized intervention by federal courts in the reapportionment process, it
directed:
[L]egislative reapportionment is primarily a matter for legislative consideration and determination, and . . . judicial relief becomes appropriate only when a legislature fails to reapportion according to federal
constitutional requisites in a490timely fashion after having had an adequate opportunity to do so.
This preference that reapportionment remain a matter for legislative rather
49 1
than judicial concern persists through recent Supreme Court decisions.
Although the Court has recognized that a state legislature has discretion in
the reapportionment process, particularly with regard to state legislative
districting, it has imposed certain requirements for proof supportive of
those interests when they are called into question before the United States
Attorney General or in court. States often have faltered when forced to
substantiate legitimate state interests. Interests that have been offered as
supporting the district lines in particular reapportionments have appeared
tenuous on close scrutiny.
For equal population cases arising under the fourteenth amendment, the
Supreme Court has established specific requirements for a state called
upon to show justification for certain district lines. The Court has required
that the factors considered by the state in districting be "free from any
taint of arbitrariness or discrimination. ' 492 Divergences from a strict population standard are possible when based on legitimate considerations that
487. See NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345 (1973) (an unsuccessful intervenor under
§ 5 has a right to appeal the denial of intervention).
488. See, e.g., Moore v. Leflore County Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 351 F. Supp. 848 (N.D.
Miss. 1971).
489. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).

490. Id. at 586.
491. E.g., Wise v. Lipscomb, 434 U.S. 1329, 1331 (1977) (wherein the Court agrees that
legislative reapportionment is a matter of legislative consideration); Connor v. Finch, 431
U.S. 407, 414-15 (1977) ("A state legislature is ... by far the best situated to identify and
then reconcile traditional state policies within the constitutionally mandated framework of
substantial population equality.").
492. Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 710 (1964).
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are incident to the effectuation of a rational state policy.49 3 With regard to
the requirement of a rational state policy, the Supreme Court has rejected
the position that the interests must be governmental necessities. 494 Some
federal courts have insisted, however, that it is not sufficient that a plan
happens to accomplish certain policies; the state must show that the policy
was considered important in the process that produced the reapportionclearly the relationship between the variance and
ment and must articulate
495
the state policy served.
The Supreme Court has not been as specific in prescribing requirements
for proving state interests in dilution of voting strength cases. The Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, however, has developed a specific formula
for determining whether a districting plan dilutes minority voting strength,
and this formula includes consideration of whether state interests are tenuous. 496 In those circumstances in which the complaining plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of invidiousness, a state is subject to requirements
similar to those imposed in equal population cases and must demonstrate
that the redistricting characteristic being complained of is justifiable under
the circumstances of the particular case. 497 Similarly, a state under the
Voting Rights Act must carry the burden of proving that its reapportionment is not purposefully discriminatory. One element of such a showing is
whether there exist objectively verifiable, legitimate purposes for any char498
acteristic of the districting possibly dilutive of racial voting strength.
Moreover, such legitimate state purposes may justify de minimus reductions in minority voting strength that otherwise would be violative of section 5 of the Act and have the effect of denying or abridging the right to
vote.

49 9

This Article suggests that there are three essential inquiries that should
be made in assessing the viability of certain potential state interests for
consideration during the reapportionment process. The first inquiry is
493. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964).
494. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 326 (1973) (the test for determining whether there is

justification for deviations from absolute equality in population is not "governmental necessity" but rational consideration). See also Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971); Cousins v. City Council, 503 F.2d 912 (7th Cir. 1974). But see Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289, 297

(1975) ("any classification restricting the franchise on grounds other than residence, age, and
citizenship cannot stand unless the district or State can demonstrate that the classification
serves a compelling state interest"); Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 422-23 (1970) (applying compelling interest test to denial of vote for persons on a federal enclave). These decisions may be distinguished as cases involving actual "exclusion" from the right to vote
rather than dilution of an existing right. Still, in reaching its result in Evans, the Court relied
on Reynolds and the concept that "a State may not dilute a person's vote to give weight to
other interests." 398 U.S. at 422-23.
495. See Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1975); Graves v. Barnes (Graves IV), 446
F. Supp. 560, 570 (W.D. Tex. 1977), a//dsubnom. Briscoe v. Escalante, 435 U.S. 901 (1978).

496. Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc), a d on other
grounds sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976). See note
326 supra.
497. 485 F.2d at 1304-05.

498. See City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 375 (1975).
499. Mississippi v. United States, No. 78-1425 (D.D.C. June 1, 1979), af'd, 100 S. Ct. 994
(1980).

1980]

REAPPORTIONMENT

whether the interest is a legitimate one, or one that of itself may make a
reapportionment invalid, or at least questionable. The second inquiry is
whether it will be possible to demonstrate that the interest has been effectuated in the plan. Vague, unclearly defined interests or ones that are effectuated in a haphazard fashion in the plan may appear proffered in lieu
of other undisclosed improper motives when subject to the scrutiny of the
court. 5°° Finally, each interest should be examined to determine whether
it is an interest acknowledged by the courts as one of sufficient importance
to allow some divergence from strict constitutional standards.
Integrity of PoliticalSubdivisions. The preservation of county lines is the
only state interest thus far found sufficient by the United States Supreme
Court to justify a maximum total deviation of more than 10% from strict
population equality. 50' The Court has also acknowledged that the policy
of preserving county lines is of importance in cases concerning dilution of
voting strength because a plan adhering to county or other political subdivision boundaries presents fewer opportunities for gerrymandering. 50 2 In
Mahan v. Howell,50 3 where the Court approved a maximum total population deviation among state legislative districts of 16.4%, there was uncontradicted evidence that the plan in question had the lowest deviation that
would allow preservation of county lines. 5°4 Moreover, the state had carried its burden of showing that the preservation of county lines effectuated
a rational state policy because the state legislature was responsible for
passing local legislation relating directly to counties within their district. 50 5
In White v. Regester,50 6 without discussing the matter in detail, the Court
indicated that if it had been required to reach the question, preservation of
county lines in Texas would have been sufficient justification for the devia500. See Canton Branch, NAACP v. City of Canton, 472 F. Supp. 859, 871 (S.D. Miss.

1979) ("tenuous state policy ...

may constitute evidence that other, improper motivations

lay behind the enactment or maintenance of the plan").
501. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 320 (1973). See also Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182

(1971), in which an apportionment for a county legislature having a maximum deviation
from equality of 11.9% was upheld in part because New York had a long history of maintaining the integrity of existing local government units within the county.
502. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 578-79 (1964) ("[i]ndiscriminate districting,
without . . . regard for political subdivision or natural or historical boundary lines, may be
little more than an open invitation to partisan gerrymandering"). But see Kirkpatrick v.

Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 534 (1969) (rejecting the claim that adherence to political subdivision
lines prevents political gerrymanders).
503. 410 U.S. 315 (1973).
504. Id. at 326-27; see Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407 (1977).
505. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 321-22, 329 (1973); see Stewart v. O'Callaghan, 343

F. Supp. 1080, 1085 (D. Nev. 1972) (explaining need to preserve county boundaries in Nevada); cf. Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 423 (1977) (refusing to accept district plan drawn
on the basis of county supervisory "beats" because there was no long-standing state policy
mandating separate representation of individual beats in the state legislature and because
factors relevant to a drawing of supervisory beats, such as road mileage, were not material to
the apportioning of state legislative seats); Chapman v. Meier, 407 F. Supp. 649, 653
(D.N.D. 1975) (invalidating state apportionment plan because state justification that plan
intended to preserve county boundaries was inconsistent with fact that districts with largest
deviation were those that cut county boundaries).
506. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
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tion present in that case. 50 7 Other decisions of the Court have acknowledged that the recognition of city and possibly other political subdivision
lines in reapportionment is proper and, if shown to effectuate a rational
state policy, may constitute
justification for minor departures from consti50 8
tutional absolutes.
Geography, Compactness, Contiguity, and History. No independent federal
constitutional requirement mandates that state legislative districts be compact or "attractive." 50 9 No requirement directs that congressional districts
be compact or contiguous. Courts, however, have viewed compactness and
contiguity as desirable policies in districting.5 10 Other policies, such as the
recognition of geography or the historical recognition of certain boundary
lines or characteristics of districting, also have been acknowledged by the
Supreme Court as legitimate considerations in effectuating a rational state
policy.5 1 These latter policies may be sufficient in particular circumstances to explain why multimember districts or certain districts tht appear
gerrymandered are justified.5 12 For example, an oddly-shaped district
may be shown to result from rivers or other natural obstacles or from an
effort to preserve historical district boundaries.
Under certain circumstances, however, the recognition of one or more of
these policies in districting may be viewed as merely an excuse for maintaining existing election inequities5 1 3 or as inadequate to justify deviation
from constitutional absolutes. 51 4 When not applied uniformly statewide,
507. Id. at 764 n.8.
508. See, e.g., Kelly v. Bumpers, 340 F. Supp. 568, 573 (E.D. Ark. 1972).
509. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 752 (1973); cf.White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783
(1973) (Court directs district court to adopt submitted plan that more closely adhered to
state goals even though it did not provide for districts as compact as alternate plan); Wright
v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 54 (1964) (Court upholds districting plan although oddly
shaped). But see Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 425 (1977) (Court directing district court to
explain lack of compactness and contiguity in court drawn redistricting); Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 56-61 (1964) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (district lines that zigzag and twist
and produce odd-shaped districts are indicative of discriminatory purpose).
510. See, e.g., Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 425 (1977); Cousins v. City Council, 503
F.2d 912, 919 (7th Cir. 1974); Drum v. Seawell, 250 F. Supp. 922, 924 (M.D.N.C. 1966);
Paulson v. Meier, 246 F. Supp. 36, 41 (D.N.D. 1965); Gumfory v. Hansford County
Comm'rs Court, 561 S.W.2d 28, 31 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (finding that the Texas Constitution requires contiguity as part of the legal as well as the popular
idea of a commissioners' precinct). But see Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 535-36
(1969); Summers v. Cenarussa, 342 F. Supp. 288 (D. Idaho 1972), vacated, 413 U.S. 906
(1973) (upholding plan with noncontiguous precincts).
511. See, e.g., Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 23 (1975); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
578 (1964).
512. See Graves v. Barnes (Graves I), 343 F. Supp. 704, 734 (W.D. Tex.), aff dsub nom.
Archer v. Smith, 409 U.S. 808 (1972), mod/ioed sub nom. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755
(1973).
513. Eg., 343 F. Supp. at 723 (history of questionable justification for unequal treatment
in a state with history of active segregation and "one-party"); Bussie v. Governor of La., 333
F. Supp. 452, 460-61 (E.D. La.) (when "historical" ward lines produced only two black legislators since reconstruction, "historical" concepts must give way to constitutional rights), aff'd
sub noma.
Bussie v. McKeithen, 457 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1971), vacated sub noma.
Taylor v.
McKeithen, 407 U.S. 191 (1972), conformed, 499 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1974).
514. E.g., Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969) (effort to achieve "nice appearing"
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the policies become tainted with signs of arbitrariness. Moreover, they are
hard to measure and their presence or systematic application in a plan may
be difficult to demonstrate. Courts often have difficulty discerning whether
the legislature actually attempted to draw compact districts and which
among several alternative districting plans in fact provides districts that
are more compact. Compactness, however, remains, in the view of some
writers, a criterion that, if required of all districts, would significantly reduce the frequency of gerrymanders. 51 5
Preservation of Incumbents. On several occasions the United States
Supreme Court has indicated that a state legislature's objective in drawing
districts to prevent or minimize the number of contests between incum51 6
bents is not invidious and does not render a reapportionment invalid.
The Court has viewed maintenance of "constituency-representative relations" as a matter of legitimate concern for state legislatures, particularly
in congressional districting where preservation of the seniority of the mem51 7
bers of its congressional delegation may be important for a state.
The Court has not determined the extent to which the interest of minimizing contests between legislators may justify deviations from strict population equality 51 8 or the use of certain characteristics in districting that
otherwise adversely affect minority voting strength. While acknowledging
that "districting has and is intended to have substantial political consequences,, 5 19 the Supreme Court has not yet specifically approved or disapproved of a legislature's reapportioning so as to draw districts consisting of
districts on a map does not justify population variance among congressional districts); Lucas
v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964) (geography insufficient for deviations
involved); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964) (neither history alone nor consideration of area alone was sufficient to justify the existing deviations). But see Mississippi v.
United States, No. 78-1425 (D.D.C. June 1, 1979) (approving small decreases in minority
voting age population in some districts when purpose was compactness), aft'd, 100 S.Ct. 994
(1980).
515. Eg., Adams, A Model State Reapportionment Process.- The Continuing Questfor
"Fairand Effective Representation," 14 HARV. J.LEGis. 825, 849 (1977); Reock, Measuring
"Compactness" as a Requirement of Legislative Apportionment, 5 MIDWEST J.POL. Sci. 79
(1961); Schwartzberg, Reapportionment, Gerrymanders, and the Notion of Compactness, 50
MINN. L.REV. 443 (1966); Comment, PoliticalGerrymandering.- A Statutory Compactness
Standard as an Antidotefor Judicial Impotence, 41 U. CHI. L.REV. 398 (1974).
516. Eg., White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 791 (1973); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73,
89 n.16 (1966). A state court also has recognized that an incumbent does not have a constitutionally protected personal right to have a district drawn for his benefit. Jones v. Falcey,
48 N.J. 25, 222 A.2d 101, 105 (1966).
517. White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 791 (1973).
518. See id But see Kirkpatrick v.Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 533 (1969) (problems created
by partisan politics cannot justify apportionment that does not otherwise pass constitutional
muster); Graves v. Barnes (Graves IV), 446 F. Supp. 560, 570-71 (W.D. Tex. 1977) (substituting a proposed plan with 2% total maximum deviation for an existent one with 7.7% total
maximum deviation), af'dsub nom. Briscoe v. Escalante, 435 U.S. 901 (1978).
519. Gaffney v.Cummings, 412 U.S. 753 (1973). The Court suggested:
Politics and political considerations are inseparable from districting and apportionment. . . .It is not only obvious, but absolutely unavoidable, that the
location and shape of districts may well determine the political complexion of
the area. District lines are rarely neutral phenomena. They can well determine what district will be predominantly Democratic or predominantly Re-
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a political constituency supportive of particular incumbents and, therefore,
likely to result in the incumbents' being reelected. An effort to protect
may
majoritarian incumbents in this manner under certain circumstances
520
invidiously dilute the voting strength of electoral minorities.
Economic, Regional, and Other Communities of Interest. Economic, regional, and other communities of interest have been offered by states or
political subdivisions on numerous occasions as factors considered during
the reapportionment process. They have not, however, been received well
by the courts. One district court observed: "[Sluch [interests] extend
across county, district, and national boundaries. They offer no guidelines.
They confuse, delay and avoid."' 52 1 In 1964 the Supreme Court included
"economic and other group interests" among those not sufficient to justify
deviations from strict population equality.5 22 A state apparently is not
prohibited from considering such factors in the reapportionment process in
an effort to provide fair or proportional representation, 523 but courts are
unlikely either to allow a state to purposefully draw districts so as to allow
a state to discriminate on the basis of population among these competing
interests or to give such interests much weight as justification for deparor for characteristics of districting that
tures from strict numerical equality,
5 24
dilute minority voting strength.
Changes Anticipated During the Decade. In states with rapidly changing
patterns of population, a reapportionment drawn on the basis of the decenpublican, or make a close race likely .... The reality is that districting
inevitably has and is intended to have substantial political consequences.
Id. at 753. In reaching this conclusion, the Court acknowledged that political party voting
results inevitably will be considered during the reapportionment process. Id.
520. See Moore v. LeFlore County Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 502 F.2d 621, 625 (5th Cir.
1974); Winter v. Docking, 356 F. Supp. 88, 91 (D. Kan. 1973). But see Russo v. Vacin, 528
F.2d 27 (7th Cir. 1976) (holding nonjusticiable the claim of an opponent of the incumbent
administration that ward boundaries were purposefully drawn to place him in the same
ward as another opponent of the administration); Cousins v. City Council, 466 F.2d 830 (7th
Cir.) (denying claim by potential independent candidates that lines purposefully were drawn
to district them together), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 893 (1972); Shapiro v. Maryland, 336 F.
Supp. 1205 (D. Md. 1972) (creation of "safe" seats does not alone invalidate reapportionment).
521. Bush v. Martin (Bush I), 224 F. Supp. 499, 517 (S.D. Tex. 1963) (Ingraham, J.,
concurring), affdper curiam, 376 U.S. 222 (1964).
522. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579-80 (1964).
523. Cf Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 136 nn.5 & 6 (1976) (noting effort to preserve community of interest in Algiers portion of New Orleans); Panior v. Iberville Parish
School Bd., 498 F.2d 1232, 1236 (5th Cir. 1974) (centers of interest may be taken into account in drawing school board election lines); Stewart v. O'Callaghan, 343 F. Supp. 1080,
1084-85 (D. Nev. 1972) ("protection of identifiable communities of interest" one guideline
used by Nevada Legislature in apportionment); Kelly v. Bumpers, 340 F. Supp. 568, 575
(E.D. Ark. 1972) (community of interest between counties taken into consideration in state
senate reapportionment), affd, 413 U.S. 901 (1973). But see Cohen v. Maloney, 410 F.
Supp. 1147, 1153 (D. Del. 1976) (no case law found to support grouping persons of like
interests).
524. See, e.g., Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 533 (1969) ("[t]o accept . ..variances . . . to create districts with specific interest orientations is antithetical to the basic
premise of the constitutional command").
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nial census, while initially producing districts of roughly equal population,
may result in significant underrepresentation and overrepresentation later
in the decade. Though acknowledging that an imbalance in population
among districts toward the end of a decennial period was almost certain,
the Court in Reynolds v. Sims 52 5 found that "[1]imitations on the frequency
of reapportionments are justified by the need for stability and continuity in
the organization of the legislative system .... *526 The Court since has
recognized that a state legislature in drawing districts may consider projected changes in population. 527 To do so, however, the legislature must
thoroughly document the projected change, and use of the projection must
be without any taint of arbitrariness or discrimination. 528 The projection
must be applied systematically throughout the state and must actually be
529
relied upon by the legislature in drawing districts.
VIII.

THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN REAPPORTIONMENT

The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the administrative and legislative history of a state enactment can be material to a determination of whether the enactment is invidiously discriminatory and
violative of the United States Constitution. 530 In both equal population
and dilution of voting strength cases, federal courts have inquired into the
legislative process that produced the reapportionment. The same inquiry,
particularly as it relates to the purpose of the enactment, may be found in
litigation arising under the Voting Rights Act. This inquiry has assumed
added significance with the determination by a plurality of the Court in
Bolden that purposeful discrimination is determinative of a constitutional
challenge.
In deciding the constitutionality of various reapportionments, federal
courts have considered official legislative histories as they appear through
committee hearings and reports and public debates. They also have considered evidence relating to matters such as: (1) procedural irregularities
in the legislative process; 53' (2) the legislature's failure to provide an opportunity for a bill's opponents to appear at public hearings; 532 (3) the
525. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
526. Id. at 583.

527. White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 792 n.12 (1973); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526,
535 (1969); Millican v. Georgia, 351 F. Supp. 447, 448-49 (N.D. Ga. 1972). The court in
Milican concluded that a reapportionment with minor underrepresentation (population
above the ideal) in districts that experienced above average growth in the preceding decade
should be viewed with the same strictness as one with more significant population deviations
among districts with less proportional growth. Id. at 448-49. On the other hand, evidence of
growth patterns to show the possibility of future discriminatory impact may not be adequate
to invalidate a reapportionment that is not discriminatory on the basis of existing census
data. See Gilbert v. Sterrett, 509 F.2d 1389, 1392 (5th Cir. 1975).
528. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 535 (1969).
529. Id.; see Summers v. Cenarrusa, 413 U.S. 906 (1973) (per curiam).
530. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 268
(1977).
531. Id. at 267.
532. Graves v. Barnes (Graves IV), 446 F. Supp. 560 (W.D. Tex. 1977), a]ff'dsub nom.
Briscoe v. Escalante, 435 U.S. 901 (1978).
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failure of a legislature to act affirmatively to solicit witnesses or to obtain
evidence; 533 (4) unofficial conversations or comments of members of the
legislative body showing an allegedly improper motive; 534 (5) the role of
the legislative staff in developing and implementing the criteria for reapportionment and in drawing actual districts;535 and (6) communications
between lobbyists and members of the legislature or their staff to show
improper influence on the redistricting process. 536 The courts have given
significant weight in their deliberations to the consideration given in the
legislative process to alternative reapportionment plans that appeared to
meet the state's announced objectives while being less offensive to the
5 37
United States Constitution than the plan that was ultimately adopted.
In order to be prepared in the event a suit is filed, each state legislature
should assume for purposes of the reapportionment process that the final
reapportionment plan will be challenged in court. The extent to which the
legislative process will be scrutinized in such litigation will vary according
to the nature of the complaint, the time available for discovery, and the
resources and knowledge of the plaintiff. No aspect of the reapportionment process, however, is immune from examination by the court.5 38
533. Bush v. Martin (Bush I), 224 F. Supp. 499, 515 (S.D. Tex. 1963), ai!'dper curiam,
376 U.S. 222 (1964).
534. Cousins v. City Council, 503 F.2d 912, 919 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 992
(1975); Cousins v. City Council, 466 F.2d 830, 837-39 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 893
(1972).
535. E.g., Cousins v. City Council, 503 F.2d 912, 919 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 992 (1975); Bush v. Martin (Bush I), 224 F. Supp. 499, 515 (S.D. Tex. 1963), affidper
curiam, 376 U.S. 222 (1964).
536. Graves v. Barnes (Graves I), 343 F. Supp. 704, 745-47 (W.D. Tex.), aj7'dsub nom.
Archer v. Smith, 409 U.S. 808 (1972), modified sub noma. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755
(1973).
537. See, e.g., Conner v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407,420-21 (1977); Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S.
1, 25-26 (1975); White v. Weisler, 412 U.S. 783, 795-97 (1973); Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S.
120, 124-25 (1967); Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440, 445-46 (1967); Winter v. Docking, 356 F.
Supp. 88, 91 (D. Kan. 1973); Bush v. Martin (Bush II), 251 F. Supp. 484, 518 (S.D. Tex.
1966) (Ingraham, J., concurring). But see Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1973)
(showing of numerical deviation in population equality among senate and house districts
failed to make prima facie case of violation of fourteenth amendment even if these deviations were considered along with fact that another plan could be conceived with lower deviations); West Va. Civil Liberties Union v. Rockefeller, 336 F. Supp. 395, 400 (S.D. W. Va.
1972) (state's rejection of plans of lower total maximum deviation upheld as having other
"overriding frailties" and resulting in only "slight reductions" in variances); Wold v. Anderson, 335 F. Supp. 952, 958-60 (D. Mont. 1971) (state's rejection of alternative plan with
lower total maximum deviation upheld on the basis that state acted in good faith and alternative plan had other drawbacks).
538. In Cousins v. City Council, 503 F.2d 912 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 992
(1975), then Circuit Judge Stevens warned: "Although there are disturbing aspects of this
case, and although, . . . the constitutional claim fails . . . , a thorough review of the evidence makes the required result perfectly clear. Those who would hereafter engage in gerrymandering must anticioate equally careful analysis of comparable claims in the future." 503
F.2d at 925 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
In their search for evidence with which to challenge a redistricting plan, plaintiffs have
obtained testimony by deposition or otherwise from such sources as: the presiding officers of
the legislative body; individual members of the legislature; members of boards charged with
redistricting; experts hired by the legislature to assist in drawing districts; the staff for individual legislators or legislative committees; and, even, lobbyists having no official role in the
reapportionment process.
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Therefore, the following observations are offered:
First, federal courts have acknowledged the value of public hearings as
part of the reapportionment process. As expressed by one district court, if
the legislature is to act on the will of the people, it is under some obligation
to determine that will.5 39 In addition to hearings held during a legislative
session, legislatures should consider the possibility of hearings prior to a
legislative session at locations across a state, allowing access to people who
could not attend hearings at the state capitol during the session.
Second, legislative staff and experts should be hired to assist in reapportionment with the view that they ultimately may have to testify, by deposition or in person, in future litigation. Experts who collect and assimilate
data, who operate computers, and who draw district lines under legislative
supervision are likely to be important witnesses later in explaining the procedures followed, criteria utilized, and availability of time and data for
drawing districts.
Third, as part of an affirmative effort to examine applicable state and
federal legal standards for reapportionment and to make legislators aware
of these requirements, state legislative bodies have authorized legal studies
or reports and distributed them among the legislators.5 40 If such studies
are to be prepared, consideration should be given to whether it is preferable that they be accomplished by the state's chief legal officer or another
source. An official opinion from the state's legal officer may have the effect
of fixing a particular procedure or characteristic of districting as lawful or
unlawful. Such an opinion could be used later as evidence of bad faith on
the part of members of the state legislature if the reapportionment is not in
conformance with the opinion.
Fourth, some states have used experts, state universities, commissions,
or legislative committees to draw reapportionment plans prior to a legislative session for consideration and amendment during that session.5 4 1 Two
state constitutions expressly require preparation
of a plan in this manner
5 42
for submission to the state legislature.
Fifth, consideration should be given to having a representative of the
chief legal officer and elections officer of the state monitor appropriate legislative committee hearings and debates during the reapportionment process. The state's legal officer should select the representative in anticipation
that the person ultimately will be involved in submission of the plan under
the Voting Rights Act, if applicable, and in defense of the plan, if necessary, in any subsequent litigation. Because of the complexities of the law
539. Graves v. Barnes (Graves I), 343 F. Supp. 704, 722 (W.D. Tex.), a'd sub nom.
Archer v. Smith, 409 U.S. 808 (1972), modified sub nom. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755
(1973).
540. E.g., TEXAS LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING (1965).

541. See Sims v. Amos, 365 F. Supp. 215, 218-19 (N.D. Ala. 1973), af'd, 415 U.S. 902
(1974); Texas Lieutenant Governor Ben Ramsey in 1950 appointed committees to draw a
senatorial and representative district plan. See TEXAS LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, note 540
supra.

542. ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 3, pt. 3, § I-A; VT. CONST. ch. II, § 73.
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in this area, however, and the possibility that any statements made by such
a representative may be part of the record in any subsequent litigation, all
opinions on the legality of any proposed action under state or federal law
should come directly from the chief legal officer, not from the representative, and should be the result of official requests made through traditional
means for obtaining legal opinions from that officer.
Sixth, a special effort should be made to assure that the legislative process itself is fair and provides for equal access by all interests. Adequate
public notice should be given for all hearings conducted on proposed reapportionment legislation. To the maximum extent possible, procedural irregularities that might deprive a person of notice or opportunities that
543
otherwise might be expected under legislative rules, should be avoided.
Seventh, special legislative rules for reapportionment bills may be appropriate to establish criteria 5 " for consideration in the process and to determine the procedure for consideration of such bills. The legislature may
consider other rules designed to insulate the decision-making process from
influences other5 than
those coming directly to legislators and through the
45
hearing process.
Eighth, any committee assigned to hear and consider reapportionment
legislation should include among its members persons who are representatives of the state's diverse geographical and economic interests and who
are members of the major identifiable electoral minorities or are known to
be sensitive to the needs and interests of those minority groups. Through
such appointments, minority groups can be assured access to this important part of the process.
Ninth, the legislature should establish a means for identifying during the
reapportionment process when a certain district or configuration of districts may be violative of state or federal law. Criteria for determining
such a circumstance are discussed in Parts IV, V, and VII of this Article.
Once the legislature identifies a circumstance, it must make an informed
decision regarding the purpose for the boundaries of the district or districts
and whether such boundaries should remain.
Tenth, the need and purpose for any boundaries that may be questionable under state or federal law must be established clearly as part of the
legislative record through committee reports, statements at public hearings
543. But see Dunn v. Oklahoma, 343 F. Supp. 320 (W.D. Okla. 1972); see note 531 supra
and accompanying text.
544. Such criteria may include construction of districts as nearly of equal population as
is practicable, avoidance of fragmentation or "packing" of minority communities, and recognition of political subdivision boundaries or other legitimate state interests selected by the
legislature for recognition in the reapportionment process. See Kelly v. Bumpers, 340 F.
Supp. 568, 573 (E.D. Ark. 1972), a'd,

413 U.S. 901 (1973). The court in Kelly indicated,

however, that the legislature is not bound to follow such guidelines "inflexibly." 340 F.
Supp. at 580.
545. Consideration may be given to prohibiting unauthorized contacts with members of
the staff or experts charged with actually drawing the district lines under legislative supervision. Such a rule would avoid the lobbying problem recognized in Graves v. Barnes (Graves
I), 343 F. Supp. 704, 745-47 (W.D. Tex.), afrd sub noma. Archer v. Smith, 409 U.S. 808
(1972), mod.edsub nom. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
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or committee meetings, and statements or colloquies during debate on the
legislation. The announced need and purpose must be supported in the
record by adequate evidence. Provision should be made for maintaining
transcripts and for obtaining other materials as necessary for such a record.
Eleventh, the legislature should provide for persons or a committee to
assist the state's chief legal officer with regard to any litigation challenging
the reapportionment and to participate in the process of submitting the
reapportionment plan for federal approval in those states subject to the
546
Voting Rights Act.

Finally, the presiding officer of each house of the state legislature bears a
heavy responsibility for the fairness of the process. His conduct during the
reapportionment process may be subject to special scrutiny in any subsequent litigation.
IX.

CONCLUSION

Some observers feel that legislative reapportionment is nothing more
than a partisan political process in which one party attempts to improve its
political strength at the expense of the opposing party or group. This view
oversimplifies a process that involves struggles among competing interests
and personalities at every level. The participants realize that each line
drawn on a map, whether "aesthetically attractive" or "misshapen," has an
unavoidable political impact when applied to our nonhomogeneous society. This impact is felt not only by the political parties and the incumbent
or potential candidate who finds his residence shifted among possible constituencies, but also by the numerous and diverse regional, economic, and
racial interests within the society.
Increasingly, writers have urged that responsibility for reapportionment
be removed from the state legislatures and entrusted to nonpartisan
boards, 547 or that the courts recognize and enforce a right of proportional
representation to assure that all groups of sufficient identity and size have
546. On several occasions, state legislative bodies have been represented separately from
the state in proceedings challenging legislative districts. Eg., Sixty-Seventh Minn. State
Senate v. Burns, 406 U.S. 187 (1972); Silver v. Jordan, 241 F. Supp. 576 (S.D. Cal. 1964),
aft, 381 U.S. 415 (1965). On other occasions, individual legislators have intervened and
offered legal positions or reapportionment plans different from those of the state's attorney
general. Eg., Preisler v. Secretary of State, 341 F. Supp. 1158 (W.D. Mo.), affdsub nom.
Danforth v. Preisler, 407 U.S. 901 (1972); Bussie v. Governor of La., 333 F. Supp. 452 (E.D.
La.), af'd sub nom. Bussie v. McKeithen, 457 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1971), vacated sub nom.
Taylor v. McKeithen, 407 U.S. 191 (1972), conformed, 499 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1974). At least
one state, in anticipation of a court challenge, enacted both a primary and an alternative
apportionment plan. Neither plan was valid. Kopald v. Carr, 343 F. Supp. 5i (M.D. Tenn.
1972).

547. See, e.g., COMMON CAUSE, REAPPORTIONMENT: A BETTER WAY AND TOWARD A
SYSTEM OF "FAIR AND EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION" (1977); R. MCKAY, REAPPORTIONMENT: THE LAW AND POLITICS OF EQUAL REPRESENTATION 270-71 (1965); NATIONAL MU2-3, 15-19
(1967); Adams, 4 Model State ReapportionmentProcess.- The Continuing Questfor "Fairand
Effective Representation," 14 HARV. J. LEGIS. 825, 852-57 (1977).
NICIPAL LEAGUE, LEGISLATIVE REDISTRICTING BY NON-LEGISLATIVE AGENCIES
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a voice in Congress and state legislatures commensurate with their voting
strength.5 4 8 As a basis for such recommendations, supporters point to the
miserable reapportionment record of most state legislatures over the decades of this century and to the potential conflict of interest in having
members of a legislative body draw their own districts or the districts of
other offices for which they may intend to be candidates.
The line drawn on the map as a district boundary has political impact
regardless of who draws it. The architect of that line, whether a member
of the legislature, a member of a nonpartisan commission, a plaintiff in a
redistricting lawsuit, an assistant United States Attorney, or a state or federal judge, is seldom totally immune from the interplay of competing political and societal policies. 5 49 The alternative placements of each boundary
are infinite; the alternative political results similarly are unlimited. In this
context the Supreme Court recently indicated: "[A] state legislature is the
institution that is by far the best situated to identify and then reconcile
traditional state policies within the constitutionally mandated framework
of substantial population equality. ' 550 With timely notice of the specific
requirements of the reapportionment process and an awareness of the likelihood of judicial review, it is the view of this writer that most state legislators will strive to meet these requirements. This conclusion does not
suggest that legislators will put aside all partisan or personal ambitions or
even that such should be their goal. It does suggest that democracy is at
best a search for proximate solutions to insoluble problems 55' and that the
"insoluble problem" of reconciling interests through reapportionment is
best entrusted to an informed legislative body led by a knowledgeable and
548. See, e.g., Comment, Reapportionment and Minority Politics, 6

COLUM. HUMAN

RIGHTS L. REV. 107, 127-28 (1974); Note, United Jewish Organizations v. Carey and the Need
to RecognizeAggregate Voting Rights, 87 YALE L. REV. 571, 592-602 (1978). But see Note,

Group Representation andRace-ConsciousApportionment: The Role of States and the Federal
Courts, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1847, 1870-73 (1978); Note, ProportionalRepresentation by Race.The Constitutionalityof Benign Racial Redistricting, 74 MICH. L. REV. 820, 838-41 (1976).
See generally Chu, Political Efficacy" The Problems of Money, Race, and Control in the
Schools, 1977 Wis. L. REV. 989.
549. See Skolnick v. Mayor of Chicago, 319 F. Supp. 1219, 1227-28 (N.D. Ill. 1970). In
Skolnick the court concluded "that if it is unconstitutional to inject politics into districting,
there is not a valid districting statute, ordinance or plan in effect in our country." Id. at
1228; accord, Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973) ("politically mindless approach may produce, whether intended or not, the most grossly gerrymandered results").
Even a line drawn by a computer is not void of criticism. As Justice Harlan, in his dissenting opinion in Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542-551 (1969), commented, "[a] computer
may grind out district lines which can totally frustrate the popular will on an overwhelming
number of critical issues."
550. Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407 (1977). For this reason it is important that a person
allegedly aggrieved by an existing or planned apportionment seek redress from the responsible legislative body. Whether the issue is alleged purposeful discrimination in the enactment
or maintenance of an apportionment, a showing that the legislative body was aware of the
impact of the plan and intended wrongful effect may be necessary for a successful challenge.
See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 48 U.S.L.W. 4436 (Apr. 22, 1980).
551. Graves v. Barnes (Graves I), 343 F. Supp. 704, 708 (W.D. Tex.), af'd sub nom.
Archer v. Smith, 409 U.S. 508 (1972), modified sub nom. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755
(1973).
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fair presiding officer. 552
This Article provides these final guidelines to assist in the reapportionment process.
(1) Each state must make a good faith effort to construct legislative
districts of as nearly equal population as is
and congressional
553
practicable;
(2) State constitutions, while subordinate to federal law, can impose
requirements that unless followed will invalidate a state legislative or congressional 554 reapportionment. In Texas, the house of
representatives must be apportioned among the state's counties
555
except as otherwise necessary to comply with federal law.
(3) A state may consider legitimate factors other than population in
reapportionment if these factors produce only minor variations
from population equality and can be shown to result from the
effectuation of a rational state policy. The standard of equality
is stricter than
in population applicable to congressional districts
556
the one applicable to state legislative districts.
or
(4) A state may not reapportion so as to invidiously minimize
557
cancel the voting strength of racial or political elements.
(5) Before any reapportionment may take effect, a state subject to
section 5 of the Voting Rights Act must carry the burden of proving to the United States Attorney General or the District Court
of the District of Columbia that the reapportionment has neither
the purpose nor the effect of denying or abridging the right to
vote on account of race or color. Preparation for carrying this
burden558must begin long before the reapportionment itself is enacted.
(6) A state subject to section 5 of the Voting Rights Act must draw
districts that contain sufficient voting age population of the protected racial minority so as to avoid a retrogression in the position of that minority in its ability to elect candidates of its
choice.5 5 9
(7) Precautions through special rules or procedures should be taken
to assure that the legislative process itself remains fair and allows
sufficient opportunity for access by the general public and the
552. Among the impending "insoluble problems" is the conflict between individual and

group rights. For discussions of this conflict, see Markowitz, Constitutional Challenges to
Gerrymanders, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 845 (1978); authorities cited in note 548 supra. Some
writers foresee the demise, or at least the retardation, of the "one man, one vote" principle
under the Burger Court. This change will be an issue in future reapportionments. See
Leventhal, Courtsand PoliticalThickets, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 345, 352-53 (1977). See generally Comment, The Burger Court and Reapportionment.: From One Person, One Vote to One
Corporation,Many Votes, 62 GEO. L.J. 1001 (1974).
553. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964).
554. Some state constitutions impose requirements on congressional districting. E.g., W.
VA. CONST. art. I, § 4 (providing that each district shall be, as nearly as possible, equal in
population).
555. See Brown v. Saunders, 159 Va. 28, 166 S.E. 105 (1932) (finding a state restriction
on congressional elections valid if not in conflict with federal law).
556. See notes 493-95 supra and accompanying text.
557. See notes 299-375 supra and accompanying text.
558. See notes 477-78 supra and accompanying text.
559. See notes 464-68 supra and accompanying text.
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diverse interest groups affected by reapportionment. 560
(8) Each state legislature should provide for legislative participation
in the submission of the reapportionment enactment to the required federal authorities, if the state is subject to section 5 of the
Voting Rights
Act, and in any litigation concerning the reappor56
tionment. '
(9) Each state legislature should adopt objectively verifiable criteria
to be utilized during the reapportionment process and must carefully establish and document as part of the legislative record the
basis for deviations of a certain degree from the constitutional
norm of population equality or the presence of characteristics of
districting that can have
the effect of diluting the voting strength
562
of minority groups.

560. See notes 544-45 supra and accompanying text.
561. See note 546 supra and accompanying text.
562. See notes 489-529 supra and accompanying text.
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